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Preferences for the scope of protests

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Abstract

This paper studies a dimension of protest largely overlooked in the literature: protest scope, that is, whether protests seek large, structural, changes for a large share of the population or focus on small scale improvements for small groups. We argue that this protest dimension is relevant for understanding the political consequences of protests. We show empirically that protests vary substantially in scope and that scope is not collinear with other protest dimensions, such as size, motive, or tactics. We explore drivers of individual preferences for protest scope with a survey experiment in two South African townships. We find that respondents made to feel more efficacious tend to support protests of broader scope. This effect operates via a social psychology channel whereby efficacy leads people to assign blame for their problems to more systemic causes.

Keywords: Protest Dimensions, Political Behaviour, Social Psychology, Survey Experiment, Efficacy, South Africa

1 Introduction

Research concerned with the political impact of protests has mainly studied two core dimensions of protest: its incidence/ size, and to a lesser extent, the use of peaceful vs. violent tactics (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; McAdam and Su 2002; Wouters and Walgrave 2017). A dimension of protest largely overlooked in the literature is protest scope, that is, whether protests seek large, structural, changes for a large share of the population (e.g. regime change) or focus on small improvements for small groups (e.g. paving a slum). Yet, this dimension is bound to be important for the political impact of protests. Protests targeting systemic change, such as those toppling Arab autocrats in 2010/2011 or those trying to bring independence to Catalonia in 2017 have very different political consequences than localized, narrow protests focusing on the corruption of a ward councilor, bad healthcare in a specific district, or property rights for shacks in a slum.

This paper focuses on the *demand side* of protest scope and asks: what drives *preferences* for protest scope? In other words, why do some protesters articulate their grievances into localized small-scale demands while others articulate them into systemic ones? The scope of actual protests obviously depends partly on supply factors, such as the decisions and calculations of movement elites. However, the demand side is likely to be crucial as well: protest narratives offered by elites have little impact unless they resonate with people's preferences and interpretations (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden and Benford 1986). Individual preferences for protest scope are thus key to understanding when protests make narrow vs. systemic demands.

The paper starts by motivating our focus on protest scope. We define protest scope with reference to previous literature along two dimensions, intensity (how much change is sought) and extensiveness (how many people would be affected by the change). We demonstrate the empirical relevance of the concept using South Africa as a case study. Based on a dataset on protests from the South African police force, we show that protests indeed vary in their scope, with most protests having a narrow focus. Importantly, we show that the scope dimension of protest is not collinear with other dimensions, such as size, tactics, or topic: small and big protests, violent and peaceful protests, protests about service delivery or about employment/ salaries can all be of narrow or broad scope.

Beyond introducing the concept, the paper's main contribution is an empirical investigation of drivers of protest scope. Building on previous research on protest occurrence and strategies, we suggest a simple theoretical framework for the analysis of protest scope. While we acknowledge that the nature of underlying grievances or the identity of protesters are likely to influence the demand-side of protest scope, we focus in this paper on the role of people's sense of efficacy, which we define as the extent to which individuals believe that they can affect their environment to pursue their goals. Specifically, we ar-

gue that efficacy is a crucial determinant of the demand-side of protest scope: The more people believe that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through protest the more likely will they have a preference for broad as compared to narrow protest scopes.

Our empirical analyses focus on one specific African, middle-income democracy. However, the concept of protest scope is relevant beyond this type of country. Protest movements in wealthy western countries such as the Black Lives Matter in the US also oscillate between a narrow focus on the brutality and impunity of certain police officers and a broad focus on social inequalities (Taylor 2016). Similarly, protest movements in non-western autocratic states such as the ongoing demonstrations in Iran entail both a narrow focus on the economic conditions of the youth in specific regions as well as a broad focus on the general legitimacy of the Islamic Republic as a whole. The political impact of these and other movements is likely to depend, among others, on whether protests of narrow or broad scope garner more popular support.

Our analysis is based on a survey experiment with 1,500 individuals in two South African townships. Our treatments were designed to temporarily affect respondent's perceptions of *efficacy*. Our most notable result is that perceptions of efficacy enhance preferences for a broader protest scope. This seems to operate via a social psychology channel whereby higher perceptions of efficacy lead people to assign blame for their problems to more systemic causes.

The focus on the preferences for protest scope can provide a useful new perspective on the political behavior of the disadvantaged in contexts of high grievances. The persistence of high levels of inequality in many countries is well documented (OECD 2008, 2011; Pellicer 2009). One of the reasons for this persistence is that the poor in highly unequal countries demand too little redistribution, relative to the level of inequality (Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Cramer and Kaufman 2011; Kaufman 2009; McCall 2013; Morgan and Kelly 2017; Solt, Hu, Hudson, Song and Yu 2017). This view fits well with one of the foundational insights of the collective action literature: even widespread objective problems or subjective grievances do generally not lead to protest (McCarthy and Zald 1977) - high degrees of social inequity may thus persist unchallenged. The perspective on the poor that emerges from these literatures is one of relative *passivity* in the face of grievances. Yet, in many parts of the world a lot of people protest, suggesting a much more active citizenry. In South Africa, a dozen protests take place every day (De Juan and Wegner 2017); in China the *daily* figure was about 500 in 2010 (Fisher 2012); in general, protests world-wide have been found to increase in number and intensity over the last decade (Carothers and Youngs 2015). Our focus on protest scope can reconcile these two perspectives. Rather than just facing the dichotomous choice between engaging in protest or not, the poor face a more complicated choice: if they protest, what should they be protesting about? How broad should their demands be? When grievances are articulated as demands for small scale local improvements instead of broad, systemic

ones, inequality can persist in the face of high discontent *and* high levels of protest.

In addition, our findings contribute to extant research on efficacy perceptions and collective action. Previous studies have highlighted the role of efficacy for protest participation (Gamson 1992; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013; Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears 2008; van Zomeren, Leach and Spears 2012): people are more likely to participate in protests when they believe that collective action is an effective means of redressing their grievances at acceptable costs. Our results extend this research in two ways: First, we show that individuals' perceptions of efficacy do not only matter for increasing their general willingness to participate in protests but also for increasing their preference for protests of broad scope. Second, our findings suggest that efficacy affects protest behavior not only by influencing people's cost-benefit calculations but through cognitive processes of blame attribution. This latter finding is in accordance with recent literature on the effect of efficacy/ power on motivated social cognition (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway 2003; Johnson and Fujita 2012; Pellicer, Piraino and Wegner 2018; Van Der Toorn, Feinberg, Jost, Kay, Tyler, Willer and Wilmuth 2015).

2 Protest scope

2.1 What is protest scope?

Research has considered different dimensions of protests that may matter for their political impact. The main focus has been on protest size and protest tactics (i.e. violent vs. peaceful). There is consensus that protest size is a key factor explaining policy attention and policy change (McAdam and Su 2002; Wouters and Walgrave 2017) while there is some debate on whether violent tactics further or dampen the success of protests (see McAdam and Su (2002) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011)). A third protest dimension considered in the literature is protest narratives; i.e. the way the protest is framed. Narratives are also relevant for the impact of protests at the very least through their link with protest size: People are willing to participate in protests to the extent that the respective narratives resonate with their own interpretations, experiences and mindsets (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986).

We argue that another dimension of protest, its *scope*, is also important. We define the concept of "protest scope" as a function of two features of the change sought by a protest: the intensity of change and the extensiveness of change. We define a protest to be of high scope if the change being sought is intense and extensive. Figure 1 illustrates this idea. Intensity of change captures how large of a change is sought. Indeed, the type of change pursued by protesters can be of low intensity (small), such as, for example, asking for the removal of a corrupt politician from office or it can be of high intensity (large), such as seeking the replacement of the whole political class. The first element of

a broad scoped protest would thus be that it seeks a substantial change per unit. Ideas related to the intensity of change dimension appear in older collective action literature as the distinction between collective action seeking to address *proximate* causes of grievances vs. actions focusing on more *distal* and structural causes. While the first pursue change within the limits of the existing social, economic or political systems, the latter aim at changing the existing system itself (Carlier 1977; Blumer 1969). Extensiveness of change defines how many people would be affected by the change. The affected population may be small, confined to a few people with certain characteristics (e.g. dairy farmers) or to a small geographical area (e.g. a village or shanty town) or it can be large, including all, or the majority of, citizens of a country. The second element of a broad scoped protest would thus be that it seeks a change for a large number of units. The extensiveness of the change dimension is referred to in previous literature by the distinction between particularistic vs. universalistic protest demands that vary in the size of their beneficiary group. Particularistic protests focus on changing conditions of one clearly specified and relatively small group while the latter challenge conditions that affect a broader population (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson 1992; Morris and Staggengborg 2004; Verhulst 2011). Importantly, the nature or issue of the actual grievance driving the protest is not a defining part of the concept. As we will discuss in more detail below, the same grievance or protest issue can give rise to protests of very different scope. For example, protests focusing on low quality healthcare may be as much of narrow scope, such as asking for more resources for the local clinic as of broad scope, such as asking for massive redistribution in a country.

[Figure 1 about here]

Figure 1 visualizes how different values of the two dimensions define degrees of scope. If the intensity of the change sought is high, we can think of it as protest seeking a large amount of change, such as changing political or socio-economic structures. In broad scope protests, these changes would potentially affect a large share of the population (i.e. be very extensive). In turn, a narrow scope protest would seek low key changes affecting a small population. In addition, we can conceive of intermediate types. In our model, protest with intermediate scope can either be those seeking relatively small policy changes (low intensity) that affect a lot of people (high extensiveness) such as when they ask for food subsidies or more or less funding for some national programmes. Or they can be protests seeking big changes (high intensity) for small amounts of people (low extensiveness). This is a less realistic case, but one could imagine protests targeting a massive overhaul of local structures, perhaps taking over the municipality or deposing the local chief. The breadth of protest scope is likely to have important implications and should be considered in addition to the size and tactics dimensions. Protest centered around

narrow issues, such as a new school in a neighborhood or the removal of one specific corrupt politician from office are unlikely to affect political and social stability. Possibly, such protests might even contribute to stability via their contribution to perceived accountability, as the government can make low-cost concessions to local demands. In contrast, if protest centers on inequality of opportunity or the corruption of the entire political class, it has at least the potential to shake up the system.

Considering the potential importance of this dimension of protest, it is puzzling that little attention has been paid to its demand side, that is to preferences for different scopes of protest. Research on the related concept of protest narratives or protest frames deals mostly with the supply side of protest issues, that is, the strategic decisions of movement elites to make social movements more or less successful (e.g. Alinsky (2010); McCarthy and Zald (1977); Thomas and Craig (1973)). To the best of our knowledge only one previous study (Verhulst 2011), considers the demand side of one scope dimension (extensiveness). This study finds that preferences for particularistic vs. universalistic protest issues vary systematically across individuals, according to factors such as gender, education, and interest in politics.

2.2 Protest Scope in South Africa

We first provide some descriptive evidence on protest scope in South Africa, seeking to distinguish it from other dimensions of protest deemed relevant in the literature. In particular, we show that the scope of protests is neither collinear with the underlying grievances motivating collective action nor to the size and tactics of protest. The South African case has attracted quite some attention as protests have increased dramatically since the mid-2000s (Alexander 2010; De Juan and Wegner 2017).

We use data from the South African police's crowd control database, the Incident Registration Information System (IRIS) that records events with more than five participants. These data record the event's location and date, provide a short description, an approximate number of participants and indicate whether the gathering was peaceful or violent.¹

We coded a random subset of 500 protest events in 2011 and 2013 from the database with the objective to identify the scope of protest as well as other relevant dimensions such as grievance type and size. The scope of protests was operationalized as protest targets, that is whether the protest was directed at the local, province, or national level with higher levels implying a broader scope. Protest targets in terms of institutional

¹Two potential problems of these data - conflation of other incident types and protests, and mis-coding of the protest motive - are not problematic for our analysis. We used human coders to identify actual protest events and code protest motives. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that these data represent police perceptions about protests not actual protests. For a detailed assessment of these data see Runciman, Alexander, Rampedi, Moloto, Maruping, Khumalo and Sibanda (2016).

level are not a perfect measure of protest scope. However, they are closely related to the extensiveness dimension of protest scope mentioned above. Protests targeted at the national level entail a potentially larger beneficiary group than protests targeted at the local level. Moreover, national-level protests also typically score relatively high on the intensity dimension of protest scope, as they tend to emphasize the “macro”, structural, aspect of problems.

The data show that the vast majority of the events (around 85 %) are targeted at the local level (narrow scope), and 10% at the national level (broad scope). Table 1 shows the distribution of different dimensions of protest (topic, size, and tactic) conditional on specific values of protest scope (local, provincial, national). The first panel on protest motives shows that, with the exception of human rights, protest motives are not predominantly associated with certain protest scopes. Topics such as services, employment, or governance/corruption can lead to protests targeted at local, provincial, or national levels. This is an important point worth illustrating further. Consider the following two event descriptions from the data.

“ +/- 60 residents of Koffiefontein marched from Steve Tshwete main road to the municipality offices. Participants are concerned with poor service delivery at their area. They displayed posters with the following wording: “We want good services and down with corrupt town manager”. The convenor [...] handed over memorandum to Chief Financial Officer.”

“ +/- 30 participant[...] picketed and with placards written. 1. “We cannot pay for electricity and water.” 2. “President Zuma hired criminals”, 3. “Democracy does not work for Africa”. A memorandum was read and handed to director from the president office.”

In both cases, the motive is service delivery but the first event points at a narrow protest scope, asking for the dismissal of a municipal manager, whereas the second suggests a broad scope linking problems with services to President Zuma’s leadership and the political regime more generally.

[Table 1 about here]

The following panels in table 1 show that protest scope is not collinear with other dimensions of protest, such as size and tactics. If at all the table shows a surprising degree of independence between scope and these dimensions. Protests with national level scope are as likely to be small as protests targeted at the local level. In other words, there may be protests with a broad scope that involve small numbers of protesters (such as a few activists outside parliament protesting about the corruption of the political class) and

protests with a narrow scope that involve large numbers (such as thousands of protesters asking for better services in their informal settlement). Similarly, protest scope cuts across protest tactics. Whereas national level protests are particularly peaceful, local and provincial level protests display violent as well as peaceful tactics.

3 Conceptual framework

What drives preferences for protest scope? At present there is no clear conceptual framework to guide the study of this question. We thus build on established factors in the literature on preferences for other dimensions of protest to propose our argument on the role of efficacy for protest scope

There are three types of factors that are consistently used to explain attitudes towards protest participation and tactics: grievances, identities, and efficacy. *Grievances* are considered key determinants of individual-level participation in protest (Gurr 1970; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Finkel, Muller and Opp 1989). As Muller and Jukam (1983) explain, “People who take part in acts of civil disobedience or political violence are discontented about something. That is a truism” (p.159). Importantly, what matters for collective action is not objective disadvantage but the subjective experience of disadvantage, perceived to be unfair and blamed on someone else (see Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears (2008)). The second factor emphasized as relevant for protest participation is *identity*. The more people identify with social, ethnic or political groups, the more they feel an obligation to participate in protests on behalf of the group (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). Consequently, individual-level protest participation is likely to depend on the strength and political salience of people’s collective identities (Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears 2008). Finally, participation also depends on perceived *efficacy*. The more people believe that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through protest, the more likely they are to participate (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson 1975; Oberschall 1973). The link between efficacy and protest is thought to be direct and straightforward “the more effective an individual believes protest participation is, the more likely s/he is to participate” (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013, p.3).

Grievances, identity and efficacy matter not only for attitudes toward protest participation but also for attitudes towards different protest tactics (violent vs. peaceful). A particularly high sense of grievance and deprivation may create particularly strong feelings of frustration and aggression and thereby increase the likelihood of support for violent tactics (Gurr 1970). Similarly, some identities may be intrinsically linked to specific “repertoires of contention” (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1998) - for example anarchist or extreme right-wing identities entailing the use of illegal and potentially violent forms of contention (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Finally, efficacy also appears to be linked to different preferences for various protest strategies (Opp 1988), with highly efficacious

people preferring peaceful forms of protest such as petitioning and demonstrations and vice-versa (Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, Singh and Siddiqui 2011).

Since grievances, efficacy, and identity are relevant for attitudes towards different dimensions of protest, we conjecture that they may a priori matter for attitudes towards protest scope as well. In this paper, we focus, however, specifically on the role of efficacy. First, as we cannot rely on a well-established body of research on protest scope, considering all three potential explanatory factors would require theoretical and empirical specifications that would go beyond the scope of this rather exploratory paper. Second, we believe efficacy-focused explanations to be more promising for providing an explanation for the demand side of protest scopes.

At first sight, it seems plausible that grievances are primary determinants of preferences for protest scope: individuals with “bigger”, systemic, grievances engage in broad-scope protest, and individuals with narrow grievances engage in narrow-scope protest. However, there are two problems with this argument: first, grievance-based explanations are hard-pressed to explain short-term changes of protest scopes. For example, the 2011 Arab uprisings mostly started with specific economic or administrative demands (more jobs, subsidies, removal of individual corrupt politicians), but later turned into radical demands of system change. It seems unlikely that a dramatic change in the nature of grievances could have occurred in such a short time to explain this change in scope. Second, as argued and shown for the case of South Africa above, associations between grievances and protest scope do not seem to be unequivocal, as similar types of grievances can result in protests of different scopes. In short, it seems that the effect of grievances on preferences for protest scope is not direct, although they certainly matter.

Identity-based explanations have similar shortcomings. Although one could imagine that people with strong local identities favor narrow protests that ask for local solutions – and, vice-versa, effects of identities are probably rather ambiguous: very narrow ethnic identities could either create preferences for very narrow protest scopes, like reforms benefiting only their own respective communities, or for very broad protest scopes like the partition of the political system. Conversely, while people with strong national identities might be more susceptible to engaging in protest that would affect all citizens, their national identity may also make them less inclined towards protests demanding extensive change of the political system.

3.1 Mechanism

For these reasons, we focus on efficacy as a potentially crucial determinant of protest scope. In particular, we argue that the more people believe that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through protest the more likely will they have a preference for broad as compared to narrow protest scope. First, this perspective can more easily account for

short-term changes in protest scopes. Experiences of success (e.g. political concessions) or failure (e.g. violent protest termination), for example, may influence people's efficacy perceptions and, in turn, make them readjust their preferences for different protest scopes. Second, the effects of high vs. low efficacy seem less ambiguous than those of grievances or identities. While different research strands make it seem plausible that high efficacy can create preferences for broad protest scope, mechanisms through which more efficacy may incline people towards narrow scope protests are more difficult to imagine.

As figure 2 shows, there are two potential mechanisms through which efficacy could lead to a preference for protests of broader scope. The first perspective is rooted in the collective action literature and highlights processes of rational decision-making. Beliefs about efficacy feature prominently in the collective action literature, mostly as affecting the cost-benefit calculus of engaging, and remaining engaged, in protest (see (van Zomeren, Leach and Spears 2012; Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears 2008)). Analogously to the direct between efficacy and protest participation mentioned above, one could expect that efficacy may lead people to believe that they can successfully take on bigger causes.

A second perspective is rooted in social psychology accounts of protest preferences. This research emphasizes that grievances can be appraised in different ways, in turn leading to different ways of attributing blame for one's problems Major and Schmader (2001). Building on this, we consider the possibility that *efficacy affects preferences for protest scope via its effect on blame attribution*.

[Figure 2 about here]

This argument has two components. The first is a link between blame attribution for one's grievances and preferences for protest scope. As social problems are complex and have a variety of causes, the same "objective" problem can, in principle, be attributed to both narrow and systemic causes. As Javeline (2009, p. 32) argues in her study of protest on wage arrears in Russia: "Targets for blame are [...] conceived by individuals in their minds and through conversations with others about the particular issue in question. At any time, possibilities include managers, local executives, local legislatures, national executives, national legislatures, and a variety of others." It seems sensible to consider that people blaming problems on narrow factors will prefer narrow-scope protests and vice-versa.

The second component is that perceptions of efficacy affect how individuals attribute the blame for their problems. Indeed social psychology literature has shown that a heightened sense of efficacy or power decreases individuals' needs to justify the existing system; in turn, feeling powerless and inefficacious can lead people to engage in "system justification" and fail to attribute blame for their social problems to systemic targets as

a way of coping with their powerlessness (Van Der Toorn et al. (2015); see also Johnson and Fujita (2012)).²

In sum, we conjecture that efficacy may affect protest scope via a rational cost-benefit appraisal or via blame attribution.

4 Data

We conducted an individual level opinion survey with 1,500 respondents in two South African townships, Gugulethu and Mitchells Plain between March and May 2016. The data were collected on mobile devices.³ While not the poorest South African citizens, these townships have high levels of unemployment (around 40 per cent in Gugulethu), and suffer from crime and service delivery problems. Gugulethu is an African black township, Mitchells Plain has a Coloured population.⁴

The survey includes an experimental component - discussed in more detail below - that investigates what drives individual preferences for protest scope. The survey focuses on views on fairness of the system, perceptions of efficacy, as well as blame attribution and preferences for protest scope. We also collect basic demographic information on education, income, and employment. The mean, minima and maxima of the main variables are displayed in table A.1 in the appendix.

Our key outcome variable, preferences for *protest scope* is measured by asking about support for different hypothetical protest marches that would address a problem of health care provision in the community. The marches presented to respondents address the same objective problem but differ in scope. The first march requests more doctors and nurses. This is a narrow scope protest that seeks direct solutions for the particular neighborhood by increasing health care personnel in that specific place. The second march asks for the removal of corrupt politicians from office, a protest of broader scope. The third march has the broadest scope, asking for wealth redistribution to increase equality in access to

²System Justification Theory argues that existing institutions and arrangements are often justified even at the expense of personal self-interest because believing consistently that the system is unfair has high psychological costs (Jost, Banaji and Nosek 2004; Jost, Liviatan, van der Toorn, Ledgerwood, Mandisodza and Nosek 2010).

³A total of 135 Enumerator Areas (EA) were randomly selected from a complete list of residential EAs as defined by StatsSA. Within each EA a random GPS coordinate was chosen as the starting point for a Random Walk. We contracted a South African survey company, ikapadata, for the survey. Pretests and training were provided by the authors. A total of 17 fieldworkers conducted the interviews with fieldworker population groups matching those of respondents. The master questionnaire was in English and was translated with feedback from the fieldworkers into Xhosa and Afrikaans. Language could be switched for each question.

⁴South Africa's Apartheid regime divided the South African population in four "races": African, Coloured, Indian/Asian, and White. Under Apartheid, there was full residential segregation with Whites living in the cities and the other groups being forcefully removed to dedicated townships or so-called homelands. Residential segregation laws were revoked in the 1990s but the vastly different housing prices in these areas have left residential segregation intact in many townships, so that Gugulethu is 99% African and Mitchells Plain 96 % Coloured, according to the 2011 population census.

high quality healthcare. The full wording of the protest scope scenario is: “Imagine that some action is planned in your neighborhood about bad healthcare. In a meeting, people disagree what the protest/ march should target. Some say that the march should only focus on getting more doctors and nurses to reduce queues in your local clinic. Others say that the march should be about corruption because the healthcare problem cannot be solved unless corrupt politicians are removed from office. And still another group says that the healthcare problem cannot be solved unless South Africa’s wealth is shared fairly and people have the means to buy the healthcare that they want.”

We use preferences for these marches to construct two different measures of preferences for protest scope. We ask respondents how much they would support any of these marches and subsequently ask them to choose which one they would attend if they could attend just one. The first measure we use is simply the choice of the march they would attend. The second measure is the difference in support for the corruption and redistribution marches, respectively, and support for the narrow scope march. These latter measures capture preferences for broad vs. narrow protests netting out general support for protest. In addition, we propose respondents to sign a petition supporting each of these claims to obtain a behavioral measure that goes beyond stated preferences.

Two points are worth noting regarding our measures of protest scope. First, we focus on preferences for protest scope *for a given objective problem*. This is because we want to understand the variation in protest scope preferences net of the scope of objective grievances. Focusing on one specific objective problem allows us to explore more precisely the role of efficacy and blame attribution. Second, the corruption march may have been perceived more narrowly than we anticipated. Our wording (“the healthcare problem cannot be solved unless corrupt politicians are removed from office”) can be interpreted in rather narrow terms (“rotten apples” or local politicians) or in broader terms (national political class). The police data presented above suggests that most protests on corruption are at the local level, i.e. about a ward councilor, the municipal manager, or the mayor, so the interpretation may be narrower than expected.⁵

The survey includes a number of measures capturing perceived *efficacy*: protest efficacy, political efficacy, and social efficacy as well as personal power. Each index includes three items with answer options ranging from disagree strongly to agree strongly.⁶ We perform a principal component analysis of these items and use the first component as measure of the respective concept. The first concept focuses on *protest efficacy*: in how far do respondents believe that they can alter conditions or policies through protest? It

⁵It may be noticed that in table 1 above, the share of local protests dealing with governance/ corruption is similar to the share of national protests. These are however distributions conditional on the protest scope level. Since there are generally many more local protests than national ones, this is consistent with around 85% of corruption protests being at the local level.

⁶As is standard practice in social psychology, we treat the 5-point scales as continuous variables even if, strictly speaking we cannot be sure if the distance between answer options such as disagree strongly - disagree - neither agree nor disagree is the same.

includes items such as “Protests/Marches can make politicians respond to people like me” or “Protests/marches are mostly a waste of time”. The second measure gauges *Political efficacy*, the extent to which people are convinced that they can make a change through conventional political means. It includes items such as “At election time, I can punish ward councilors who don’t do their job” or “My community can put pressure on local politicians to do their job”. *Social efficacy* measures beliefs about people’s ability and willingness to stand up for a just society. It includes items such as “A fair society could be achieved if communities really stood up for it”. In addition, we use a combined efficacy index that is an average of the different efficacy indices. The *personal power* index uses items from the power scale as developed in Anderson, John and Keltner (2012) such as “In my relationships with others my ideas and opinions are often ignored” or “In my relationships with others I can get them to listen to what I say”. All indices are standardized.

We also collect information allowing us to assess the two potential channels linking efficacy to protest scope (blame attribution vs. rational cost-benefit-calculation). *Blame attribution* is measured via two survey items where respondents are asked to attribute the blame for two specific problems: delivery of water and electricity, and crime.⁷ The answer options range from blaming the people (i.e. bad parenting for crime, people stealing electricity for services), to state agencies (the police, ESKOM, water authority), the government, or the wider system (poverty and inequality). We construct variables for blaming people, blaming agencies, etc. by combining the crime and the services items; i.e. an individual has value one for blaming the wider system if they blame poverty and inequality for both problems. In addition, we combine the two blame variables (for services and crime) into an additive variable (broad blame) to measure more fine-grained blame levels. To assess the plausibility of the cost-benefit-calculation channel, we gauge people’s assessment of the effectiveness of different protest types via an item (broad protest effectiveness) asking respondents about their beliefs about which type of protest they think is most likely to be successful. Protests about small (narrow) issues, protest about big (broad) issues, or whether the type of issue has no bearing on the likelihood of success. We use the latter two items relative to the first to measure beliefs about the potential effectiveness of broad vs. narrow protests.

4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Key Outcome Variables

Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the protest scope, blame attribution, and protest type effectiveness variables for the control group. The inspection of these variables delivers some first, relevant, insights. The “march choice” variables show that there is indeed

⁷The question wording is as follows: “Many people think that crime [the lack of affordable services of good quality such as water and electricity] is an important problem. Could you please tell me which you think is the most important factor responsible for this problem?”

high variation in terms of which protest respondents choose in order to address the same hypothetical healthcare problem. While about half of the respondents favour a narrow scope protest – asking for more doctors and nurses – the remainder is split between the corruption and the redistribution march. This supports our contention that different people articulate similar grievances in different ways. In turn, respondents also differ in where they attribute blame for the delivery and police problems. Each type of response has been selected by substantial numbers of respondents. In particular, around 60% of respondents attribute crime and public service problems to broader targets, namely the government or inequality but there is also about one quarter of respondents who believes the people are to blame. Lastly, the table also shows the results for the variable by which we measure whether our treatment affects belief about protest type effectiveness. Again, there is substantial variation in respondents’ beliefs about what type of protest is likely to succeed. Beyond the 10% that believe that protest never works, there are about one third of respondents each believing either that only narrow or only broad scoped protests work, and about a quarter that believe that protest scope has no bearing on how successful a protest will be.

[Table 2 about here]

5 Results

Our main analysis is based on an experiment embedded in the survey where we seek to temporarily affect perceptions of *efficacy* and study the effects of this manipulation on protest scope. We consider the two potential channels presented above, via processes of rational decision-making and via blame attribution.⁸

5.1 Treatments

To affect perceptions of efficacy, we ask respondents to recall a successful (high efficacy treatment) or unsuccessful (low efficacy treatment) protest. We then ask a number of questions about that protest in order to make respondents engage with the treatment. For example, we ask what the protest was about, whether they or someone they know participated, why they felt it was successful (unsuccessful), or how empowered (powerless) they felt when they realized that the protest was successful (unsuccessful). In addition, there is a control group.

⁸The experimental component of the survey delivered separate treatments seeking to affect two aspects of efficacy: personal power and political (protest) efficacy. In the event, the personal power treatment was not successful in affecting perceptions of personal power or any efficacy measure. We thus exclude the respondents who received this treatment from the analysis and discuss it separately in appendix B

To make it more likely that respondents recall a successful (unsuccessful) protest event, the categories of success and failure were defined very broadly. In the high efficacy treatment, we define success as including the increase of awareness about the problem, in the low efficacy treatment, we define failure as including a protest where not all demands were met.

We opted for a personal recall treatment rather than presenting respondents with real existing protests for three main reasons. First, pre-tests revealed that it was difficult to identify protests that would be relevant and known to most of the respondents. Second, individuals have pre-conceptions about the success level of an existing protest. It was perfectly possible that a protest we present as successful would have been stored in someone’s memory as unsuccessful - perhaps because it did not solve a problem that was personally relevant to the respondent, and vice-versa. Third, as Hassell and Settle (2017) discuss, previous work has found that treatments requiring respondents to think about personal issues are more salient. They make respondents “more prone to conceptualize themselves in that state of being because they are more likely to access memories confirming these conceptualizations” (pp.13-14). In other words, respondents are more likely to feel efficacious if they remember a protest they personally thought was successful compared to an existing one presented to them as successful.

The treatments were designed in an effort to minimize the chances that they affect individual dispositions besides efficacy. The “high” vs. “low” condition differ only in one word: whether a *successful* or *unsuccessful* protest was to be remembered. The objective was to induce a difference in perceived efficacy as large as possible, but nothing else.⁹

It is important to note that the treatments are not intended to emulate a real-world situation and generate lasting effects. The treatments intend to temporarily manipulate perceptions of efficacy to help understand mechanisms driving the formation of preferences for protest scope.

5.2 Manipulation checks

We first consider whether our treatments have succeeded in manipulating different measures of efficacy perceptions. The first measure is protest efficacy and represents our manipulation check in the narrow sense. We also consider measures of more general political and social efficacy to understand whether a successful manipulation of beliefs about protest efficacy carry over to beliefs about efficacy more generally.

Table 3 shows the treatment effects on indices of protest, political, social efficacy, and power. The top panel compares the high with the low condition of the efficacy treatment,

⁹The experimental randomization was programmed into the survey so that the different treatment groups should not differ significantly from each other. OLS regressions of demographic and pre-treatment attitudinal variables on the treatments show indeed that all treatment groups are similar *ex ante* (see table A.2).

while the bottom panel compares both conditions to the control. The treatment is successful in affecting all types of efficacy perceptions as well as perceived personal power. Individuals asked to remember a *successful* protest (relative to those remembering an unsuccessful one), are more likely to believe generally that protests are effective, that politicians can be held accountable and that social groups can improve their situation. Moreover, they are more likely to feel powerful in a personal sense. The size of the coefficients is substantial. The high efficacy treatment (relative to the low efficacy one), increases protest efficacy by 0.3 standard deviations, and increases political and social efficacy by around 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviations.

All the action comes from the high efficacy treatment. This can be seen in the bottom panel of the table: respondents in the low efficacy treatment are essentially indistinguishable from the control. This could be an indication that the default perception of this population is rather inefficacious and pessimistic so that perceiving protests as generally unsuccessful is the norm.¹⁰ Because the effect comes from the high efficacy treatment, from here onward we display results that compare the high and low efficacy treatments to the control group.

[Table 3 about here]

5.3 Protest scope

We consider the effect of the efficacy treatments on preferences for protest of broad scope. Columns 1 and 2 in table 4 show the results for respondents' *choice* of a particular march, columns 3 and 4 display their level of *specific support* for one of these marches.

Results are as hypothesized regarding preferences for the redistribution march. Respondents in the high efficacy treatment are more likely to prefer a march focusing on poverty and inequality to address health care problems in their neighborhood. As expected, the low efficacy treatment, which does not affect efficacy, does not affect preferences for a redistribution march either. These insights hold across the two outcome measures. In contrast, we find no effect of the high efficacy treatment on preferences for the corruption march. This may be due to the fact that the corruption march may be considered of rather narrow scope, as mentioned above.¹¹

[Table 4 about here]

¹⁰Van Der Toorn et al. (2015) make the general argument that disadvantaged individuals often feel rather powerless. This could explain why we cannot further decrease such perceptions experimentally.

¹¹Table A.3 in the appendix shows that these results carry over to people's willingness to sign a petition targeting either narrow or broad complaints.

5.4 Channels: Blame attribution and protest type effectiveness

Our conceptual framework posits two potential channels through which efficacy could affect preferences for protest scope. One channel could operate via rational cost-benefit-calculations. Beliefs that broad scope protests can succeed may generate preferences for protests with broader scope. We might refer to this as a “rational actor” channel. A second channel could operate via blame attribution. Higher perceptions of efficacy may allow for blame to be attributed to more systemic targets. We might refer to this as a “social psychology” type of channel.

Table 5 shows the treatment effects for these two channels. We find evidence in line with the social psychology channel but not with the rational actor channel.

Columns 1-4 show that respondents in the high efficacy conditions are indeed more likely to attribute blame for their grievances to systemic factors: the high efficacy condition is associated with a higher propensity to attribute social problems to the government and to poverty/ inequality.¹²

¹³ In contrast there is no effect of the high efficacy condition on people’s assessment of the effectiveness of broad scoped protests. Individuals in the high efficacy conditions are not more likely to believe that either broad scoped protests are likely to succeed or that any protest can be successful. The low efficacy treatment, in turn, has no effect on any of these variables.

[Table 5 about here]

5.5 Robustness checks

The experimental approach allows us to establish the causal effect of our treatments. However, our theoretical framework concerns the causal effect of efficacy perceptions. Attributing the causal effect to efficacy requires the assumption that the treatment has not brought about other changes in the individual relevant to our results besides affecting their efficacy perceptions.

Although we designed the two treatment conditions with this concern in mind by changing only one word between these, asking individuals to recall successful vs. unsuccessful protest may induce different memories that may lead to different perceptions or

¹²There are several ways in which the two questions on blame attribution scope could be combined to derive a single measure. Table A.4 in the appendix uses an alternative procedure, where we consider an actor to be blamed if it is blamed in either domain (crime *or* services) rather than in both domains (crime *and* services) as in the table 5. Results are generally similar using this alternative measure.

¹³We investigated if system justification, as defined by Jost, Banaji and Nosek (2004) played a role in this process. Table A.3 in the appendix shows the results. The coefficient of the high efficacy treatment is negative as expected, although small and statistically insignificant. This could be because the measure we use is drawn from system justification research in the US, and this may not adequately capture system justification in a completely different setting as is South Africa (see also Cichocka and Jost (2014), suggesting that the concept is less relevant in Eastern Europe than in the US).

thoughts. While we cannot exhaustively partial out all these, we can verify two important issues. First, we examine if respondents in the high vs. low condition had different recall rates, which would induce potentially problematic sample selection. Second, we examine if the characteristics of the protests recalled by respondents in the high vs. low condition differ in systematic ways. Table 6 shows the results. Reassuringly, recall rates between the two conditions are identical. Furthermore, some characteristics of the recalled protest are similar, such as whether the individual was present or knew someone in the protest in question. However, other characteristics differ substantially. Respondents asked to recall a successful protest are more likely to recall a larger one, one having occurred during Apartheid, and with a topic other than services.

These differences could potentially have important implications for the validity of the results. In particular, protests during Apartheid were more likely to be of broad scope. Accordingly, it is plausible that respondents asked to recall a successful protest subsequently report more attribution and protest scope, not because of efficacy perceptions, but because of their mental association with Apartheid-era protests.

[Table 6 about here]

To address this issue, we investigate if the results hold when we control for the characteristics of the protests recalled, in particular for the time period, the size, and the topic of the recalled protest. Strictly speaking, these variables are endogenous, and this makes coefficients of this regression hard to interpret. Nevertheless, we believe that the exercise is useful because if results remain similar to the benchmark specification, it suggests that our results are *not* driven by Apartheid or large protests. Table 7 shows the results, focusing on our key outcome variables. The top panel reproduces the results from before with the whole sample and the second panel shows the results controlling for the characteristics of recalled protests. The table shows comparisons between the high efficacy and the low efficacy condition, because there is no information on types of protest for the control group. Our main results clearly hold even when controlling for protest characteristics.

We perform a further test to check that our results reflect the treatment working as intended. The treatments require a degree of effort, good will, and engagement from respondents to serve their purpose. If results are driven by the intended treatment effect, they should be stronger for people having engaged more intensely with the treatments. We built three items into the survey that measure respondent engagement as reported by the fieldworkers. The third row panel of table 7 reproduces the regression in panel 2 but restricting the sample to those engaged with the treatment. Results are indeed present and stronger for more engaged respondents. Thus, even when controlling for protest characteristics and restricting attention to respondents most engaged with the

treatment, we find that being asked to recall a successful as opposed to an unsuccessful protest is associated with more efficacy, more systemic blame attribution and a preference for broader scope protests (demanding redistribution).¹⁴

[Table 7 about here]

6 Concluding remarks

This paper argues that *scope* is a dimension of protest relevant for understanding a protest’s potential impact – alongside established dimensions such as size or protest tactics. We show that similar grievances can give rise to protests of different scope. We propose a simple conceptual framework to understand drivers of preferences for protest scope focusing on perceptions of efficacy.

Using a survey experiment conducted in two South African townships we provide evidence that individuals induced to feel more efficacious are indeed more likely to prefer protests of broader scope to address a given social problem, namely protests that target systemic social issues such as poverty and inequality. This effect seems to operate via a social psychology channel whereby high efficacy increases the propensity of people to attribute their problems to systemic factors.

We believe that the study of protest scope can offer useful new insights into the political behavior of disadvantaged groups. We hope that this study provides a useful first step in that direction. Future research could explore cases beyond South Africa. For instance, it would be interesting to study preferences for protest scope and blame attribution of African Americans in the context of the Black Lives Matter movement: which share support broad framed protests that target social inequality as opposed to narrowly framed protests that focus on police brutality? How do changes in perceived efficacy – perhaps induced by the state’s reaction to protest - affect preferences for protest scope? In addition, future research could fruitfully consider the role of other individual and contextual factors. Our focus on efficacy makes sense as a starting point in the agenda. However, other factors are bound to be relevant to understand when and why some people articulate their grievances towards narrow targets and when towards more systemic ones.

¹⁴The benchmark specification shows a negative coefficient for the corruption march, but this effect is not robust to alternative specifications and measures.

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Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Dimensions of Protest Scope




Table 1: Protest Scope and Other Dimensions of Protest

	local	provincial	national
<i>Motive</i>			
crime	0.05	0.00	0.09
employment/salaries	0.53	0.53	0.42
governance/corruption	0.04	0.05	0.08
human rights	0.01	0.05	0.19
other	0.15	0.11	0.09
service delivery	0.21	0.26	0.13
Total	1	1	1
<i>Number of Participants</i>			
below 100	0.58	0.33	0.53
101-500	0.34	0.61	0.37
501-1000	0.04	0.06	0.02
above 1000	0.04	0.00	0.08
Total	1	1	1
<i>Tactics</i>			
peaceful	0.79	0.79	0.96
violent	0.22	0.21	0.04
Total	1	1	1

Note: Based on a random subset of 2011 and 2013 events from IRIS database; cells show shares by protest scope level

Figure 2: Channels linking Efficacy to Protest Scope




Table 2: March Choice, Blame Attribution, Protest Type Efficacy in Control Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Total	Gugulethu	Mitchells Plain
<i>March Choice:</i>			
- - choice docs & nurses march	0.46	0.53	0.38
- - choice corruption march	0.30	0.26	0.35
- - choice redistribution march	0.24	0.21	0.27
<i>Attribution Crime Problem:</i>			
- - blame people	0.22	0.26	0.19
- - blame police	0.14	0.16	0.12
- - blame government	0.31	0.20	0.43
- - blame poverty/inequ	0.33	0.38	0.27
<i>Attribution Service Problem:</i>			
- - blame people	0.29	0.35	0.23
- - blame agency	0.11	0.11	0.10
- - blame government	0.30	0.25	0.36
- - blame poverty/inequ	0.30	0.29	0.31
<i>Protest Type Efficacy:</i>			
- - Protests never work	0.11	0.08	0.14
- - only narrow protests work	0.36	0.48	0.23
- - only broad protests work	0.28	0.18	0.38
- - all protest scopes can work	0.25	0.25	0.25
Observations	703	361	342

Table 3: Manipulation Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Protest efficacy	Political efficacy	Social efficacy	Personal power
<i>Efficacy high vs. low</i>				
High Efficacy	0.293*** (0.069)	0.114 (0.067)	0.181* (0.071)	0.141* (0.060)
Observations	776	776	751	776
<i>All vs. control</i>				
High Efficacy	0.264*** (0.061)	0.134* (0.059)	0.112 (0.062)	0.158** (0.055)
Low Efficacy	-0.026 (0.060)	0.011 (0.059)	-0.054 (0.061)	0.015 (0.054)
Observations	1478	1478	1439	1478

Standard errors in parentheses

Controls: fieldworker, area, female, age, secondary schooling

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4: Treatment Effects on Preferences for Protest Scope

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Choice	Choice	Support	Support
	March	March	March	March
	Corruption	Redistribution	Corruption	Redistribution
High Efficacy	-0.023 (0.029)	0.073** (0.027)	-0.051 (0.066)	0.139 (0.072)
Low Efficacy	0.054 (0.029)	-0.024 (0.027)	0.017 (0.066)	0.048 (0.071)
Observations	1465	1465	1478	1478

Standard errors in parentheses

Controls: fieldworker, area, female, age, secondary schooling

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5: Channels: Blame Attribution & Protest Type Effectiveness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Blame People	Blame Agencies	Blame Government	Blame Inequality	Broad Protests Effective
High Efficacy	-0.060*** (0.016)	0.007 (0.009)	0.060** (0.021)	0.072** (0.022)	0.042 (0.029)
Low Efficacy	-0.003 (0.016)	0.014 (0.009)	0.013 (0.021)	0.001 (0.022)	0.015 (0.029)
Observations	1459	1459	1459	1459	1462

Standard errors in parentheses

Controls: fieldworker, area, female, age, secondary schooling.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6: Treatment effect on characteristics of remembered protest

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Remem. Protest		Particip./ Knew someone	When Recent	When last 10 yrs	When Aparth.	> 1000 People	Topic Services	Topic Crime	Topic Work
High Efficacy vs. low	-0.013 (0.024)	0.021 (0.036)	-0.056 (0.037)	-0.092* (0.037)	0.148*** (0.027)	0.121*** (0.036)	-0.116*** (0.034)	-0.009 (0.030)	-0.012 (0.028)
<i>N</i>	776	663	663	662	662	663	659	659	659

Standard errors in parentheses

Controls: fieldworker, female, age, secondary schooling

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 7: Robustness Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Combined Efficacy	March Corruption	March Redistribution	Support March Corruption	Support March Redistribution	Broad Blame Attrib.	Broad Protests Effective
<i>Benchmark model</i>							
High Efficacy	0.289*** (0.068)	-0.077* (0.033)	0.096** (0.031)	-0.064 (0.071)	0.101 (0.077)	0.515*** (0.117)	0.022 (0.034)
Observations	751	772	772	776	776	768	765
<i>With Protest Characteristics Controls</i>							
High Efficacy	0.362*** (0.076)	-0.068 (0.038)	0.090* (0.037)	-0.108 (0.085)	0.156 (0.091)	0.561*** (0.135)	0.048 (0.039)
Observations	625	644	644	646	646	638	639
<i>With Protest Characteristics Controls & restricted to motivated</i>							
High Efficacy	0.441*** (0.104)	-0.067 (0.049)	0.134** (0.048)	0.015 (0.117)	0.292* (0.118)	0.562** (0.173)	0.028 (0.050)
Observations	399	410	410	410	410	405	405

Standard errors in parentheses

All models control for fieldworker, female, age, secondary schooling

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .001$

Protest Characteristics are dummy variables for the time period, topic, and size of the remembered protest.

Motivated Respondents: Fieldworkers subjectively rated how engaged respondents were with the treatment, as well as how bored or distracted they were more generally during the survey (possibly by the presence of other people or chores, etc.) (all on scales from 1 to 5). “Motivated” captures respondents that were most engaged and least bored and distracted. It takes value 1 if respondents had the highest value in engagement, and lowest in boredom and distraction.

A Appendix Tables

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

	count	mean	sd	min	max
<i>Protest Efficacy:</i>					
– protests make politicians listen	1482	2.42	1.23	0	4
– protests waste of time	1482	1.75	1.26	0	4
– protests make politicians respond	1482	2.38	1.18	0	4
– protest efficacy index	1482	-0.00	1.00	-2	2
<i>Political Efficacy:</i>					
– can punish politicians	1482	2.45	1.30	0	4
– dishonest politicians can be shamed	1482	2.88	1.07	0	4
– community can pressure politicians	1482	2.97	1.04	0	4
– political efficacy index	1482	-0.00	1.00	-3	1
<i>Social Efficacy:</i>					
– fair society achievable	1482	4.20	0.87	1	5
– community stands up f. fair society	1481	0.61	0.49	0	1
– inequality inevitable	1444	0.38	0.49	0	1
– social efficacy index	1443	0.00	1.00	-3	2
<i>Other Efficacy Variables:</i>					
– protest type effectiveness	1466	0.55	0.50	0	1
– combined efficacy index	1482	0.00	1.00	-4	2
<i>Personal Power:</i>					
– people listen to me	1482	3.14	0.84	0	4
– my opinions are ignored	1482	1.48	1.10	0	4
– my wishes not valued	1482	1.57	1.10	0	4
– power index	1482	0.00	1.00	-3	2
<i>Crime Blame:</i>					
– blame people	1463	0.19	0.39	0	1
– blame police	1463	0.14	0.34	0	1
– blame government	1463	0.33	0.47	0	1
– blame poverty/inequ	1463	0.34	0.48	0	1
<i>Service Blame:</i>					
– blame people	1482	0.25	0.43	0	1
– blame agency	1482	0.11	0.31	0	1
– blame government	1482	0.32	0.47	0	1
– blame poverty/inequ	1482	0.33	0.47	0	1

– broad blame attribution	1463	5.56	1.71	2	8
<i>Protest Scope:</i>					
– choice docs & nurses march	1469	0.44	0.50	0	1
– choice corruption march	1469	0.31	0.46	0	1
– choice redistribution march	1469	0.25	0.43	0	1
– net support redistribution march	1482	-0.43	1.19	-3	3
– net support corruption march	1482	-0.29	1.05	-3	3
<i>Petition:</i>					
– petition docs & nurses	1362	0.42	0.49	0	1
– petition corruption	1362	0.33	0.47	0	1
– petition redistribution	1362	0.25	0.43	0	1
<i>Demographics:</i>					
– female	1482	0.60	0.49	0	1
– age	1478	43.37	16.33	18	96
– secondary school degree	1482	0.34	0.47	0	1

Table A.2: Randomization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	sex	secondary education	age	grievance level	identity scope
High Efficacy	-0.014 (0.031)	0.003 (0.030)	2.589* (1.018)	0.039 (0.031)	0.029 (0.051)
Low Efficacy	-0.024 (0.031)	0.023 (0.030)	1.920 (1.011)	0.011 (0.031)	-0.073 (0.051)
Observations	1482	1482	1478	1482	1418

Standard errors in parentheses

Controls: fieldworker, area

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.3: Petition and System Justification Outcomes

	(1) Petition Corruption	(2) Petition Redistribution	(3) System Justification
High Efficacy	-0.021 (0.031)	0.061* (0.028)	-0.026 (0.060)
Low Efficacy	0.056 (0.030)	-0.023 (0.028)	0.091 (0.060)
Observations	1358	1358	1478

Standard errors in parentheses

Controls: fieldworker, area, female, age, secondary schooling

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.4: Alternative Specification of Blame Attribution Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Blame People	Blame Agencies	Blame Government	Blame Inequality
High Efficacy	-0.163*** (0.030)	-0.046 (0.026)	0.053 (0.031)	0.077* (0.031)
Low Efficacy	-0.071* (0.030)	0.034 (0.026)	-0.010 (0.031)	0.021 (0.031)
Observations	1459	1459	1459	1459

Standard errors in parentheses

Controls: fieldworker, area, female, age, secondary schooling

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

B Results power treatment

The *power treatment* seeks to induce a sense of power / powerlessness in respondents to study whether personal power is related to protest scope. We attempt to operationalize the approach in Van Der Toorn et al. (2015) in our setting. In their study, students are asked to write an essay about a situation where they had power over someone/ where someone else had power over them. In our setting - face to face interviews - respondents are asked to *think* about such situations but without telling the interviewer any details about the experience. A series of follow-up questions is asked to make respondents dwell on the situation (setting of the experience, age, sex, race of other person involved, how happy/unhappy powerful/powerless they felt).

Table B.1 shows that respondents asked to remember situations where they had power over someone report similar power perceptions (as well as efficacy ones) as those asked to remember a situation where someone had power over them. Both high and low power conditions induce individuals to report being more powerful (and perceive higher political efficacy) than the control. It is not clear why this is the case. It may be that respondents asked to recall a situation where someone had power over them reacted by reasserting their dignity. Irrespective of the reason, the implication is that the power treatment is not able to yield insights on the role of power/ efficacy for protest scope.

Table B.1: Manipulation Check Power Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Personal power	Protest efficacy	Political efficacy	Social efficacy
power_high	0.099 (0.055)	0.031 (0.062)	0.111 (0.059)	-0.027 (0.061)
power_low	0.113* (0.057)	0.036 (0.064)	0.081 (0.062)	-0.056 (0.064)
Observations	1422	1422	1422	1388

Standard errors in parentheses

Controls: fieldworker, area, female, age, secondary schooling.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



SALDRU

Southern Africa Labour and
Development Research Unit

The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) conducts research directed at improving the well-being of South Africa's poor. It was established in 1975. Over the next two decades the unit's research played a central role in documenting the human costs of apartheid. Key projects from this period included the Farm Labour Conference (1976), the Economics of Health Care Conference (1978), and the Second Carnegie Enquiry into Poverty and Development in South Africa (1983-86). At the urging of the African National Congress, from 1992-1994 SALDRU and the World Bank coordinated the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD). This project provide baseline data for the implementation of post-apartheid socio-economic policies through South Africa's first non-racial national sample survey.

In the post-apartheid period, SALDRU has continued to gather data and conduct research directed at informing and assessing anti-poverty policy. In line with its historical contribution, SALDRU's researchers continue to conduct research detailing changing patterns of well-being in South Africa and assessing the impact of government policy on the poor. Current research work falls into the following research themes: post-apartheid poverty; employment and migration dynamics; family support structures in an era of rapid social change; public works and public infrastructure programmes, financial strategies of the poor; common property resources and the poor. Key survey projects include the Langeberg Integrated Family Survey (1999), the Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain Survey (2000), the ongoing Cape Area Panel Study (2001-) and the Financial Diaries Project.

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