

**SECOND CARNEGIE INQUIRY INTO POVERTY  
AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

**The face of rural poverty in Trans-  
kei: Two village socio-economic  
profiles**

**by**

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Nkanga

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Transkei

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COMPARATIVE RURAL PROFILES : NKANGA, NTSHIQO, AND RURAL TRANSKEI.

|  | NKANGA<br>202 | NTSHIQO<br>161 | RURAL TRANSKEI<br>546 800 |
|--|---------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| Number of Households                   |               |                |                           |
| <u>Household Structure. (de jure).</u> |               |                |                           |
| Total Persons                          | 4,76          | 6,54           | 5,30                      |
| Total Males                            | 2,22          | 2,98           | 2,45                      |
| Total Females                          | 2,54          | 3,56           | 2,85                      |
| Under 15                               | 2,08          | 2,51           | 2,01                      |
| Males                                  | 1,02          | 1,16           | 1,02                      |
| Females                                | 1,06          | 1,35           | 0,99                      |
| Manpower (15 - 60)                     | 2,38          | 3,35           | 2,87                      |
| Males                                  | 1,12          | 1,63           | 1,29                      |
| Females                                | 1,26          | 1,72           | 1,58                      |
| Old                                    | 0,30          | 0,68           | 0,42                      |
| Male                                   | 0,09          | 0,19           | 0,14                      |
| Female                                 | 0,21          | 0,49           | 0,28                      |
| Migrants                               | 0,83          | 1,20           | 0,84                      |
| Males                                  | 0,76          | 1,02           | ....                      |
| Females                                | 0,07          | 0,18           | ....                      |
| <u>Household Structure (de facto).</u> |               |                |                           |
| Total Persons                          | 3,93          | 5,27           | 4,56                      |
| Total Males                            | 1,46          | 1,94           | 1,81                      |
| Total Females                          | 2,47          | 3,33           | 2,75                      |
| <u>De Jure Age Structure. (%)</u>      |               |                |                           |
| 0 - 14                                 | 43,70         | 38,38          | 37,92                     |
| 15 - 60                                | 50,00         | 51,22          | 54,16                     |
| 60+                                    | 6,30          | 10,40          | 7,92                      |
| % Males Absent                         | 34,30         | 33,47          | 29,60                     |
| De Facto Male : Female Ratio           | 60            | 61             | 66                        |
| <u>Mortality.</u>                      |               |                |                           |
| Infant                                 | ....          | 320            | 130                       |
| Crude                                  | 54            | 45             | ...                       |
| <u>Fertility</u>                       |               |                |                           |
| All Females Over 14 years              | 139           | 145            | ...                       |
| Females 15 - 49                        | 174           | 193            | 179                       |
| Adjusted                               | 170           | 186            | 179                       |
| Crude                                  | 39            | 56             | ...                       |
| % Females 15 - 49                      | 45,7          | 43,7           | 45,5                      |

| <u>Agriculture and Livestock.</u>  | <u>NKANGA</u> | <u>NISHIQO</u> | <u>RURAL TRANSKEI</u> |
|------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| Average Ownership (per household). |               |                |                       |
| Cattle                             | 2,54          | 2,05           | 2,74                  |
| Sheep                              | 1,26          | 4,73           | 6,49                  |
| Pigs                               | 0,97          | 0,80           | 1,35                  |
| Goats                              | 1,72          | 2,10           | 3,25                  |
| Chickens                           | 4,61          | 5,84           | 6,99                  |
| % Households without :             |               |                |                       |
| Cattle                             | 47,03         | 61,50          | 51,00                 |
| Sheep                              | 88,11         | 70,81          | 66,20                 |
| Pigs                               | 43,06         | 57,76          | 33,70                 |
| Goats                              | 74,75         | 78,26          | 59,90                 |
| Chickens                           | 21,78         | 35,40          | 17,70                 |
| % Landless                         | 23,27         | 28,57          | 33,33                 |
| Average 1982 Maize Yield (bags)    | .....         | 2,39           | 2,04                  |
| % Maize Requirements               | .....         | 29,40          | 24,52                 |
| <u>Income.</u>                     |               |                |                       |
| Per Capita (de facto)              | ....          | 206            | 472                   |
| Mean Household                     | ....          | 1 097          | 2 174                 |
| Median Household                   | ....          | 708            | 900                   |
| Structure Mean (household %)       |               |                |                       |
| Wages                              | ....          | 33,98          | 58,2                  |
| Pensions                           | ....          | 18,50          | 9,1                   |
| Remittances                        | ....          | 45,57          | 30,3                  |
| Other                              | ....          | 1,95           | 2,4                   |
| Gini Index                         | ....          | 0,487          | 0,537                 |

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The primary objective of this paper is to present the results of socio-economic surveys in two rural Transkei villages - Nkanga and Ntshiqo. Despite differences in actual numbers recorded, these surveys reveal largely similar patterns of poverty which are also seen in macro data. Low incomes, small wealth holdings, high child mortality, adult illiteracy and inadequate education show clearly the effects of the apartheid policies on the rural areas of african settlement. Large scale male absenteeism, industrial concentration in mining and dependence on migrant remittances reflect the impact of migrant labour on these communities. Yet, it is a fundamental departure of this paper that these characteristics cannot be understood in isolation from the broader events that shape the political economy of South Africa in the era of Separate Development. The paper also considers aspects of this process in order to locate the processes of change and possible strategies of development.

## 2. SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSKEI'S RURAL AREAS.

The first question that one addresses in studying the homelands concerns the origins and nature of 'homeland economic development'. The details of this history have been extensively explored elsewhere <sup>(1)</sup> and it is sufficient merely to draw out the broad outlines.

It is commonplace to distinguish the 'apartheid' policy followed by the National Party after its electoral victory in 1948, from the earlier policies of racial 'segregation'.<sup>(2)</sup> Similarly, within the apartheid era strategic changes are noted. One useful way of illustrating these changes is by reference to the economic ('development') and political ('control') dimensions of the policy. Legassick (1974 : 23-4), for example, comments that "looked at in retrospect, what is remarkable about the first decade of Nationalist rule is the lack of large scale social change in comparison with the 1960s". During the latter period however, the pace of social change was increased and the Grand Apartheid scheme sketched with ever greater boldness. As Legassick goes on to say, "it



was the Bantustan concept which, at the ideological level, constituted the basic framework beneath which the political and economic dynamic reinforced economic growth and black powerlessness together. For on the one hand, it was consistently argued that government policy was not one of discrimination on the grounds of colour, but of nationhood of different nations..."

Yet, these changes did not emerge in isolation and followed earlier attempts at reconstruction of tribal structure and chiefly authority. The dual dynamics of development are clearly captured by Jansen, Minister for Native Affairs at the passing of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951, who defined the objectives of this central piece of legislation thus :

"to restore tribal life as far as possible by seeing to it that chiefs and the whole tribal government adapt themselves to the exigencies of our times and thereby regain the position of authority which they forfeited to a large extent by their backwardness." (Quoted in Tapscott & Haines, 1983 : 6-7).

In this process of tribal reconstruction in the era of apartheid, primacy was to be given to the functions of rural control. However, it was realised that the long run requirements of racial rule pointed to a minimum of economic development (betterment) to arrest the 'backwardness' of rural life. While there were obvious continuities in the policies, the decision to allow for political independence of the homelands marks a new departure. Geldenhuys (1981 : 11) points out :

"Although it could be argued that the Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act followed logically upon the Bantu Authorities Act (of 1951), the fact remains that the independence held out for the homelands by Verwoerd in 1959 represented a radical new departure."

The present shape of the homeland rural areas is closely linked to the radical speeding up of the dynamics of separate development. What accounts for this change in policy? The fundamental viewpoint of this paper is that explanation of the emergence of separate development must be located against the emergent contradictions of capitalist development and the internal and international oppositions to white supremacy in South Africa. (Southall, 1982 : 21).

## 2.1 Capitalism and the 'Reserves'.

The first type of explanation of the dynamics and rhythms of homeland 'development' lies at the level of the capitalist mode of production and its reproductive requirements. Two levels of explanation are offered here. Firstly, the relationship between the reproductive requirements of the capitalist mode, spatially located in the 'white' urban areas, and those of the precapitalist mode in the african reserves. Under this head we understand the process of subsidisation of african migrant wages by confining the reproduction of the household to the 'reserves'. The penetration of capitalist agriculture, which would have caused widespread proletarianisation, was arrested by limitations on land ownership and migrant labour was elicited through a variety of measures which served to turn the effort price of crop production in favour of wage labour. (cf Bundy, 1979). Over time, however, the mechanisms designed to elicit labour served also to undermine the ability of the reserves to subsidise migrant wages. The ability of the reserves to provide a constant share of household subsistence requirements was dependent on the out-migration of 'surplus' population to relieve pressure on the resource base. (Simkins, 1980) Thus, between 1904 and 1951 the african urban population increased 5,6 times and a peak annual growth rate of 6,6% was recorded between 1946 and 1951. This lead to increased pressures to implement the so-called Stallard Doctrine according to which 'the native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to minister to the needs of the white man and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister.' and between 1948 and 1959 the annual number of convictions under the pass laws increased from 176 100 to 413 600. (Wilson, 1972 : 232). Underdevelopment and urban opposition are thus viewed as the direct outcome of the articulation between the modes of production and the contradictions that it throws up.

Secondly, capitalist development is relative to the reserves due to contradictions thrown up by capital accumulation within the capitalist mode itself. Here the most important feature is the transition from a labour shortage to a labour surplus economy with mass structural unemployment due to the increased capital intensity throughout the

economy, and especially, agriculture. Increased application of machinery to the production process slows the rate of job creation and changes the type of labour required in favour of skilled and operative labour. This has brought forth tendencies to 'stabilise' labour, incorporate trade unions, raise wages and reduce the demand for unskilled (migrant) labour. Increased use of machinery in agriculture and declining agricultural labour demand is a key factor in understanding the ending of labour tenancy and the resettlement of nearly two million people out of the 'white' rural areas into the homelands.

The combined effect of rural underdevelopment and the generation of a population 'surplus' to the reproductive requirements of capitalism, who are to be confined to the homelands through the various labour and population mobility controls, concentrates poverty and powerlessness in what can only be regarded as rural ghettos. While in the early phases of capitalist development, rural african poverty may have been viewed with a certain ambiguity as it increased the supply of migrant labour, this is no longer the case and a certain amount of 'homeland development', primarily betterment and industrial decentralisation, is encouraged to keep africans out of the urban areas. In Wolpe's (1972) words separate development can be viewed as :

"the attempt to retain, in a modified form, the structure of the 'traditional' societies, not, as in the past, for the purposes of ensuring an economic supplement to the wages of the migrant labour force, but for the purposes of reproducing and exercising control over a cheap African industrial labour force, in or near the homelands, not by means of preserving the pre-capitalist mode of production but by the political, social, economic and ideological enforcement of low levels of subsistence."

However, while analysis in terms of the dynamics (i.e. functionality) of the capitalist mode of production is illustrative of much of South African history, it would be incorrect to reduce separate development to capitalist development. This requires an examination of the more explicitly racial dimensions of apartheid.

## 2.2. African Nationalist Opposition.

The second reason for the emergence of Separate Development as the organising framework lies in the increased levels of african opposition to exclusion from the central political apparatus. The defiance campaigns, bannings, shootings, and detentions of african nationalists and their organisations showed both the increased levels of opposition and the determination of the Nationalist government to maintain power at whatever cost. However, it was clear to Verwoerd that power could not be maintained by naked force alone and he cryptically noted that 'leadership in a democracy is not retained by means of pious words. It depends on numbers'. (Quoted by Geldenhuys, 1981 : 14). By positing the homelands as the political, and, at that stage, residential home of all africans, it was hoped to diffuse the united claims of african nationalism. Yet, as Charton (1976 : 63) notes :

"There is a political law which states that in the long run those who are keen to rule must produce political and material satisfaction for those over whom they rule or face up to political turbulence and instability."

If the homelands were to achieve any credibility as socio-political entities, a certain amount of economic development was necessary. In practice the 'carrot' of homeland economic development was always constrained by the requirements of rapid economic development in the white core as the material basis of white supremacy. Thus up until 1968 and the Promotion of the Economic Development of the Homelands Act, white industrial capital was effectively banned from the homelands. Such 'development' as occurred being largely confined to the buying up of white trading stores and the expansion of homeland bureaucracies. As Lombard (1981), economic adviser to the Prime Minister notes :

"The strategic planners focussed on the gigantic Orange River development programme which took up the temporary scope for resource expenditure but contributed relatively little to the creation of permanent employment and income generating capacity. The benefit cost index of this venture seems to have turned out to be very low....(H)ad these resources been applied to a number of human or physical infrastructural projects in the so-called black

homelands, the country would have reaped greater economic and political dividends..." (Quoted in Gillmore and Muller, 1982 : 8).

As a result, despite impressive growth rate achievements since the early 1960's, the homelands only increased their share of South African GDP from 2,6% to 3,6% between 1955 and 1980. Furthermore, an examination of the economic structure reveals little support for any 'autonomous' development policy. (vid. Muller, 1982).

### 2.3 International Opposition.

The third consideration in promoting economic development in the homelands was provided by the increased international opposition to South Africa's internal racial policies. In a meeting between the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarsjold, and Verwoerd in 1961, international opposition to the homelands policy was emphasised. However, it was conceded that Separate Development might be accepted provided that sufficient land was allocated to the homelands, 'radical' industrial development occurred, and restrictions on africans living outside the homelands were lifted.

### 2.4. Separate Development and Rural Transkei.

The above sections reveal clearly that homeland economic development has been ruled more by political than 'development' considerations. The ensuing combination of tightened influx controls and rural underdevelopment serve to lock the rural population of Transkei into a world of human and ecological degradation. Homeland economic development remains largely an ideological device to hide the face of rural poverty behind a facade of 'development'. After a century of rapid economic development the rural areas are largely marginalised as can be seen from the following indicators :

- 66% of the adult population is illiterate;
- two thirds of rural households earned less than the rural household subsistence level of R 1 509 in 1982;
- tuberculosis is rife and the greatest adult killer;
- two thirds of the male labour force is absent as migrant labour;

-child mortality rates range up to 261 per thousand in Tabankulu and averaged 190 for Transkei as a whole. It is against this background that the results of the surveys, micro studies of macro trends, are presented.

### 3. THE SURVEYS.

Both Nkanga and Ntshiqo have been resettled. Both are about 50 kms from Umtata and are near to smaller towns. The Nkanga survey was conducted in April 1983 and the Ntshiqo survey in January 1984. In Nkanga, all households were interviewed, while in Ntshiqo the coverage was about 90%. The questionnaires were broadly comparable although the Ntshiqo questionnaire included a number of extra questions. Unfortunately, the income and yield data for Nkanga is particularly suspect and it has been excluded from the data reproduced in the appended tables. The tables are fairly self explanatory and only the most salient features are highlighted in the discussion. Finally, although the data is presented comparatively, the intention is to show common trends rather than explain differences.

#### 3.1. Demographic Characteristics.

The basic household demographic data are collected in table 1 which reveals an average household size of 4,76 persons in Nkanga and 6,54 in Ntshiqo compared with an average size of 5,30 persons for the rural areas as a whole. A noticeable feature of the age structure is the relatively large percentage of children, although Ntshiqo's population is older than that of Nkanga. The effect of migrant labour on both villages is clear with 34,30% of Nkanga's males and 33,47% of Ntshiqo's male population absent. This is higher than the average for Transkei's rural areas. The gender selectivity of migration is revealed in the de facto masculinity ratios of 60 males per 100 women in Nkanga and 61 in Ntshiqo. In the manpower age groups, male absenteeism reaches as high as 93,6% in Nkanga and 86,4% in Ntshiqo.

Table 1 : Household Demography.

|                 | Nkanga | Ntshiq | Rural |
|-----------------|--------|--------|-------|
| <u>De Jure</u>  |        |        |       |
| Total           | 4,76   | 6,54   | 5,30  |
| Males           | 2,22   | 2,98   | 2,45  |
| Female          | 2,54   | 3,56   | 2,85  |
| <u>Migrants</u> | 0,83   | 1,20   | 0,84  |
| <u>De Facto</u> |        |        |       |
| % 0 - 14        | 43,70  | 38,38  | 37,92 |
| % 15 - 59       | 50,00  | 51,22  | 54,16 |
| % 59+           | 6,30   | 10,40  | 7,92  |
| % Males Absent  | 34,30  | 33,47  | 29,60 |
| Masculinity     | 60     | 61     | 66    |

Population dynamics can be gauged on the basis of fertility and mortality compared in table 2. Perhaps the clearest indicator of the poverty of rural life is provided by the mortality figures. Infant mortality figures were not available for Nkanga, but in Ntshiq, the figure for 1983, perhaps distorted by the drought, was 16 deaths in 50 births, or 32 percent. This is much higher than the average figure of 130/1 000 obtained in a survey by Irwig in 12 magisterial districts in 1982. The crude mortality rates were 54/1 000 and 45/1 000 in Nkanga and Ntshiq respectively.

The crude fertility rates were 36/1 000 and 56/1 000 respectively. The lower rate in Nkanga is perhaps surprising given the higher percentage of women in the fertile cohort between 15 and 49 years of age and, when adjusted for the different female age structures, is even lower than the rate of 179 births per 1 000 females 15 - 49 used in the projections of Transkei's population. (vid. Muller, 1983). Ntshiq's rates, on the other hand are consistently higher than those in both Nkanga and rural Transkei. Perhaps most interestingly, the net rate of natural increase was -15/1 000 in Nkanga and 11/1

000 in Ntshiqo, far lower than the projected growth rate of 2,7% for Transkei as a whole.<sup>(3)</sup>

Table 2 : Fertility and Mortality

|                     | Nkanga | Ntshiqo | Rural |
|---------------------|--------|---------|-------|
| <u>Mortality</u>    |        |         |       |
| Infant              | ....   | 320     | 190   |
| Crude               | 54     | 45      | ...   |
| <u>Fertility</u>    |        |         |       |
| % Females 15 - 49   | 45,7   | 43,7    | 45,5  |
| All Females over 14 | 139    | 145     | ....  |
| Females 15 - 49     | 174    | 193     | 179   |
| Adjusted            | 170    | 186     | 179   |
| Crude               | 39     | 56      | ....  |

Based on the demographic data, we note that the populations of these two villages are subject to high mortality, fertility and migration rates.

### 3.2. Social Characteristics.

Unfortunately only education data is available for Nkanga and these indicate an adult rate of illiteracy of about 50%. This is comparable with the rate of 46,37% found in Ntshiqo. In Ntshiqo, 21,24% of the population was economically active (i.e. earning money incomes). Participation rates varied greatly by gender. 83,41% of the potential male labour supply was economically active compared with 14,44% for females. 84,23% of this workforce worked as migrant labour either inside Transkei (14,82%) or outside. Reflecting the dominance of migrant employment, 49,17% of the male labour force worked in mining. Women on the other hand, were predominantly employed in services and commerce. Occupationally, the workforce was squeezed towards the bottom of the scale with 53,89% classified as labourers.



### 3.3. Agriculture.

The question of access to land is fairly difficult to gauge ( vid Baskin, 1984). Some ambiguity arises as some households may confuse homestead gardens, available to practically all households, with fields for dry land farming. However, based on the responses, 23,27% of households in Mkanga and 28,57% in Ntshiq claimed to have no arable land. This compares favourably with the figure of 33% for the South West region of Transkei. (Hawkins Associates, 1984). Once again information on agricultural practices is not available for Mkanga. Data for Ntshiq is compiled in tables 3 to 5.

TABLE 3 : TYPES OF CROPS PLANTED 1981 - 1983

|                     | 1983   |                       | 1982   |                       | 1981   |                       |
|---------------------|--------|-----------------------|--------|-----------------------|--------|-----------------------|
| Fields Planted      | 123    |                       | 107    |                       | 117    |                       |
| Households Planting | 109    |                       | 93     |                       | 102    |                       |
| CROPS               | NUMBER | % PLANTING HOUSEHOLDS | NUMBER | % PLANTING HOUSEHOLDS | NUMBER | % PLANTING HOUSEHOLDS |
| Maize               | 108    | 99,08                 | 90     | 96,77                 | 102    | 100,00                |
| Spinach             | 2      | 1,83                  | 1      | 1,08                  | 1      | 0,98                  |
| Onions              | 1      | 0,92                  | 0      | 0,00                  | 0      | 0,00                  |
| Beans               | 85     | 77,98                 | 72     | 77,47                 | 86     | 84,31                 |
| Pumpkins            | 67     | 61,47                 | 55     | 59,14                 | 68     | 66,67                 |
| Potatoes            | 3      | 2,75                  | 0      | 0,00                  | 4      | 3,92                  |
| Sorghum             | 19     | 17,43                 | 36     | 40,00                 | 41     | 40,20                 |

Table 3 reveals that almost all households plant maize in their fields. Other common crops are beans and pumpkins. Yield information, compiled in tables 4 and 5, is likely to be considerably distorted by the drought conditions over the past few years and the percentage of 'green' crops consumed. Nevertheless, a number of points do emerge.



**TABLE 5 : SELECTED CROP YIELDS BY HARVEST YEAR**

|                              | MAIZE |       | SORGHUM |       | BEANS |       |
|------------------------------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------|-------|
|                              | 1983  | 1982  | 1982    | 1982  | 1983  | 1982  |
| Number of Households         | 161   | 161   | 161     | 161   | 161   | 161   |
| Did Not Plant                | 71    | 59    | 125     | 115   | 89    | 73    |
| % Did Not Plant              | 44,10 | 36,68 | 77,64   | 71,43 | 55,28 | 45,34 |
| % No Yield                   | 73,29 | 49,69 | 84,47   | 74,53 | 82,61 | 70,19 |
| Village Yield (Bags)         | 121   | 384   | 46      | 103   | 28    | 42    |
| Average Per Household (Bags) | 0,75  | 2,39  | 0,29    | 0,63  | 0,17  | 0,26  |
| Average Per Planter (Bags)   | 1.34  | 3,76  | 1,28    | 2,22  | 0,39  | 0,48  |
| Average Per Harvester (Bags) | 2,81  | 4,74  | 1,85    | 2,51  | 1,00  | 0,88  |

Firstly, many of those that do plant crops suffer crop failure. Thus in the harvest of 1982, 20,6% of maize, 10,87% of sorghum, and 45,45% of bean growers received no yield. Secondly, primarily as a result of the drought, these figures increased in 1983 to 52,21% (maize), 31,56% (sorghum) and 61,11% (beans) respectively. Thirdly, the average maize yield for Ntshiq in 1982 was 2,39 bags which accounts for 29,40% of the estimated annual maize requirement after adjustment for family size. (This is slightly more than the average found in the South West of 24,52%). Finally, due to the differential access to land and agricultural inputs, there are large differences in actual crop shares which can easily be lost sight of when talking of averages. In 1982, 59 households did not plant maize at all. A further 21 households received no yield, while the average harvester received 4,74 bags. More than fifty percent of the harvest was collected by only 20% of households.

#### 3.4. Livestock.

The structural insecurity of most rural households means that strong reliance is made on livestock holdings as a buffer against unemployment or disability. However, as tables 6 and 7 show, average holdings are small and many households own none of the major stock types. Given the importance of cattle in rural life, the small cattle holdings are a very clear indication of the poverty of many communities. Table 6 contains comparative average ownership figures.

Table 6 : Average Stock Ownership Per Household.

| Type     | Nkanga | Ntshiq | Rural |
|----------|--------|--------|-------|
| Cattle   | 2,54   | 2,05   | 2,74  |
| Sheep    | 1,26   | 4,73   | 6,49  |
| Pigs     | 0,97   | 0,80   | 1,35  |
| Goats    | 1,72   | 2,10   | 3,25  |
| Chickens | 4,61   | 5,84   | 6,99  |

Both villages report smaller average holdings than the figures derived from a survey in the South West. Perhaps surprisingly, Mkanga has larger cattle holdings. Part of the reason for this is that the Mkanga survey was held in April 1983 before the worst period of drought in Transkei, whereas the Mshiqo survey occurred after the drought. However, once again, average figures mask sharp disparities in ownership, as can be seen in table 7 which shows the percentage of households that do not own certain stock types.

Table 7 : % Households without Certain Stock Types.

| Type     | Mkanga | Mshiqo | Rural |
|----------|--------|--------|-------|
| Cattle   | 47,03  | 61,50  | 51,00 |
| Sheep    | 88,11  | 70,81  | 66,20 |
| Pigs     | 43,06  | 57,76  | 33,70 |
| Goats    | 74,75  | 78,26  | 59,90 |
| Chickens | 21,78  | 35,40  | 17,70 |

based on these results it seems reasonable to hypothesise that perhaps 50% of rural households do not own cattle.

### 3.5. Income.

Income data must be approached with some caution as there are reasons for hiding the true extent and sources of income. In the case of Mkanga, they were so poor that they have been excluded from this discussion. Table 8 contains the income data for Mshiqo and it raises a number of points which were also found in the Income and Expenditure Survey conducted in 1982. (vid table A.31).

The average annual income per household<sup>(4)</sup> was R 1 097,04. 33,98% of this was contributed by wages earned in or near Mshiqo, and only 1,95% from sale of subsistence production and craftwork. Perhaps most importantly, 45,57% of income came from migrant remittances and 18,50% from pensions, showing clearly that Mshiqo fills a reproductive rather than

TABLE 8 : NTSHIQO HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY SOURCE

| ANNUAL INCOME<br>INCOME<br>(R) | NUMBER OF<br>HOUSEHOLDS | % HOUSEHOLDS | % CUMULATIVE<br>HOUSEHOLDS | AVERAGE<br>INCOME<br>(R) | % WAGE<br>INCOME | % PENSION<br>INCOME | % REMITTANCE<br>INCOME | % OTHER | NUMBER OF<br>HOUSEHOLDS<br>BELOW AVERAGE |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------|--|
| 0- 299                         | 26                      | 16,15        | 16,15                      | 86,76                    | 10,65            | 0,0                 | 57,40                  | 31,95   | 15                                       |
| 300- 599                       | 37                      | 22,98        | 39,13                      | 468,96                   | 14,05            | 38,78               | 41,30                  | 6,47    | 17                                       |
| 600- 899                       | 24                      | 14,90        | 54,03                      | 719,52                   | 29,74            | 20,08               | 38,91                  | 11,27   | 9  |
| 900-1 199                      | 26                      | 16,15        | 70,18                      | 1 033,80                 | 9,60             | 30,32               | 58,76                  | 1,32    | 12                                       |
| 1 200-1 499                    | 24                      | 14,90        | 85,08                      | 1 319,52                 | 12,92            | 27,77               | 59,31                  | 0,00    | 14                                       |
| 1 500-1 799                    | 6                       | 3,73         | 88,81                      | 1 716,60                 | 18,06            | 22,68               | 59,26                  | 0,00    | 3  |
| 1 800-2 399                    | 6                       | 3,73         | 92,54                      | 2 064,00                 | 0,00             | 9,40                | 90,60                  | 0,00    | 2  |
| 2 400-2 999                    | 6                       | 3,73         | 96,27                      | 2 510,04                 | 42,23            | 6,37                | 51,40                  | 0,00    | 4  |
| 3 000+                         | 6                       | 3,73         | 100,00                     | 7 368,00                 | 84,65            | 2,69                | 12,98                  | 0,00    | 4  |
| TOTAL                          | 161                     | 100,00       |                            | 1 097,04                 | 33,98            | 18,50               | 45,57                  | 1,95    | 108                                      |

productive space. Poverty is extreme with more than 85% of families falling below the rural subsistence level.<sup>15</sup> Besides the generalised poverty, however, inequality is also quite severe. The median income is only R 708 and the Gini index of income concentration 0,487.

### 3.6. Overview.

The picture which emerges from the data are of two villages subject to extreme poverty and inequality. Dependence on migrant labour is high and this distorts both the family structure and the perception of opportunities for children and the community. In the next sections a few cursory observations on existing community organisations and aspirations are made.

## 4. RURAL ORGANISATION.

The structure of rural organisation is important in determining the development potential within a particular community. While this is a much neglected area of research, and the data presented here is drawn largely from interviews held at Nkanga, a general impression is that the heritage of Bantu Authorities is strong in many areas, and may have been re-inforced since independence. As a result the chief/ headman is central to all organisation and many of the committees are dominated by old men - despite the fact that women are often the effective heads of rural households. In this section a description of Nkanga is given.

The village is divided into 5 wards headed by a ward leader (u Nondlu) who is usually the head of the dominant clan. The dominance of a clan is generally ascribed to the fact that it was established in the locale prior to the other clans. An additional 8 men, nominated by the chief of the area, act as advisers to the ward leaders. Each ward leader is responsible for the affairs of his particular ward, although his authority is extremely limited and matters of import are referred to the usibonda (Since Nkanga has no headmen) for referral to the chief. The chief's decision is final and binding, and

according to those interviewed, is never challenged. Similarly, the representatives of the chief or his emissaries (abathunywa : those sent) are not questioned when speaking on his behalf.

In addition to the formal "traditional" structure, several committees have been elected to oversee activities of common concern to the community. These include a church committee, a clinic committee, a TB patient committee, a school committee and an IMDS development committee. Election to these committees is generally undertaken democratically although certain categories of people are seldom elected e.g those without their own unzi (homestead) as well as the amaqaba (illiterate 'red blanket' people). The chief retains the right to nominate members to all committees who keep him informed of any decisions that are made.

It is apparent that a constant flow of information is central to the chief's means of control since little that is spoken of or undertaken at Nkanga does so without his knowledge. It is evident moreover that he has a network of informers, abancetezi who are not generally known to the community but who provide information on any undesirable behaviour. The existence of informers amongst their ranks, however, does create an atmosphere of fear and suspicion amongst community members and few are prepared to talk about, still less, to criticise the rule of their chief.

Reviewing patterns of social organisation in Nkanga is problematic due to the superficiality of information currently available. What is apparent nevertheless is the centrality of the chief in all affairs of the village, and in this his authority appears more centralised than in other districts of Transkei. The chief has for example appointed no headmen for the administrative area in which Nkanga is situated and deals directly with the community through his representatives or through the usibonda,<sup>6</sup> who as indicated, has no effective powers himself. Thus while there is an element of local democracy in the elected committees this is extremely limited and issue specific, and all decisions must, in any event, in the final instance be ratified by the chief



himself. The net effect of this centralisation of authority and decision making (underpinned by a range of co-ercive mechanisms)<sup>(7)</sup> - is a low level of community confidence and in certain instances, resignation and fatalism. The inability to challenge what are generally perceived by the community to be malpractices is for example reflected in an interview with a resident questioned about bribery and irregular practices of land allocation.

Q. "Do the people complain about that?"

A. "No, they cannot complain, there is nowhere they can complain to. Even if they can try to complain about it, they know their complaint can never be attended to. People cannot complain against the usibonda because he represents the Chief".

The seeming inability of rural communities in Transkei to articulate grievances or to mobilise opposition within their ranks to confront perceived injustices, would appear especially prevalent at Nkanga; but as indicated elsewhere (Tapscott, Haines et al.) this is to be expected, given the nature of social control currently operating in these areas.

##### 5. COMMUNITY ASPIRATIONS - SOME IMPRESSIONS

The attempt to determine aspirational patterns in any community is at best a highly speculative exercise and no less so in a rural village in Transkei. As such the evidence available to date is extremely impressionistic and can not be assumed to represent the general views of the people of Nkanga or even of specific categories within that community.

The majority of respondents at Nkanga indicated a desire to remain in the village provided they could generate sufficient income off the land or provided alternative work opportunities became available. It must be stated however that this view is occasioned as much by the lack of any viable alternative as by a genuine desire to remain on the land as can be seen in the response of a 26 year old male migrant :

- Q. "How is life here in the rural areas compared with life in town?"
- A. "We like to stay here because we cannot say we do not like it, since we were born and grew up here"
- Q. "What is it that you actually like here?"
- A. "We know of no other place in which we can live, except this one".
- Q. "Why do you leave this place and go and work in Johannesburg then?"
- A. "We go to Johannesburg to seek money because there is no work here. If there was work here we wouldn't bother to go to Johannesburg. We go to Johannesburg only to get money because, without money, we cannot survive here since there are now few cattle with which we can plough our lands. We use the money for hiring tractors and so on. It is only through fear that we believe Marga is the only place we can live in. We are afraid to go and establish ourselves at some other places."

Those interviewed indicated an understandable desire to improve their material standing in life and to rise above the level of abject poverty, but many had no conception of how this could be achieved :

"My husband died in 1966. I am now experiencing difficulties in supporting my two children. I haven't got a field although I have a kraalsite. I only depend on my mother's pension money which she gets from the government. We share the money because she has her own house and I am staying at my own house. I am not working. If I could get work, the first thing that I would try would be to look for a field, even before building a decent house. Livestock would then

follow later. All that would only be achieved when I was working. Now I am in complete darkness. I do not know what can help me".

Other individuals interviewed put their hopes on their children, and as such strive to provide for their education :

"Sometimes (my husband) does not work because of ill-health he has no job. I also do not have a substantial building something which I have been wishing for a lifetime. Such things are the things which do not make me happy at all".

Q. "Are there any other plans which you can try in order to overcome this situation?"

A. "I have no other plans at all. I can only be saved from this situation when my children reach the stage when they can go to work."

However, while the large increases in migrant recruitment and wages from Transkei during the 1970's provided a material basis for the large sacrifices made by rural households to educate their children, these trends are unlikely to continue and even those that reach std 7, the highest class at Mkanga's only school, are unlikely to obtain jobs.

Redundant and unemployed workers appear to be the most susceptible to despair. Having been forced through economic pressure to undertake wage employment and having generated relatively large incomes, they are suddenly cut off from any prospect of advance and the gap between expectations and circumstances is relatively large. Thus one unemployed former migrant had this to say :

"I have been staying here for four years now without work but I cannot think of anywhere else where I can go....I cannot say anything about my future now because my heart is now 'dead' since I am not working. But when I was working, all that I was concerned with was wealth in the form of cattle. Livestock was going to help me in times of starvation and illness because I was going to sell

some of my stock. Now, I never achieved that. I am just staying here hopelessly and doing nothing".

Although no in depth interviews on aspirations and perceptions of poverty were conducted in Ntshigo, interviewers were instructed to write down additional comments and impressions. The following three quotations indicate comparability with the situation in Nkanga :

"He never sent any money since he went away and he has never come back. I don't know whether he's alive or dead." (Mother of three on the migration of her husband).

"I am in a bad situation of being unemployed since I lost my job in Vereeniging in 1982. And being responsible for the survival of the whole family I have to sell my stock". (38 year old illiterate male.)

"Since we are all of us not learned and therefore illiterate, we only depend on this land of our forefathers for a living. We have nowhere to go, we can't read and write, so we can't get employment anywhere. So can't we be assisted in improving our only means of survival the land because some of us are unable to pay for the expenses." (Unemployed male head of an 8 person household).

## 6. CONCLUSIONS.

In this paper we have considered the face of rural poverty in Transkei on the basis of information collected in two villages. These micro studies revealed well the macro processes of underdevelopment and powerlessness which seem to place an overwhelming burden on rural families in the homelands. The debilitation of migrant labour, land degradation, and generalised poverty could be seen in the low incomes, small subsistence agricultural production, and ownership - or, rather, lack of ownership - of livestock. An important point to note though, is that even the poverty revealed by average characteristics hides a far more pitiful sight when distributions are examined

indicating that inequality too is a problem. Yet, as could be seen from the introductory section on the historical determinants of Separate Development, the explanation of the economic dimensions of poverty lay outside of the villages.

The second issue examined was that of rural organisation. This showed clearly the dominance of the chiefly structures set up under the Bantu Authorities system and aimed primarily at controlling rather than developing the rural population. The result was widespread suspicion and a certain fatalism. The mobilisation of the community under these conditions is likely to prove problematic.

Perceptions of poverty and rural aspirations were also examined illustratively. Widespread awareness of the difficulty of rural life and the dependence on migrant employment was noted. Most seemed to see their futures in the village although this was born out of a feeling of resignation and defeat in the face of the structural insecurity of apartheid, rather than a positive view of life in the rural areas.

Although this issue was not dealt with directly in any depth in the text one might, in conclusion, venture a thought on the trajectory of rural development in an independent Transkei. As was pointed out in the introductory sections of this paper, homeland development has been mediated by the goals of white supremacy and capitalist development. In this process the goals of control have always dominated the needs of homeland development. The contradiction between these two goals is well captured by Southall (1982 : 37) in the case of land tenure reform, a prerequisite for agricultural development :

"extensive reform of the existing land tenure system would undermine the political structure of Bantu Authorities, under which chiefs play a central role in the allocation of land and other material resources. The introduction of freehold title would act as a corrosive upon chiefly authority, with the distributive function being transferred to the forces of an impersonal market."

In the past the resistance of the chiefs has been one of the key forces blocking land

reform. However, as the economic marginalisation of the rural population increases, so too will the demand for the Transkei state to do something. This is well captured by the observation of a widowed household head in Ntshiqo who had this to say on the future of the rural areas :

"First of all, the government should see to it that all people are cared for equally. Not only those who are close to the chiefs or headmen, but the ones in need. The government must also understand that not all the people have the means to cultivate, especially after this drought, because now everybody lacks confidence in the fields and the process itself, so there must be other means for survival. What should the widows, the sick, and the childless do?"

As land becomes less important and people depend more on pensions and migrants for survival, the material base of chiefly authority is undermined. Much will depend on how this disaffection is mobilised and how the chiefs respond to the pincer in which they are caught.

#### Notes.

1) Vid. Southall, 1982. Wolpe, 1972 and Legassick, 1974.

2) Vid. Wolpe 1972. However, it should be noted that a variety of explanations for the more 'repressive' development have been given. (vid. Moerdijk, 1981).

3) The determinants of rural mortality and fertility are little explored. However Table A.4 in the appendix gives the age and cause of death for Ntshiqo. This reveals that 49% of deaths occurred in the 0 - 5 age group. Of the classifiable answers, 25% were stomach diseases, 16,7% measles, and 8% T.B. The next largest group of deaths were in the old group over 65 years of age where a quarter of the deaths occurred. 2/3 of these deaths were attributed to T.B which is endemic in the rural areas.

4) The definition of 'household' and 'family' is quite problematic in the rural areas

due to traditions of kinship and community obligation. Members of the household in kinship comprised all those 'usually' resident on the plot. For the purposes of the income figures migrants have been excluded from consumption and only their remittances taken into account. It should also be noted that the estimation of remittances is probably too low as only about one half of remittances are sent directly in cash. The rest come home with the migrant in cash and kind or may be remitted through recruiting agents.

5) Potgieter (1982) estimated the rural subsistence level in Transkei at R 1 509 in 1982.

6) The usibonda acts as a headman, though without the equivalent status or any form of government remuneration. His primary function would appear to be as intermediary between people and the chief. He for example, has the right to summons all inhabitants to a meeting if the matter at hand affects the community.

7) See Tapscott, Haines et al. "The Silence of Poverty - Networks of Social Control in Rural Transkei" for a discussion of these mechanisms.

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TABLE A.1: AGE STRUCTURE (NUMBERS)

| AGE     | DE JURE |      |        | DE FACTO |      |        | MIGRANT |      |        |
|---------|---------|------|--------|----------|------|--------|---------|------|--------|
|         | TOTAL   | MALE | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE | FEMALE | TOTAL   | MALE | FEMALE |
| 0 - 4   | 126     | 56   | 70     | 126      | 56   | 70     | 0       | 0    | 0      |
| 5 - 9   | 149     | 65   | 84     | 149      | 65   | 84     | 0       | 0    | 0      |
| 10 - 14 | 122     | 64   | 58     | 122      | 64   | 58     | 0       | 0    | 0      |
| 15 - 19 | 119     | 64   | 55     | 109      | 55   | 54     | 10      | 9    | 1      |
| 20 - 24 | 95      | 40   | 55     | 64       | 12   | 52     | 31      | 28   | 3      |
| 25 - 29 | 86      | 45   | 41     | 44       | 10   | 34     | 42      | 35   | 7      |
| 30 - 34 | 57      | 28   | 29     | 27       | 4    | 23     | 30      | 24   | 6      |
| 35 - 39 | 48      | 23   | 25     | 27       | 5    | 22     | 21      | 18   | 3      |
| 40 - 44 | 49      | 23   | 26     | 27       | 4    | 23     | 22      | 19   | 3      |
| 45 - 49 | 33      | 20   | 13     | 19       | 6    | 13     | 14      | 14   | 0      |
| 50 - 54 | 39      | 14   | 25     | 34       | 10   | 24     | 5       | 4    | 1      |
| 55 - 59 | 19      | 14   | 5      | 13       | 8    | 5      | 6       | 6    | 0      |
| 60 - 64 | 69      | 17   | 52     | 65       | 13   | 52     | 4       | 4    | 0      |
| 64+     | 34      | 14   | 20     | 32       | 12   | 20     | 2       | 2    | 0      |
| TOTAL   | 1 045   | 487  | 558    | 858      | 324  | 534    | 187     | 163  | 24     |

TABLE A.2: NTSHIQO AGE STRUCTURE AND MIGRATION RATES

| AGES    | DE JURE |        |        | DE FACTO |        |        | MIGRANTS |        |        | TOTAL<br>MIGRATION<br>RATE % | DE FACTO<br>MALE<br>FEMALE<br>RATIO |
|---------|---------|--------|--------|----------|--------|--------|----------|--------|--------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
|         | TOTAL   | MALE   | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE   | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE   | FEMALE |                              |                                     |
| 0 - 4   | 12.06   | 11.70  | 12.54  | 14.68    | 17.28  | 13.11  | 0        | 0      | 0      | 0                            | 80                                  |
| 5 - 9   | 14.26   | 13.35  | 15.05  | 17.36    | 20.06  | 15.73  | 0        | 0      | 0      | 0                            | 77                                  |
| 10 - 14 | 11.67   | 13.14  | 10.39  | 14.21    | 19.75  | 10.86  | 0        | 0      | 0      | 0                            | 91                                  |
| 15 - 19 | 11.39   | 13.14  | 9.86   | 12.70    | 16.98  | 10.11  | 5.35     | 5.52   | 4.17   | 14.06                        | 102                                 |
| 20 - 24 | 9.09    | 8.21   | 9.86   | 7.46     | 3.70   | 9.74   | 16.58    | 17.18  | 12.50  | 70.00                        | 23                                  |
| 25 - 29 | 8.23    | 9.24   | 7.35   | 5.13     | 3.09   | 6.37   | 22.46    | 21.47  | 29.17  | 77.78                        | 29                                  |
| 30 - 34 | 5.45    | 5.75   | 5.20   | 3.15     | 1.23   | 4.31   | 16.04    | 14.72  | 25.00  | 85.71                        | 17                                  |
| 35 - 39 | 4.59    | 4.72   | 4.48   | 3.15     | 1.54   | 4.12   | 11.23    | 11.04  | 12.50  | 78.26                        | 23                                  |
| 40 - 44 | 4.69    | 4.52   | 4.66   | 3.15     | 1.23   | 4.31   | 11.76    | 11.66  | 12.50  | 86.36                        | 17                                  |
| 45 - 49 | 3.16    | 4.11   | 2.33   | 2.21     | 1.85   | 2.43   | 7.49     | 8.59   | 0      | 70.00                        | 46                                  |
| 50 - 54 | 3.73    | 2.88   | 4.48   | 3.96     | 3.09   | 4.49   | 2.67     | 2.45   | 4.16   | 28.57                        | 42                                  |
| 55 - 59 | 1.82    | 2.87   | 0.90   | 1.52     | 2.47   | 0.94   | 3.21     | 3.68   | 0      | 42.86                        | 160                                 |
| 60 - 64 | 6.60    | 3.49   | 9.32   | 7.58     | 4.01   | 9.74   | 2.14     | 2.46   | 0      | 23.53                        | 25                                  |
| 64+     | 3.26    | 2.88   | 3.58   | 3.74     | 3.71   | 3.75   | 1.07     | 1.23   | 0      | 14.29                        | 60                                  |
| TOTAL   | 100.00  | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00   | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00   | 100.00 | 100.00 | 33.47                        | 61                                  |

TABLE A.3: AREA OF WORK OF MIGRANTS

| AREA OF WORK                     | NUMBER |        |       | %     |        |       |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|-------|-------|--------|-------|
|                                  | MALE   | FEMALE | TOTAL | MALE  | FEMALE | TOTAL |
| Major Metropolitan Areas of S.A. | 94     | 11     | 105   | 58.02 | 45.83  | 56.45 |
| Other R.S.A.                     | 35     | 2      | 37    | 21.60 | 8.33   | 19.89 |
| Umtata                           | 5      | 7      | 12    | 3.08  | 29.18  | 6.45  |
| Other Areas in Transkei          | 19     | 2      | 21    | 11.74 | 8.33   | 11.29 |
| Unspecified                      | 9      | 2      | 11    | 6.56  | 8.33   | 5.92  |
| TOTAL                            | 162    | 24     | 186   | 100   | 100    | 100   |

TABLE A.4 : DEATHS BY AGE AND CAUSE

| AGE     | NUMBER |        |       | %      | CAUSE |    |                 |         | %      |       |         |         |
|---------|--------|--------|-------|--------|-------|----|-----------------|---------|--------|-------|---------|---------|
|         | MALE   | FEMALE | TOTAL |        | TOTAL | TB | STOMACH DISEASE | MEASLES | OTHER  | TB    | STOMACH | MEASLES |
| 0       | 6      | 10     | 16    | 32,65  | 1     | 4  | 3               | 8       | 6,25   | 25,00 | 18,75   | 50,00   |
| 1 - 4   | 4      | 4      | 8     | 16,33  | 1     | 2  | 1               | 4       | 12,50  | 25,00 | 12,50   | 50,00   |
| 5 - 9   | 4      | 1      | 5     | 10,20  | 0     | 0  | 0               | 5       | 0,00   | 0,00  | 0,00    | 100,00  |
| 10 - 14 | 0      | 1      | 1     | 2,04   | 0     | 0  | 0               | 1       | 0,00   | 0,00  | 0,00    | 100,00  |
| 15 - 19 | 0      | 0      | 0     | 0,00   | 0     | 0  | 0               | 0       | 0,00   | 0,00  | 0,00    | 0,00    |
| 20 - 24 | 0      | 0      | 0     | 0,00   | 0     | 0  | 0               | 0       | 0      | 0,00  | 0,00    | 0,00    |
| 25 - 29 | 2      | 0      | 2     | 4,08   | 2     | 0  | 0               | 0       | 100,00 | 0,00  | 0,00    | 0,00    |
| 30 - 34 | 0      | 0      | 0     | 0,00   | 0     | 0  | 0               | 0       | 0,00   | 0,00  | 0,00    | 0,00    |
| 35 - 39 | 0      | 1      | 1     | 2,04   | 0     | 0  | 0               | 1       | 0,00   | 0,00  | 0,00    | 0,00    |
| 40 - 44 | 2      | 0      | 2     | 4,08   | 0     | 0  | 0               | 2       | 0,00   | 0,00  | 0,00    | 0,00    |
| 45 - 49 | 0      | 0      | 0     | 0,00   | 0     | 0  | 0               | 0       | 0,00   | 0,00  | 0,00    | 0,00    |
| 50 - 54 | 1      | 0      | 1     | 2,04   | 1     | 0  | 0               | 0       | 100,00 | 0,00  | 0,00    | 0,00    |
| 55 - 59 | 0      | 0      | 0     | 0,00   | 0     | 0  | 0               | 0       | 0,00   | 0,00  | 0,00    | 0,00    |
| 60 - 64 | 1      | 0      | 1     | 2,04   | 0     | 0  | 0               | 1       | 0,00   | 0,00  | 0,00    | 0,00    |
| 64+     | 5      | 7      | 12    | 24,49  | 8     | 0  | 0               | 4       | 66,67  | 0,00  | 0,00    | 33,33   |
| Total   | 25     | 24     | 49    | 100,00 | 13    | 6  | 4               | 26      | 26,53  | 12,24 | 8,16    | 53,07   |

TABLE A.5 : DEATHS BY MONTH

|           | NUMBER | %      |
|-----------|--------|--------|
| January   | 5      | 10,20  |
| February  | 6      | 12,25  |
| March     | 1      | 2,04   |
| April     | 5      | 10,20  |
| May       | 3      | 6,13   |
| June      | 0      | 0,00   |
| July      | 12     | 24,50  |
| August    | 3      | 6,12   |
| September | 4      | 8,16   |
| October   | 3      | 6,12   |
| November  | 2      | 4,08   |
| December  | 5      | 10,20  |
| Total     | 49     | 100,00 |

**TABLE A:6: BIRTHS BY MONTH AND SEX**

|              | NUMBERS   |           |           | PERCENTAGE    |               |               |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
|              | MALE      | FEMALE    | TOTAL     | MALE          | FEMALE        | TOTAL         |
| January      | 3         | 7         | 10        | 16,66         | 21,88         | 20,00         |
| February     | 2         | 3         | 5         | 11,11         | 9,38          | 10,00         |
| March        | 0         | 1         | 1         | 0,00          | 3,12          | 2,00          |
| April        | 1         | 2         | 3         | 5,56          | 6,25          | 6,00          |
| May          | 0         | 3         | 3         | 0,00          | 9,38          | 6,00          |
| June         | 0         | 2         | 2         | 0,00          | 6,25          | 4,00          |
| July         | 5         | 2         | 7         | 27,77         | 6,25          | 14,00         |
| August       | 2         | 1         | 3         | 11,11         | 3,12          | 6,00          |
| September    | 1         | 1         | 2         | 5,56          | 3,12          | 4,00          |
| October      | 1         | 5         | 6         | 5,56          | 9,38          | 12,00         |
| November     | 1         | 2         | 3         | 5,56          | 6,24          | 6,00          |
| December     | 1         | 3         | 4         | 5,56          | 12,50         | 8,00          |
| Unknown      | 1         | 0         | 1         | 5,55          | 3,12          | 2,00          |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>18</b> | <b>32</b> | <b>50</b> | <b>100,00</b> | <b>100,00</b> | <b>100,00</b> |

TABLE A.7 : AGE SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATES

| AGE     | NUMBER OF BIRTHS | NUMBER OF FEMALES | % BIRTHS | FERTILITY RATE (PER 1 000) |
|---------|------------------|-------------------|----------|----------------------------|
| 15 - 19 | 4                | 55                | 8,00     | 73                         |
| 20 - 24 | 18               | 55                | 36,00    | 327                        |
| 25 - 29 | 12               | 41                | 24,00    | 293                        |
| 30 - 34 | 5                | 29                | 10,00    | 172                        |
| 35 - 39 | 4                | 25                | 8,00     | 160                        |
| 40 - 44 | 2                | 26                | 4,00     | 77                         |
| 45 - 49 | 2                | 13                | 4,00     | 154                        |
| 50+     | 3                | 102               | 6,00     | 29                         |
| Total   | 50               | 346               | 100,00   | 145                        |
| 15 - 49 | 47               | 244               | 94,00    | 193                        |

TABLE A.8 : EDUCATION STRUCTURE

| EDUCATION LEVEL  | DE JURE |        |       | MIGRANTS |        |       | DE FACTO |        |       |
|------------------|---------|--------|-------|----------|--------|-------|----------|--------|-------|
|                  | MALE    | FEMALE | TOTAL | MALE     | FEMALE | TOTAL | MALE     | FEMALE | TOTAL |
| None/Unspecified | 231     | 268    | 499   | 55       | 3      | 58    | 176      | 265    | 441   |
| Sub A            | 26      | 36     | 62    | 0        | 0      | 0     | 26       | 36     | 62    |
| Sub B            | 22      | 24     | 46    | 2        | 0      | 2     | 20       | 24     | 44    |
| Std 1            | 30      | 28     | 58    | 6        | 1      | 7     | 24       | 27     | 51    |
| Std 2            | 29      | 24     | 53    | 12       | 2      | 14    | 17       | 22     | 39    |
| Std 3            | 29      | 29     | 58    | 18       | 2      | 20    | 11       | 27     | 38    |
| Std 4            | 34      | 27     | 61    | 14       | 0      | 14    | 20       | 27     | 47    |
| Std 5            | 20      | 27     | 47    | 13       | 0      | 13    | 7        | 27     | 34    |
| Std 6            | 24      | 31     | 55    | 17       | 2      | 19    | 7        | 29     | 36    |
| Std 7            | 14      | 32     | 46    | 9        | 4      | 13    | 5        | 28     | 33    |
| Std 8            | 9       | 17     | 26    | 4        | 4      | 8     | 5        | 13     | 18    |
| Std 9            | 6       | 6      | 12    | 3        | 1      | 4     | 3        | 5      | 8     |
| Std 10           | 8       | 6      | 14    | 8        | 4      | 12    | 0        | 2      | 2     |
| Post Std 8       | 3       | 2      | 5     | 1        | 1      | 2     | 2        | 1      | 3     |
| Post Matric      | 2       | 1      | 3     | 1        | 0      | 1     | 1        | 1      | 2     |
| Total            | 487     | 558    | 1 045 | 163      | 24     | 187   | 324      | 534    | 858   |





TABLE A.10 INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION

| INDUSTRY  | DE JURE |      |        | MIGRANTS |      |        | DE FACTO |      |       |
|---|---------|------|--------|----------|------|--------|----------|------|-------|
|   | TOTAL   | MALE | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE | TOTAL |
| Agriculture   | 10      | 7    | 3      | 5        | 4    | 1      | 5        | 3    | 2     |
| Mining  | 90      | 89   | 1      | 90       | 89   | 1      | 0        | 0    | 0     |
| Manufacture   | 30      | 26   | 4      | 30       | 26   | 4      | 0        | 0    | 0     |
| Electricity, Gas & Water  | 3       | 3    | 0      | 3        | 3    | 0      | 0        | 0    | 0     |
| Construction  | 2       | 2    | 0      | 2        | 2    | 0      | 0        | 0    | 0     |
| Commerce, Catering<br>and Accommodation                         | 20      | 6    | 14     | 11       | 3    | 8      | 9        | 3    | 6     |
| Transport and Communication                                     | 5       | 4    | 1      | 4        | 3    | 1      | 1        | 1    | 0     |
| Financing, Insurance<br>Community, Social, Personal<br>Services | 0       | 0    | 0      | 0        | 0    | 0      | 0        | 0    | 0     |
| Unspecified   | 29      | 19   | 10     | 19       | 13   | 6      | 10       | 6    | 4     |
| Total Economically Active                                       | 33      | 25   | 8      | 21       | 19   | 2      | 12       | 6    | 6     |
| Total Not Economically Active                                   | 222     | 181  | 41     | 185      | 162  | 23     | 37       | 19   | 18    |
| Total   | 823     | 306  | 517    | 2        | 1    | 1      | 821      | 305  | 516   |
| Total   | 1 045   | 487  | 558    | 187      | 163  | 24     | 858      | 324  | 534   |

TABLE A.11 :INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION (%)

| INDUSTRY                         | DE JURE |        |        | MIGRANTS |        |        | DE FACTO |        |        |
|----------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|----------|--------|--------|----------|--------|--------|
|                                  | TOTAL   | MALE   | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE   | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE   | FEMALE |
| % Economically Active Population |         |        |        |          |        |        |          |        |        |
| Agriculture                      | 4.50    | 3.87   | 7.32   | 2.70     | 2.47   | 4.35   | 13.51    | 15.79  | 11.12  |
| Mining                           | 40.56   | 49.17  | 2.44   | 48.65    | 54.95  | 4.35   | 0.00     | 0.00   | 0.00   |
| Manufacturing                    | 13.51   | 14.36  | 9.76   | 16.22    | 16.05  | 17.39  | 0.00     | 0.00   | 0.00   |
| Electricity,<br>Gas & Water      | 1.35    | 1.66   | 0.00   | 1.62     | 1.85   | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00   | 0.00   |
| Construction                     | 0.90    | 1.10   | 0.00   | 1.08     | 1.23   | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00   | 0.00   |
| Commerce                         | 9.01    | 3.32   | 34.15  | 5.95     | 1.85   | 34.77  | 24.32    | 15.79  | 33.33  |
| Transport                        | 2.25    | 2.21   | 2.44   | 2.16     | 1.85   | 4.35   | 2.70     | 5.26   | 0.00   |
| Finance                          | 0.00    | 0.00   | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00   | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00   | 0.00   |
| Services                         | 13.06   | 10.50  | 24.38  | 10.27    | 8.02   | 26.09  | 27.03    | 31.58  | 22.22  |
| Unspecified                      | 14.86   | 13.81  | 19.51  | 11.35    | 11.73  | 8.70   | 32.44    | 31.58  | 33.33  |
| Total                            | 100.00  | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00   | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00   | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| % NEA                            | 78.76   | 37.17  | 92.65  | 1.07     | 0.61   | 4.17   | 95.69    | 94.14  | 96.63  |
| % EA                             | 21.24   | 62.83  | 7.35   | 98.93    | 99.39  | 95.83  | 4.31     | 5.86   | 3.37   |

**TABLE A.12: OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION**

| OCCUPATION     | DE JURE |      |        | MIGRANTS |      |        | DE FACTO |      |        |
|----------------|---------|------|--------|----------|------|--------|----------|------|--------|
|                | TOTAL   | MALE | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE | FEMALE |
| Professional   | 18      | 10   | 8      | 11       | 7    | 4      | 7        | 3    | 4      |
| Managerial     | 0       | 0    | 0      | 0        | 0    | 0      | 0        | 0    | 0      |
| Clerical       | 5       | 4    | 1      | 5        | 4    | 1      | 0        | 0    | 0      |
| Sales          | 7       | 2    | 5      | 4        | 2    | 2      | 3        | 0    | 3      |
| Service        | 26      | 17   | 9      | 19       | 13   | 6      | 7        | 4    | 3      |
| Farm           | 8       | 5    | 3      | 2        | 2    | 0      | 6        | 3    | 3      |
| Labourer       | 118     | 112  | 6      | 116      | 110  | 6      | 2        | 2    | 0      |
| Not Classified | 37      | 30   | 7      | 28       | 24   | 4      | 9        | 6    | 3      |
| Total          | 219     | 180  | 39     | 185      | 162  | 23     | 34       | 18   | 16     |



**TABLE A.14 : NUMBER OF FIELDS PER HOUSEHOLD**

| <b>FIELDS</b> | <b>NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS</b> | <b>% HOUSEHOLDS</b> | <b>% CUMULATIVE HOUSEHOLDS</b> |
|---------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| 0             | 46                          | 28.57               | 28.57                          |
| 1             | 97                          | 60.25               | 88.82                          |
| 2             | 16                          | 9.94                | 98.76                          |
| 3             | 0                           | 0.00                | 98.76                          |
| 4             | 2                           | 1.24                | 100.00                         |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  | <b>161</b>                  | <b>100.00</b>       |                                |

TABLE A.15: OWNERSHIP OF LIVESTOCK

| HERD SIZE | SHEEP | CATTLE | GOATS | PIGS | FOWLS | SHEEP % | CATTLE % | GOATS % | PIGS % | FOWLS % |
|-----------|-------|--------|-------|------|-------|---------|----------|---------|--------|---------|
| 0         | 114   | 99     | 126   | 93   | 57    | 70.81   | 61.50    | 78.26   | 57.76  | 35.40   |
| 1 - 4     | 16    | 43     | 10    | 66   | 33    | 9.94    | 26.71    | 6.21    | 41.00  | 20.50   |
| 5 - 9     | 9     | 10     | 11    | 2    | 32    | 5.59    | 6.21     | 6.83    | 1.24   | 19.88   |
| 10 - 14   | 10    | 3      | 5     | 0    | 14    | 6.21    | 1.86     | 3.11    | 0.00   | 8.70    |
| 15 - 19   | 4     | 1      | 6     | 0    | 15    | 2.48    | 0.62     | 3.73    | 0.00   | 9.31    |
| 20 - 24   | 1     | 3      | 1     | 0    | 6     | 0.62    | 1.86     | 0.62    | 0.00   | 3.73    |
| 25+       | 7     | 2      | 2     | 0    | 4     | 4.35    | 1.24     | 1.24    | 0.00   | 2.48    |
| TOTAL     | 161   | 161    | 161   | 161  | 161   | 100.00  | 100.00   | 100.00  | 100.00 | 100.00  |

TABLE A16 CATTLE HERD DYNAMICS BY HERD SIZE 1983

| Herd Size | Households | Bought | Sold | Born | Died | Lost | Killed | Lobola | Total | % Owners | % Cattle |
|-----------|------------|--------|------|------|------|------|--------|--------|-------|----------|----------|
| 1 - 4     | 22         | 3      | 0    | 5    | 21   | 1    | 1      | 2      | 60    | 31,88    | 8,49     |
| 5 - 9     | 23         | 1      | 5    | 7    | 57   | 16   | 6      | 4      | 154   | 33,33    | 21,78    |
| 10 - 14   | 13         | 0      | 14   | 5    | 48   | 20   | 4      | 2      | 165   | 18,65    | 23,34    |
| 15 - 19   | 3          | 0      | 0    | 2    | 25   | 12   | 0      | 0      | 46    | 4,35     | 6,51     |
| 20+       | 8          | 3      | 6    | 10   | 45   | 45   | 7      | 26     | 282   | 11,59    | 39,88    |
| TOTAL     | 69         | 7      | 15   | 29   | 196  | 94   | 18     | 36     | 707   | 100,00   | 100,00   |



TABLE A17 GOAT HERD DYNAMICS BY 1983 HERD SIZE

| Herd Size | Owners | Bought | Sold | Born | Died | Lost | Killed | Total | % Owners | % Goats |
|-----------|--------|--------|------|------|------|------|--------|-------|----------|---------|
| 1 - 4     | 12     | 4      | 2    | 21   | 7    | 3    | 3      | 34    | 37,50    | 12,50   |
| 5 - 9     | 8      | 0      | 0    | 8    | 5    | 0    | 7      | 57    | 25,00    | 20,96   |
| 10 - 14   | 6      | 0      | 9    | 26   | 3    | 0    | 3      | 75    | 18,75    | 27,57   |
| 15 - 19   | 5      | 0      | 1    | 16   | 14   | 0    | 2      | 78    | 15,62    | 28,68   |
| 20+       | 1      | 0      | 11   | 3    | 1    | 0    | 11     | 28    | 3,13     | 10,29   |
| TOTAL     | 32     | 4      | 23   | 74   | 30   | 3    | 26     | 272   | 100,00   | 100,00  |

TABLE A18 SHEEP FLOCK DYNAMICS BY 1983 FLOCK SIZE

| Flock Size | Owners | Bought | Sold | Born | Died | Lost | Killed | Total | % Owners | % Sheep |
|------------|--------|--------|------|------|------|------|--------|-------|----------|---------|
| 1 - 4      | 18     | 1      | 4    | 20   | 1    | 14   | 10     | 51    | 32,73    | 6,06    |
| 5 - 9      | 9      | 0      | 2    | 13   | 13   | 18   | 5      | 56    | 16,36    | 6,66    |
| 10 - 14    | 14     | 10     | 11   | 24   | 20   | 24   | 4      | 164   | 25,45    | 19,50   |
| 15 - 19    | 2      | 0      | 0    | 10   | 1    | 0    | 2      | 34    | 3,64     | 4,04    |
| 20+        | 12     | 0      | 42   | 189  | 72   | 80   | 30     | 536   | 21,82    | 63,74   |
| TOTAL      | 55     | 11     | 59   | 256  | 107  | 136  | 51     | 841   | 100,00   | 100,00  |

TABLE A19 DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES PER MONTH

| WAGE GROUP<br>(R) | DE JURE |      |        | MIGRANTS |      |        | DE FACTO |      |        |
|-------------------|---------|------|--------|----------|------|--------|----------|------|--------|
|                   | TOTAL   | MALE | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE | FEMALE |
| Unknown           | 114     | 97   | 17     | 101      | 88   | 13     | 13       | 9    | 4      |
| 1 - 25            | 5       | 0    | 5      | 0        | 0    | 0      | 5        | 0    | 5      |
| 26 - 50           | 12      | 5    | 7      | 5        | 2    | 3      | 7        | 3    | 4      |
| 51 - 75           | 5       | 5    | 0      | 4        | 4    | 0      | 1        | 1    | 0      |
| 76 - 100          | 21      | 17   | 4      | 19       | 15   | 4      | 2        | 2    | 0      |
| 101 - 125         | 3       | 3    | 0      | 3        | 3    | 0      | 0        | 0    | 0      |
| 126 - 150         | 6       | 5    | 1      | 6        | 5    | 1      | 0        | 0    | 0      |
| 151 - 200         | 23      | 21   | 2      | 21       | 20   | 1      | 2        | 1    | 1      |
| 201 - 350         | 23      | 19   | 4      | 21       | 19   | 2      | 2        | 0    | 2      |
| 351 - 500         | 8       | 8    | 0      | 6        | 6    | 0      | 2        | 2    | 0      |
| 501 - +           | 2       | 1    | 1      | 1        | 1    | 0      | 1        | 0    | 1      |
| TOTAL             | 222     | 181  | 41     | 187      | 163  | 24     | 35       | 18   | 17     |

TABLE A20: DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWN WAGES PER MONTH (%)

| WAGE GROUP<br>(R) | DE JURE |        |        | MIGRANTS |        |        | DE FACTO |        |        |
|-------------------|---------|--------|--------|----------|--------|--------|----------|--------|--------|
|                   | TOTAL   | MALE   | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE   | FEMALE | TOTAL    | MALE   | FEMALE |
| 1 - 25            | 4,63    | 0,00   | 20,83  | 0,00     | 0,00   | 0,00   | 22,73    | 0,00   | 38,46  |
| 26 - 50           | 11,11   | 5,95   | 29,17  | 5,81     | 2,67   | 27,27  | 31,82    | 33,34  | 30,78  |
| 51 - 75           | 4,63    | 5,95   | 0,00   | 4,65     | 5,33   | 0      | 4,55     | 11,11  | 0,00   |
| 76 - 100          | 19,44   | 20,24  | 16,66  | 22,09    | 20,00  | 36,37  | 9,09     | 22,22  | 0,00   |
| 101 - 125         | 2,78    | 3,57   | 0,00   | 3,49     | 4,00   | 0,00   | 0,00     | 0,00   | 0,00   |
| 126 - 150         | 5,56    | 5,95   | 4,17   | 6,98     | 6,67   | 9,09   | 0,00     | 0,00   | 0,00   |
| 151 - 200         | 21,30   | 25,00  | 8,33   | 24,42    | 26,67  | 9,09   | 9,09     | 11,11  | 7,69   |
| 201 - 350         | 21,30   | 22,62  | 16,67  | 24,42    | 25,33  | 18,18  | 9,09     | 0,00   | 15,38  |
| 351 - 500         | 7,40    | 9,52   | 0      | 6,98     | 8,00   | 0,00   | 9,09     | 22,22  | 0,00   |
| 501 - +           | 1,85    | 1,20   | 4,17   | 1,16     | 1,33   | 0,00   | 4,54     | 0,00   | 7,69   |
| TOTAL             | 100,00  | 100,00 | 100,00 | 100,00   | 100,00 | 100,00 | 100,00   | 100,00 | 100,00 |
| % Unknown         | 51,35   | 53,59  | 41,46  | 54,01    | 53,99  | 54,99  | 37,14    | 50,00  | 23,53  |

TABLE A21: AVERAGE MONTHLY MIGRANT REMITTANCES JULY - DECEMBER 1983

| INTERVAL (R) | NUMBER | %      | % CUMULATIVE |
|--------------|--------|--------|--------------|
| 0            | 62     | 38.51  | 38.51        |
| 1 - 25       | 14     | 8.70   | 47.21        |
| 26 - 50      | 31     | 19.25  | 66.46        |
| 51 - 75      | 20     | 12.42  | 78.88        |
| 76 - 100     | 18     | 11.18  | 90.06        |
| 101 - 125    | 3      | 1.86   | 91.93        |
| 126 - 150    | 5      | 3.11   | 95.03        |
| 151 - 175    | 3      | 1.86   | 96.89        |
| 176 - 200    | 5      | 3.11   | 100.00       |
| TOTAL        | 161    | 100.00 |              |

TABLE A22 AGE/SEX STRUCTURE (NUMBERS)

| AGE GROUP | DE FACTO |        | MIGRANTS |        | DE JURE |        | DE FACTO |        | MIGRANTS |        | DE JURE |        | DE FACTO    |       | RATIO |
|-----------|----------|--------|----------|--------|---------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|---------|--------|-------------|-------|-------|
|           | MALE     | FEMALE | MALE     | FEMALE | MALE    | FEMALE | MALE     | FEMALE | MALE     | FEMALE | MALE    | FEMALE | MALE/FEMALE |       |       |
| 0 - 4     | 72       | 65     | 0        | 0      | 72      | 65     | 24.57    | 13.32  | 0.00     | 0.00   | 16.4    | 12.92  | 110         | 0     |       |
| 5 - 9     | 86       | 87     | 0        | 0      | 86      | 87     | 29.35    | 17.83  | 0.00     | 0.00   | 19.28   | 17.30  | 95          | 0     |       |
| 10 - 14   | 47       | 63     | 0        | 0      | 47      | 63     | 16.04    | 12.91  | 0.00     | 0.00   | 10.54   | 12.52  | 75          | 0     |       |
| 15 - 19   | 36       | 55     | 7        | 4      | 43      | 57     | 12.29    | 10.86  | 4.58     | 26.67  | 9.64    | 11.33  | 65          | 16.27 |       |
| 20 - 24   | 12       | 45     | 22       | 4      | 34      | 49     | 4.10     | 9.22   | 14.38    | 26.67  | 7.62    | 9.74   | 27          | 64.71 |       |
| 25 - 29   | 2        | 36     | 29       | 2      | 31      | 38     | 0.68     | 7.38   | 18.95    | 13.33  | 6.95    | 7.55   | 6           | 93.35 |       |
| 30 - 34   | 5        | 24     | 23       | 0      | 28      | 24     | 1.71     | 4.92   | 15.03    | 0.00   | 6.28    | 4.78   | 21          | 82.14 |       |
| 35 - 39   | 3        | 28     | 16       | 1      | 19      | 29     | 1.02     | 5.74   | 10.46    | 6.66   | 4.26    | 5.77   | 11          | 84.21 |       |
| 40 - 44   | 3        | 13     | 20       | 4      | 23      | 17     | 1.02     | 2.66   | 13.07    | 26.67  | 5.16    | 3.38   | 23          | 86.96 |       |
| 45 - 49   | 3        | 16     | 17       | 0      | 20      | 16     | 1.02     | 3.28   | 11.11    | 0.00   | 4.48    | 3.18   | 19          | 85.00 |       |
| 50 - 54   | 5        | 9      | 10       | 0      | 15      | 9      | 1.71     | 1.84   | 6.54     | 0.00   | 3.36    | 1.79   | 56          | 64.67 |       |
| 55 - 59   | 5        | 9      | 4        | 0      | 9       | 9      | 1.71     | 1.84   | 2.61     | 0.00   | 2.02    | 1.79   | 56          | 44.44 |       |
| 60 - 64   | 2        | 10     | 3        | 0      | 5       | 10     | 0.68     | 2.05   | 1.96     | 0.00   | 1.13    | 1.99   | 20          | 60.00 |       |
| 65+       | 12       | 30     | 2        | 0      | 14      | 30     | 4.10     | 6.15   | 1.31     | 0.00   | 3.14    | 5.96   | 40          | 14.29 |       |
| TOTAL     | 293      | 488    | 153      | 15     | 446     | 503    | 100.00   | 100.00 | 100.00   | 100.00 | 100.00  | 100.00 | 60          | 34.30 |       |

TABLE A 23

SEX STRUCTURE - MIGRANTS

|        |       |
|--------|-------|
| Male   | 90.8% |
| Female | 9.2%  |

TABLE A 24

AREA OF WORK - MIGRANTS - INTERNAL & EXTERNAL

|                     | MALE   | FEMALE | TOTAL  |
|---------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Transvaal           | 63.13  | 33.33  | 72.3   |
| Natal               | 22.58  | 9.52   | 8.4    |
| W. Cape             | 7.37   | 4.76   | 6.4    |
| O.F.S.              | 1.84   | 4.76   | 2.5    |
| Transkei (Internal) | 4.16   | 38.11  | 8.4    |
| Swaziland           | 0.46   | 0      | 0.5    |
| E. Cape             | 0.46   | 9.52   | 1.5    |
|                     | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |

TABLE A 25

## BIRTHS BY MONTH AND SEX

| MONTH     | NUMBERS |        |       | PERCENTAGE |        |        |
|-----------|---------|--------|-------|------------|--------|--------|
|           | MALE    | FEMALE | TOTAL | MALE       | FEMALE | TOTAL  |
| January   | 2       | 3      | 5     | 11.76      | 13.03  | 12.5   |
| February  | 2       | 2      | 4     | 11.76      | 8.70   | 10.0   |
| March     | 0       | 1      | 1     | 0          | 4.35   | 2.5    |
| April     | 0       | 1      | 1     | 0          | 4.35   | 2.5    |
| May       | 1       | 4      | 5     | 5.88       | 17.39  | 12.5   |
| June      | 0       | 0      | 0     | 0          | 0      | 0      |
| July      | 2       | 2      | 4     | 11.76      | 8.70   | 10.0   |
| August    | 1       | 2      | 3     | 5.88       | 8.70   | 7.5    |
| September | 3       | 3      | 6     | 17.65      | 13.03  | 15.0   |
| October   | 2       | 1      | 3     | 11.76      | 4.35   | 7.5    |
| November  | 3       | 2      | 5     | 17.66      | 8.70   | 12.5   |
| December  | 1       | 2      | 3     | 5.88       | 8.70   | 7.5    |
| TOTAL     | 17      | 23     | 40    | 100.00     | 100.00 | 100.00 |



TABLE A 26

## AGE SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATES

| AGE     | NO. OF BIRTHS | NO. FEMALES | % BIRTHS | FERTILITY RATE (PER 1000) |
|---------|---------------|-------------|----------|---------------------------|
| 15 - 19 | 7             | 53          | 17.5     | 132                       |
| 20 - 24 | 11            | 45          | 27.5     | 244                       |
| 25 - 29 | 9             | 36          | 22.5     | 250                       |
| 30 - 34 | 5             | 24          | 12.5     | 208                       |
| 35 - 39 | 5             | 28          | 12.5     | 179                       |
| 40 - 44 | 1             | 13          | 2.5      | 77                        |
| 45 - 49 | 2             | 16          | 5        | 125                       |
| 50 +    | 0             | -           | 0        | 0                         |
| TOTAL   | 40            | 215         | 100      | 186                       |
| 15 - 49 | 40            | 215         |          | 186                       |





TABLE A 29      NUMBER OF FIELDS PER HOUSEHOLD

| FIELDS | NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS | % HOUSEHOLDS | % HOUSEHOLDS |
|--------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|
| 0      | 47                | 23.27        | 23.27        |
| 1      | 146               | 72.28        | 95.55        |
| 2      | 6                 | 2.97         | 98.52        |
| 3      | 3                 | 1.48         | 100.00       |
| TOTAL  | 202               | 100.00       |              |



TABLE A 31

## SOURCES OF INCOME — RURAL HOUSEHOLDS (%)

| INCOME GROUP P. A. | % HOUSEHOLDS | WAGES | PENSIONS | REMITTANCE | HOME PRODUCTION | TOTAL |
|--------------------|--------------|-------|----------|------------|-----------------|-------|
| < 500              | 23.90        | 10.65 | 19.40    | 67.05      | 2.90            | 100   |
| 501 - 1000         | 26.42        | 12.10 | 14.30    | 71.10      | 2.50            | 100   |
| 1000 - 1500        | 13.21        | 15.36 | 17.11    | 65.75      | 1.78            | 100   |
| 1501 - 2000        | 6.69         | 26.52 | 21.40    | 48.08      | 4.0             | 100   |
| 2001 - 3000        | 6.96         | 37.67 | 13.89    | 46.17      | 2.27            | 100   |
| 3001 - 4000        | 6.47         | 74.40 | 4.24     | 19.86      | 1.50            | 100   |
| 4001 - 5000        | 5.36         | 80.61 | 4.22     | 13.22      | 1.95            | 100   |
| 5001 - 10000       | 7.31         | 69.90 | 4.43     | 22.95      | 2.72            | 100   |
| > 10000            | 3.68         | 83.05 | 8.16     | 6.08       | 2.71            | 100   |
|                    | 100.00       |       |          |            |                 |       |