| dc.contributor.author |
Burns, Justine |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Edwards, Lawrence |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Pauw, Karl |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2014-06-09T12:14:01Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2014-06-09T12:14:01Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013 |
|
| dc.identifier.citation |
Burns, J., Edwards, L. and Pauw, K. (2013). Revisiting Wage Subsidies: How Pro-Poor is a South African Wage Subsidy Likely To Be?, Development Southern Africa, 30(2). |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0376835X.2013.801197#.U5WkavmSz9U |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/11090/712 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
Wage subsidies have been used in both developed and developing countries to raise employment. After a decade of deliberation, the South African Government recently announced the introduction of a wage subsidy scheme. Given the intrinsic link between unemployment and poverty in South Africa, the belief is that a wage subsidy programme sufficient in scope will also make inroads into poverty. However, the way in which jobs are distributed among poor and non-poor jobseekers is crucial. Our general equilibrium microsimulation model confirms the expectation that a higher wage elasticity of labour demand is associated with larger reductions in poverty. We also find that a greater proportion of new jobs accrue to poor jobseekers when the elasticity is high. While youth-targeting does not improve the poverty-reducing effect of the policy, sectors such as textiles, accommodation, and construction services with their pro-poor employment profiles are good candidates for targeting. |
en_US |
| dc.language.iso |
en |
en_US |
| dc.publisher |
Development Southern Africa |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Wage subsidy |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
South Africa |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Employment |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Poverty |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Revisiting wage subsidies: How pro-poor is a South African wage subsidy likely to be? |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Article |
en_US |