THE IMPACT OF RESETTLEMENT IN THE CISKEI:
THREE CASE STUDIES

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Saldu Working Paper No. 49

Cape Town

April 1983
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are grateful to the Algemeen Diakonale Bureau van de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland who provided financial support for this project, and to the Surplus Peoples' Project, particularly those people in the Eastern Cape for their co-operation and help in making their date available to us.

We are most grateful to our translator, Msokolo Qotole, without whom this publication would not have been possible. His patience, hard work and comradeship, inside the Ciskeian resettlement camps and the useful discussions with him in Cape Town are greatly appreciated.

We should also like to thank our colleagues in SalDr for their time and assistance.
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION TO RESETTLEMENT

Massive population relocation is one of the most striking features of modern South Africa and possibly one of the most monstrous aspects of apartheid. Over the past thirty years, millions of people have been uprooted and set down on strange soil through the policy of the South African government. As Cosmas Desmond points out, these processes have been quite widely documented but what has generally been focussed upon has been empirical details of the actual dimensions of the process and the lack of facilities immediately after the removals. Relatively little has been written about the long term effects and implications of resettlement though the literature and research in this area is clearly expanding. What we have attempted to do in this paper is to study aspects of resettlement in three settlements in the Ciskei - Sada, Elukhanyweni and Dimbaza - in terms of longer term implications for the people concerned, the district and the region.

The pioneer work on population relocation is widely acknowledged to be Desmond's famous 'The Discarded People' which when published in 1971 stimulated interest at a national and international level and, in conjunction with several documentary movies, provoked widespread protest. The book consisted of a history of the programme, a national survey and an exploration of the way resettlement fitted into apartheid. Desmond's was not the first work on the subject - the Liberal Party, the Black Sash and the South African Institute of Race Relations had all looked at resettlement, but none in as comprehensive a manner.

Subsequent to 'The Discarded People' the most notable contributions to the study of resettlement have been the works of Alan Baldwin and Gerry Maré. Other articles on the subject have included several contributions to SASH and entries in the Annual Survey of the SAIRR. Margaret Nash of the South African Council of Churches and Sheena Duncan of the Black Sash have been important publicists on the subject. Besides these works there are a number which deal with the issue as a part of a discussion of different aspects of South Africa's political economy. Social scientists such as Martin Legassick and Mike Morris have attempted, separately, to explain the resettlement programmes as aspects of apartheid policy in analyses of South Africa as a capitalist society characterised by exploitation and oppression with a racial form.
Our main concern in this paper is to discuss the implications of resettlement, although we do focus briefly on its causes. Initially, however, we will attempt to elucidate the term. In the early analyses the term resettlement was used in an unreflective way to describe the plight of the millions who found themselves in strange and hostile environments in the countryside. This is true, too, of popular discussions of the subject today. However one of the important contributions made by Baldwin's work and later extended by Maré was to develop workable categories of population relocation and, particularly in Maré's works, to attempt to deal with each separately as well as in a combined form. Maré identified eight separate major forms of population relocation and one minor one. The categories are as follows:

1. **Clearance of 'Black Spots'**

This covers those Africans removed from farming or residential land in the rural areas of 'white South Africa' to which they held freehold title and which were rescheduled white. Between 1948 and 1976 approximately 258,000 Africans were resettled from 'black spots' to the homelands, at a rate which rapidly increased in the late 1960s. In our study one of the three resettlement camps examined was a typical example of such a clearance. Four hundred families farming small plots of land in four villages in the Humansdorp district were forcibly expropriated in 1977/8 and resettled at Elukhanyweni in the Keiskammahoek district. We discuss this in detail in section V(B).

2. **Relocation due to the abolition of the Labour Tenant System and Squatting on White Farms**

Many white farms accommodated black residents who worked some land for themselves in return for labour services or other forms of rent to the farmer/landlord. As agriculture was capitalised this form of relationship became increasingly redundant and the farms employed fully proletarianised workers. Some labour tenants were retained as wage labourers and many families of former labour tenants were forced to leave. Between 1960 and 1974 nearly one and a half million people falling into these categories were expelled from the farms and resettled in the homelands. These expulsions continued through the 1970s.
In the Eastern Cape neither the labour tenant nor the squatter system were widely practised. What was more important there was the elimination of seasonal and casual labour on the farms as a result of farm consolidation, capitalisation and rationalisation. Thus many former farm labourers and even more members of farm workers' families have been expelled from the farms and forced to move to resettlement camps. Many of the people who are said to have moved 'voluntarily' to the camps fall into this category. They are not physically resettled in the camps, but are left with little choice but to go there. The alternatives are to search for another farm or enter the towns illegally. This form of resettlement has in common with Mare's category two that people are expelled from farms as a result of the capitalist development of agriculture.

3. Relocation through the operation of Influx Control Legislation

Africans living in white scheduled areas, particularly urban ones, can be expelled and sent to the homelands if they do not comply with regulations under the Blacks Urban Areas Act.\textsuperscript{10} The mass resettlement of urban squatters, as in the Nyanga case, is the most dramatic form of this resettlement. There are small unpublicised Nyanga's everyday. It is difficult to estimate the number of people effectively resettled under these regulations, but the number arrested for their contravention regularly exceeded 500 000 per annum during the early 'seventies.\textsuperscript{11} Repression under these laws has been particularly severe in the area designated the 'Coloured Labour Preference Area' - the western half of the Cape Province.

Several people we interviewed in Dimbaza were products of such relocation, from cities as well as country towns. Women, in particular, are subject to such relocation when they wish to join their men who work in towns as contract workers.

4. Urban Relocation

This refers to the relocation of Africans, employed or not, from urban areas to dormitory settlements within the homeland boundaries.\textsuperscript{12} In many cases this has resulted in people being moved from convenient townships to sites 20 km. or further from their workplaces. Many people in locations outside small towns have been relocated in this way, as have those in large urban townships. Some squatter removals also fall into this category.
In the Ciskei, Mdantsane is the most dramatic example of such relocation. Thousands of people have been relocated there from locations around East London. They now have to commute over 20 kms. daily to work. In Sada and Dimbaza we found people who had been part of en bloc relocations of townships from Whittlesea and Queenstown, and Middleburg, Burgersdorp and Tarkastad respectively. These are but some examples for the Eastern Cape. Total national figures are difficult to obtain for this category of resettled people though their numbers clearly run into the hundreds of thousands.

5. Relocation due to Betterment Schemes

These are schemes in the homelands where people practising quasi-traditional subsistence or commercial agriculture are subsumed in schemes which seek to promote more organised forms of small scale agriculture. These schemes were, and are, not well received as they involve disruption and often dispossession and culling. Betterment was often an inaccurate description of the effect of the schemes for many of the people involved. 13

Modern irrigation projects such as Shiloh, next to Sada, and Keiskammahoek Dairy Scheme, near Elukhanyweni, were two such projects that we came across in our research which have effects in relocation terms not unlike the older betterment schemes. Both schemes had involved some dispossession and relocation and were unpopular in their regions though not necessarily with some small farmers who benefited.

6. Relocation for Strategic or Infrastructural Schemes

People who have been moved to accommodate military programmes (no man's land, testing sites) or infrastructural schemes such as dams or ports. Examples include the northern Natal border and St. Lucia lakes in the first categories and the Upper Tugela Basin and Richards Bay in the second. Total numbers are unobtainable for this category. 14

7. Relocation as Resistance

This is one of Maré's more questionable categories. 15 It includes both the action of squatting in the urban areas, illegally, and the somewhat
different phenomenon of voluntary flight from one homeland to another. Both are large-scale and important social phenomena, the first having been very widely discussed and not needing repetition here. One of the best known examples of flight between homelands was the massive movement of people from the Herschel and Glen Grey districts when these were transferred from the Ciskei to the Transkei shortly before the latter's independence in 1976. The move was a protest against the Transkei's political structures and was encouraged by false promises of land made by Ciskeian officials. Clearly the category includes quite different phenomena, though what it has as a unifying factor is that people move voluntarily. Thus it includes those people who flee unbearable conditions on white farms for some perceived security or relief in a homeland (we have already referred to these people under category 2 and will return to them later). Perhaps a more suitable name for category 7 might be 'voluntary relocation', but voluntary is a relative term and the value of the general category doubtful as the phenomena need to be dealt with separately.

8. Homeland Consolidation

As homeland boundaries are redrawn, land is rescheduled white, Venda, Shangaan or whatever. As in the aftermath of a war, people living on land under a different authority are forced to move, often into inferior circumstances.

In terms of a 1975 BENBO estimate, more than a million people were still destined to be moved under such circumstances. Between 1970 and 1979 about 305 000 people were officially moved due to homeland consolidation. Simkins argues that many such persons are in this process, moved from 'black spots' and thus homeland consolidation might in some cases be a euphemism for black spot removals. In these cases black spots are sometimes called 'badly situated areas'.

9. Other

Under this category Mare focuses exclusively on those people banished by security legislation to some settlement in a homeland. It is difficult
to establish how many people are affected in such a way, though it is obviously a relatively small number compared to the other categories. Despite this, its importance as a political weapon should not be underestimated. Of the relatively few people we spoke to, one was a former political prisoner who had been banished and another was the mother of a man in the same circumstances. Both men were sent to Dimbaza.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE


3. Cf. for example: Liberal Party of South Africa, 'Blackspots : A Study of Apartheid in Action' n.d.; Annual Surveys of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR); Black Sash, various issues of The Black Sash, now called SASH.


9. Mare, Gerry, op.cit., pp.8-11.

10. For a valuable exposition of the Act c.f. Black Sash 'Memorandum on the Application of the Pass Laws and Influx Control'.

11. Mare, Gerry, op.cit., pp.16-24.


15. Ibid. pp.36-40.

16. For a well documented study see NUSAS 'We Will Not Move', 1979, for a study of Crossroads to that date, as well as South African Outlook Vols. 107 and 108.

17. C.f. 'Control', Development Studies Group, 1979, pp.94-96.


20. Mare, Gerry, op.cit., 1980. p.43.
CHAPTER 2  HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE CISKEI

Recently, several issues have resulted in the Ciskei becoming a subject of much public discussion in South Africa. Of these, two are particularly noteworthy. On the one hand, the Ciskei has been granted 'independence' by the South African government - to become the fourth 'independent homeland' in South Africa. On the other, the Ciskei authorities have become quite infamous in their attempt to suppress the independent trade union movement in the Border region. Officials and members of three trade union branches in East London have frequently been detained, sometimes for long periods, by the Ciskeian security forces (and by their South African equivalents), accompanied by other forms of harassment.

These are issues of current importance, but the Ciskei has long been the site of struggles between oppressor and oppressed in South Africa. As far back as the eighteenth century the area, including that which is now known as the Ciskei (on 'this' side of the Kei River - as opposed to the Transkei, over the river, known as British Kaffraria in the intervening period), was a focal point of conflict between black and white cattle farmers. Many of the frontier ('Kaffir') wars took place thereabouts, and the names of many local white settlements indicate the uncordial nature of social relations in the region; Fort Beaufort, Fort Cox and Fort Cunynghame, for example.

The amount of land set aside for African ownership in the region by the 1913 Land Act was a relatively small and inferior portion, consisting of a number of small pieces of land, very little of which was arable. Of the remainder, much was unsuitable even as pastureage. The position and rôle of the reserves in South Africa have changed substantially since the general policy was first promulgated in 1913. This has been documented elsewhere and we do not intend to dwell on it here except insofar as it has immediate importance for our discussion. During the first half of this century the small pieces of land concerned were governed through the Department of Native Administration (which has since undergone numerous changes of name - presently the Department of Co-Operation and Development). Like the other reserves this land was run by white magistrates and, below them in the hierarchy, African chiefs and headmen. The
legal underpinning of the system was a curious mixture of customary and Roman Dutch law lodged in the material basis of communal land tenure in the reserves and held together by the political might of the central South African state.

The chiefs had some power that they could exert in local affairs and in the allocation of land. The substance of the power, though not great, varied between districts. At a wider level chiefs participated in the Ciskeian General Council, and the Natives’ Representative Council at a national level. Neither had any real power and were certainly no compensation for the lack of the franchise.

The ascendance of Malan’s National Party in 1948 saw the movement from the policy of ‘segregation’ to that of ‘apartheid’. This was a result of a combination of factors including the demands of the white middle class and small capitalists and farmers and the rise of an African nationalist movement with greater political force than before. The watershed statute was the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. This demarcated separate ‘ethnic’ homelands which were placed under separate hierarchies of authority. Old structures were modified and new ‘ethnically constituted’ ones developed at local, regional and territorial levels, under the rule of the Bantu Commissioner for each homeland. These structures were established for the Ciskei between 1957 and 1959. In 1961 the Ciskeian General Council was renamed the Ciskeian Territorial Authority which was granted minor powers. Subsequently the 1951 Act has been amended and replaced as the homelands system was modified, culminating in ‘independence’ for some since the mid-seventies.

The economic history of the Ciskei is similar to that of the other homelands. Throughout the twentieth century pieces of land in the Ciskei were little more than subsistence supplementing bases for migrant workers and, later, receptacles for capitalism’s unwanted Africans, classified Ciskeian. What has changed is the capacity of the land to play any kind of subsistence rôle. Starting earlier, but, like other homelands, particularly since the early 1950s, agricultural production has fallen rapidly, certainly in terms of output per head. This meant several things: the declining ability of the homelands to support even their resident population; the weakening of the distorted traditional modes of control; thus, generally, the declining legitimacy of these territories in almost every way.
In spite of the Tomlinson Commission's recommendations in 1955 that rapid economic development of the homelands was urgently needed, requiring vast investments by the state and capital, the homelands continued to stagnate and decline. The establishment of the Bantu Investment Corporation in 1959 made very little impact. Instead, the government of the time, guided by the principle that homeland development had to be indigenously financed, and that outsiders should not invest in the homelands, did no more than mildly promote border industry development outside the borders of the homelands. Agricultural betterment schemes within the borders had no significant positive economic impact.

The rationale for the decentralisation programme revolved around the aim of drawing industry and consequently African workers away from the major industrial concentrations. In the late sixties, there was a detectable policy shift. Decentralised economic activity was now to be located within the homelands where possible. Industrial and agricultural schemes were initiated. These we will discuss later in more detail, focussing more particularly on the Ciskei. What should be noted in passing, however, is that their real economic impact has been very limited. We shall argue that their importance lies much more at the political and ideological levels, inasmuch as they are tools for the reproduction of the Ciskei state in particular and the apartheid system in general.

Parallel to these shifts in economic planning for the homelands has been the rapid implantation, and in some cases fertilisation, of political structures designed to take them to independence. In the late sixties the powers of the Territorial Authorities were extended. In 1971, after the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970, and the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971, the Ciskei Territorial Authority became the Ciskei Legislative Assembly. A year later the Ciskei was granted 'self-governing status'. Although some members were elected, the Assembly was still overwhelmingly composed of nominated chiefs - the higher level of salaried 'chiefs' who remained important ideological/administrative cogs in the system, at regional and local authority levels. In 1979, of the 57 members of the Assembly, 35 were appointed chiefs and 22 were elected. Lennox L. Sebe, despite neither having a political party nor being an appointed or hereditary chief, was 'elected' Chief Minister. This choice of leader would seem to have been a result of the chiefs' voting on the instructions of the Bantu Administration Department which, after all, was
their employer. Sebe has remained boss and since independence in 1981 has been called Prime Minister. His brother, Charles, is head of the police and army.

The changing political structures in the Ciskei, as in the other homelands, reflected the changing rôle of the reserves/homelands/bantustans in the South African political economy. In the earlier period, up to the second world war, their economic rôle was to maintain a reserve army of labour for capital and to subsidise the wages of migrant workers on the mines. Politically, as we have seen, the distorted forms of traditional politico-legal relations were maintained and supported in order to contain conflicts at a local and regional level. These were based on the bolstered remains of communal tenure systems.

After the war the reserves played a new rôle that was predicated on a number of factors: the economic decline of the reserves, the rise of the African nationalist movement in South Africa and the changing rôle of migrant labour. The decline of the economic bases of the reserves did not occur in a uniform manner. One could safely argue, for example, that the Ciskei region saw a more rapid and earlier decline than some of the other homelands, such as Bophuthatswana. Nevertheless, a secular tendency towards decline existed, and accelerated after the war. Local political and ideological structures needed reinforcement and possibly restructuring. The rise of the African nationalist movement in the ANC and moves towards black unity through the 'doctor's pact' and the Programme of Action in 1949, and the resultant Congress Alliance formed in 1955 - which brought coloured, Indian, African and a few white radical political leaders together - posed a very serious threat to racial capitalism in South Africa. Traditional political controls were disintegrating.

At the same time, the migrant labour system developed new dimensions. Through the 1950s and 1960s, an increasing number of employees in industry were migrant workers. Before this period most migrant workers had gone to the mines and the industrial proletariat was drawn almost exclusively from permanently settled people. Several explanations have been offered for this development. Kaplan argues that competitive capital required cheaper labour in competition with the more highly capitalised industries.
of the advanced industrial countries. Morris argued that tighter controls were imposed on the recruitment of labour in industry in order to protect capitalist agriculture which supported many people migrating to work elsewhere and was experiencing a shortage of cheap labour.

Thus, he argued, labour bureaux were instituted partly in order to force industry to recruit migrant labour from the reserves/homelands rather than use labour moving more freely between the farms and the factories. The general disorganisation of the working class and inhibition of trade union organisation has been widely invoked as contributing to the extension of the migrant labour system. This argument is related, at least at an economic level, to Kaplan's explanation.

All these arguments would seem to have some validity - to rank them in importance is not our task. We are concerned, here, with the consequences. The measures adopted to extend the migrant labour system consisted of the reinforcement and expansion of influx control measures and the rapidly growing use of state labour bureaux for the allocation of labour.

Thus pressures from various class forces resulted in the development of apartheid - the extension of the homeland system. It was a response to economic and political factors of various kinds, as we have listed above. It is not intended to be a comprehensive list but rather a guide to the range of contradictions out of which the homeland system grew.

The Ciskei, like the other homelands, though homelands are by no means identical, emerged over the last two decades as a means of maintaining and developing the present form of capitalist accumulation in South Africa. What we intend to do in the rest of this paper is to examine how the Ciskei is playing this role, and the intended and unintended effects of this policy, through the prism of resettlement. The central section of this paper which consists of a detailed account of interviews in three resettlement areas is, of course, a small basis from which to attempt this analysis and our claims must be somewhat limited in this respect.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Morris, M., op.cit., 1976; Legassic, op.cit., 1974, and various other works many of which are listed in Maré's op.cit., 1980 bibliography, mainly under Section III. We have also looked at it briefly in a previous article, Green, P. and Hirsch, A. 'The Ciskei: Political Economy of Control', South African Labour Bulletin, Vol.7 No. 4/5, 1982.


CHAPTER 3  POPULATION AND ECONOMY OF THE REGION

1. Demography of Resettlement

The current population of the Ciskei is about 700,000, while twice that number of 'Ciskeians' live outside the Ciskei. There are several reasons for this. Firstly the territory denoted Ciskei does not represent any kind of ancestral home for many people classified Ciskeian. The homelands are token reserves, they do not necessarily represent real historical regions. Many 'Ciskeians' have never seen the place. Secondly, Xhosa speaking people were faced with the choice of registering as Transkeian or Ciskeian 'citizens' in 1976, shortly before the Transkei's independence. Because of the widespread unpopularity of the Matanzima regime and the imminence of 'Transkei independence', those people who could registered as Ciskeian. Thirdly, as we have mentioned, the Ciskei region experienced an earlier and more severe economic decline than the other reserves and many people left the area permanently to work on white farms and in the towns.

Although the final boundaries of the Ciskei are still, as far as we know, either undecided or secret, it seems unlikely that they will change very much from current ones. That would give the Ciskei a maximum land area of about 8,000 km\(^2\) of which about 2/3 is potential pasture, though extremely limited by periodic drought\(^1\) and the absence of agricultural services. About 15% potentially arable.\(^2\) Thus the Ciskei would have a population density of about 85 persons per \(\text{Km}^2\). When this is compared with a population density of 33 persons per \(\text{Km}^2\) for South Africa as a whole,\(^3\) it is not surprising that the Ciskei (Quail) Commission referred to the Ciskei as 'perhaps the most overcrowded rural area of South Africa'.

The other striking feature of the Ciskei population, apart from the high femininity ratio, is the very rapid population growth rate that the Ciskei has experienced, particularly between 1970 and 1980. This is shown in Table 1. Some other studies of Ciskei population growth in this period have not shown its real extent because of the incorrect baseline data chosen for 1970. The official population of the Ciskei in 1970 was about 526,000, but this included the population of areas which have since been excised from the Ciskei, such as the heavily populated Herschel and Glen Grey districts later ceded to the Transkei. We were fortunate to obtain
the Department of Statistics estimates for the 1970 population of the Ciskei as envisaged by the 1975 consolidation proposals. Though not exactly comparable with today's Ciskei it is a close approximation, and it is certainly reasonably close to the Ciskei in 1980 from which our comparative census figures are derived.

As the table indicates, between 1970 and 1980 the official population of the Ciskei grew from 350 741 to 630 353. This represents a per annum population growth rate of 6% which is more than double the 2.7% for Africans in the country as a whole. There would seem to be no other explanation for this, but that the difference of 3.3% p.a. represents the influx of population into the Ciskei largely as a result of resettlement. This amounts to 172 537 people over the ten year period. Officially 40 601 people were resettled there by the Department of Co-Operation and Development of the South African government between 1970 and 1980, in terms of Section 5 of the Black Administration Act of 1927 (as amended). The Ciskei Commission estimates 100 000 people resettled for the same period. It would seem that both figures are too low, though some of the difference from 172 537 might be accounted for by consolidation of the Ciskei, and voluntary resettlement which has not been measured.

The influx included people not resettled by the South African government itself. Of these the two most important categories are those who were evicted or left with little choice but to leave white farms, and those who fled the Transkei before its independence. The former category will be discussed in more detail later in this section. The latter group consists predominantly of those people who fled the Herschel and Glen Grey districts in 1976. It has been estimated that about 50 000 people left the Transkei shortly before independence. Some of these people were Sotho-speaking people who feared discrimination. Others were clans in the Herschel and, to a lesser extent, Glen Grey districts, who had opposed the Matanzimas in the past. They were offered land in the Hewu district of the Ciskei on farms to be handed over to the Ciskei. Both the Ciskei and the South African authorities seem to have been party to this arrangement. Furthermore, some farm workers in the Orange Free State heard about land being available in the Ciskei and left their tenuous existence for the chance of something better.
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<th>F Female 1980</th>
<th>G (A-B) Total Increase</th>
<th>( \frac{D}{C} \times 100) Percentage Increase Males</th>
<th>( \frac{E}{F} \times 100) Percentage Increase Females</th>
<th>( \frac{B}{A} \times 100) Percentage Increase Total</th>
<th>P/A Percentage Increase (2)</th>
<th>'Unnatural' Population Growth (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Hewu</td>
<td>31 904</td>
<td>74 065</td>
<td>14 021</td>
<td>34 566</td>
<td>17 883</td>
<td>39 499</td>
<td>42 161</td>
<td>146,5%</td>
<td>120,9%</td>
<td>132,1%</td>
<td>8,8</td>
<td>32 421</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keiskam-Mahokek</td>
<td>26 531</td>
<td>38 280</td>
<td>11 576</td>
<td>16 834</td>
<td>14 955</td>
<td>21 466</td>
<td>11 749</td>
<td>45,4%</td>
<td>43,4%</td>
<td>44,3%</td>
<td>3,7</td>
<td>3 650</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mdantsane</td>
<td>105 564</td>
<td>178 743</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>48 114</td>
<td>88 014</td>
<td>57 450</td>
<td>90 729</td>
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<td>57,9%</td>
<td>69,3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle-Drift</td>
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<td>47 926</td>
<td>16 431</td>
<td>21 328</td>
<td>20 303</td>
<td>26 598</td>
<td>11 192</td>
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<td>31,0%</td>
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<td>2,7</td>
<td>-22</td>
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<td>58 725</td>
<td>13 335</td>
<td>25 797</td>
<td>16 956</td>
<td>32 928</td>
<td>28 434</td>
<td>93,5%</td>
<td>94,2%</td>
<td>93,9%</td>
<td>6,8</td>
<td>19 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria East</td>
<td>26 896</td>
<td>65 616</td>
<td>12 212</td>
<td>30 335</td>
<td>14 684</td>
<td>35 281</td>
<td>38 720</td>
<td>148,4%</td>
<td>140,3%</td>
<td>144,0%</td>
<td>9,3</td>
<td>30 509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zwellit-Sha</td>
<td>92 829</td>
<td>166 998</td>
<td>42 114</td>
<td>74 203</td>
<td>50 707</td>
<td>92 795</td>
<td>74 117</td>
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<td>83,0%</td>
<td>79,9%</td>
<td>6,0</td>
<td>45 840</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>350 741</td>
<td>630 353</td>
<td>157 803</td>
<td>291 077</td>
<td>192 938</td>
<td>339 276</td>
<td>279 612</td>
<td>84,5%</td>
<td>75,8%</td>
<td>79,7%</td>
<td>6,0</td>
<td>172 537</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Urban</strong></td>
<td>102 380</td>
<td>228 539</td>
<td>47 949</td>
<td>110 743</td>
<td>54 431</td>
<td>117 816</td>
<td>126 159</td>
<td>230,0%</td>
<td>216,5%</td>
<td>223,2%</td>
<td>8,2</td>
<td>94 804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural</strong></td>
<td>248 361</td>
<td>401 794</td>
<td>109 854</td>
<td>180 334</td>
<td>138 507</td>
<td>221 460</td>
<td>153 433</td>
<td>164,2%</td>
<td>159,9%</td>
<td>161,8%</td>
<td>4,9</td>
<td>77 613</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By mid-1977 it was estimated that about 30,000 people were trying to live on two totally inadequate farms recently incorporated in the Ciskei: Thornhill and Oxton. In 1978 a typhoid epidemic broke out which took several months to bring under control. Thus Thornhill and Oxton represent examples of the products of voluntary resettlement brought about by two different factors: political conflict in the Transkei and the untenable position of farm workers in the Orange Free State.

An indication of the usefulness of our figures in Table 1 is that 'unnatural population growth', in other words the difference between the per annum growth rate and the national average, is highest in areas where massive resettlement has occurred. The district of Zwelitsha contains, as well as Zwelitsha itself, Dimbaza, a product of resettlement with a population of about 20,000. The district of Mdantsane contains the township of Mdantsane which did not exist twenty years ago but today has a population well over 300,000 (the census figures for 1980 are extremely unreliable here). The district of Hewu contains some of the worst resettlement camps in South Africa including Sada and Thornhill. On the other hand, the district of Middledrift has seen no resettlement and has had a normal population growth rate. As far as the figures for Victoria East are concerned the massive influx can be substantially accounted for by the haphazard 'voluntary' exodus from white farms in the Eastern Cape. Many of these people have not actually settled in 'closer settlements' but have asserted their right to small pieces of tribal land. Thus, for example, the Gaga Valley is filled to the brim with refugees from white farms.

2. 'White' Agriculture in the Border Region

While the abolition of labour tenancy and the evictions of squatters from white farms have been responsible for the relocation of nearly 1½ million people between 1960 and 1974 in South Africa, in the Eastern Cape this has not been the predominant cause for evictions. Nevertheless, because a substantial proportion of those resettled came off 'white' farms in the Border region and further afield (many from farms in the Midlands region) it was considered important to examine briefly changes in capitalist agriculture since the 1960s in the relevant areas.
One of our suppositions was that the increasing capitalisation of agriculture in the Border region had led to a sharp decrease in the number of 'casual' workers employed, and a relative decrease in the number of regular workers. Because 'casual' workers on farms are generally the families of regular farm-workers, we questioned whether this decrease in 'casual' labour resulted in the eviction and resettlement of the families of African farm-workers.

Other questions related to the actual process of resettlement. Who, in the final analysis, was responsible for the resettlement of considerable numbers from the farms? Was it the farmers themselves, or did the state intervene to effect removals?

The examination of changes in capitalist agriculture in the Border region proved to be one of the most difficult parts of this project. We could not answer any of our original questions directly, often because we had assumed too much about the region to begin with. Major sources used were the Department of Agricultural Statistics Reports from 1965 to 1976, interviews with agricultural extension officers in the relevant magisterial districts, and statistics from the various agricultural study groups compiled from figures kept by the Regional Agricultural Economist in the area. Secondary material was drawn mainly from the Saldru Farm Labour Conference Papers, 1976.

Magisterial districts covered in the examination of Department of Agricultural Statistics were: Albany, Bathurst, Kingwilliamstown, Peddie, Victoria East, East London, Cathcart, Port Beaufort, Komga, Queenstown, Stockenstrom, Stutterheim and Tarkastad. Most of the Victoria East and Peddie districts have now been consolidated into the Ciskei, so comparison between 1965 and 1976 statistics is not feasible.

Extension officers for the magisterial districts of Albany, Bathurst, Fort Beaufort, Stockenstrom, Victoria East, Queenstown, Stutterheim and Cathcart, were interviewed. These extension officers, employed by the Department of Agriculture and Technical Services, to some extent, represent organised agriculture in the region. The interviews, at first, sought to establish the indices of mechanisation and its effects on labour.
The view that increasing mechanisation of agriculture is directly linked to the outflow of people from the farms to the homelands had to be slightly modified. While the increase in mechanisation, correlated with a decrease in the number of Africans employed, has been statistically an important trend over the past 20 years, it cannot be assigned as the sole, or even the predominant, cause for the efflux.

The Border region is predominantly a livestock area, except for pockets of cash-crop production in the Kat River Valley (mainly tobacco and citrus). The coastal district of Alexandria, Bathurst and East London, are the only other areas in the Border where cash-crops are predominant. Here, pineapples and chicory are the main crops. The effects on employment of mechanisation of livestock production is less marked than employment effects of mechanisation of crop production. This is partly because the labour processes involved in rearing livestock have never involved the same scale of employment as the labour process involved in crop production. It is also because there are certain natural limitations on the extent of mechanisation in livestock areas. There are fewer areas open to mechanisation than there are in the production of crops. The production of fodder crops is becoming mechanised, as are particular parts of livestock production, e.g. sheep-shearing and cattle-milking (although cattle in this region are mainly beef). Particular re-arrangements in the fencing of herds, making numerous herdsmen unnecessary, has certainly had its effects on employment, too. But generally, the re-organisation of livestock production does not have the substantial effects on labour that the re-organisation of crop production does.

So, while there has been a marked drop in the employment of Africans on farms in the Border region from 1965, this drop cannot be entirely attributed to increasing mechanisation, although the statistics show some kind of correlation.

Geoff Antrobus examined trends in farm labour in the Eastern Cape from 1953 to 1973 and showed that the number of regular farm workers had decreased from 76 505 to 47 779. Although these figures include areas in the North Eastern Cape, they are nevertheless useful as a guide. Antrobus suggests a correlation between an increase in mechanisation and a decrease in employment. While total labour employment decreased by 28%...
for 1957-1973, the number of tractors increased by 42%. He argues that the same tendency is shown in all the sub-regions, except the coastal areas, which shows the decrease in regular labour occurring only from 1965.

Figures from the Agricultural Censuses for the Border magisterial districts from 1965 to 1976 confirm the general trend of a decrease in the numbers of Africans employed and an increase in mechanisation. Employment of Africans has decreased by between as much as 30% in some areas (e.g. Bathurst) and 5% in others (Cathcart). (See Table II). Cathcart is almost entirely a livestock region, while Bathurst is a coastal district where crop production is an important part of agricultural activity.

The Department of Agriculture uses differing factors every year for mechanisation, but two common ones which seemed relevant to the Border were tractors (wheel and crawler) and hay and forage machinery. Increases in the latter range from 21% (Tarkastad) to 156% (East London) from 1965 to 1976. The range of the percentage increases in tractors is from about 5% (Tarkastad) to 33% (East London). (See Table III). So it appears that the efflux of people from the farms to the homelands is partially predicated on this trend. A number of pensioners interviewed in the resettlement camps explained how they had been evicted or resettled once they had become ill or too old to work, together with all the non-working members of their families. The eviction of old people and their grandchildren seems to be a common way of cutting down on labour. It is also a way to stabilise the regular work-force, while decreasing the amount of casual labour, by evicting women and children with the old and disabled.

What emerges as an important trend in capitalist agriculture in the Border region, which explained much of the outflow of workers to resettlement camps, was the consolidation of farms and the rationalisation of labour. The extension officer for the Stutterheim and Cathcart districts explained that the fluctuations in returns from agriculture force many of the smaller farmers to leave. These farms are either bought up by bigger farmers, who try to consolidate the holdings as much as possible and rationalise their labour force, or they become unoccupied farms. When big farmers buy up holdings, the number of regular workers and their families is invariably decreased. The redundant workers either go to the homelands, to resettlement
camps (which are their only hope of being afforded any sort of shelter), or squat on unoccupied farms, from where the Department of Co-operation and Development usually relocates them in the homelands.

In the Stutterheim-Cathcart district, according to the extension officer, there are a number of unoccupied farms many of which are occupied by squatters evicted from nearby farms. In the Upper Kabusi Valley, for instance (which is just west of Stutterheim), there are more than 3 000 squatters on vacant farms. The state plans to remove these people into the Ciskei with people from the Mgwali and Warberg locations (which are between Stutterheim and Queenstown). According to extension officers many of the skilled workers (e.g. sheep shearsers) who work on short contracts for neighbouring farms, are housed in these locations.

The extension officer for Stutterheim-Cathcart argued that farm workers were more affected by consolidation of farms than by mechanisation. He also pointed out that the rate of mechanisation in the Border region might be impeded by the fact that farmers are reluctant to invest large sums of money into fixed capital, because they feel insecure on the Ciskei border.

A number of other extension officers confirmed this viewpoint. Apparently one problem is the extent of stock-theft and another is the uncertainty over the precise boundaries of the Ciskei. Farmers in the Cathcart district, for instance, do not know if and when their property will be incorporated into the Ciskei.

Farmers in the Albany/Bathurst/Alexandria districts have complained to the Department of Co-operation and Development about the proximity of Glenmore, a notorious resettlement camp on the borders of the Ciskei. The Secretary of the Farmers' Association for East London and Western Districts said in evidence to the Quail Commission that many small farmers near the border have lost as much as R10 000 worth of pineapples. The extension officer for Victoria East complained that while the area was ideal for raising angora goats, these were easily stolen and transported across the border. The extension officer for Albany, Bathurst and Alexandria said land values near the Ciskei border had dropped to R50 per hectare, while near the coast they are as high as R300 - R400 per hectare, although the potential profit is only 10% that of the immediate border areas.
Whether the fears of local farmers are well-founded or not, it seems they have inhibited any substantial investment and therefore any accelerated growth rate. Thus, in recent years, increased mechanisation has become an even less substantial reason for the efflux of people from the farms.

Although all workers are affected by mechanisation and consolidation according to extension officers, casual labour is much less in demand than previously. Table II is a summary of various agricultural census data and shows a decrease in the amount of casual labour employed from 1965-1976 in all but 3 districts (East London, Stutterheim and Cathcart) where the decrease occurs from 1971. It should be mentioned here that the agricultural census data is notoriously unreliable. Casual workers are enumerated on the 31st August and the numbers employed at these times are not necessarily an accurate reflection of the average employed throughout the year. For instance, as Van der Vliet and Bromberger point out, in the Albany district peak usage of seasonal labour is in June (hoeing), September/October (shearing) and November-February (hoeing and harvesting). Nevertheless, the tendency is a general, overall drop in casual labour. Table IV indicates the extremely small proportion of total costs spent on casual labour since 1976. This Table was compiled from statistics kept at the Dohne Agricultural Research Station and figures were drawn from the averages for agricultural study groups in the relevant areas. Unfortunately it was not possible to get data earlier than 1976, because the study groups were not yet formed.

Van der Vliet and Bromberger, and Antrobus report evictions of workers' families by farmers. Antrobus found many farmers complaining about young men leaving the farms to go to the towns in search of better jobs, while their families remained behind. This was a frequently mentioned 'grievance' by extension officers, in our interviews, as well. Farmers complain that the mines have been their major competitors for a labour supply, and they are left providing subsistence for mine workers' families, while being deprived of young male labour.

Evictions of families from farms seem to have taken place on a marked scale, especially in the Midlands regions. Unfortunately, we did not research agriculture in this region at all, but a number of our Dimbaza informants had had members of their households working on local farms in
the Midlands. Some people had left the farms to go to local townships and so establish themselves nearer local labour bureaux. Many people living in the Midland townships were farmworkers' families. Kooy, in her research on farm labour in the Karoo in 1976, found about 40 - 50 (farm workers') families per year since 1973 had been repatriated to the homelands. The bulk of removals from this area had taken place by 1969 however, so these figures do not reflect the extent of resettlement.

The other major reason for the efflux of people from the farms is accounted for by voluntary moves. Reasons for this are spelt out in more detail in the area surveys, but briefly the low wages and often harsh working conditions and long hours drive many to seek a 'better life' elsewhere. For the farmworker the only objectively possible alternative is to move to the homelands, register at a labour bureau and take out a contract. With the average monthly wage and value of rations taken together being R29 in Cathcart or R35 in Tarkastad (areas where many ex-farmworkers said they had come from) in 1976, it is not difficult to see why many Africans would choose rather to live in a resettlement camp than to remain on the farms. It also becomes possible to build a house in the homelands - something which promises more security than the tenuous and dependent existence farmworkers live out on farms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td>2719</td>
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<td>4828</td>
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<td>1569</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>1534</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>530</td>
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<td>1821</td>
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<td>8216</td>
<td>4077</td>
<td>5189</td>
<td>9266</td>
<td>3108</td>
<td>2816</td>
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<td>1650</td>
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<td>830</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>1719</td>
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Sources:
1) Report on Agricultural and Pastoral Production, 1965
2) Report No. 06-01-08, Agricultural and Pastoral Production, 1971
3) Report No. 06-01-13, Agricultural and Pastoral Production, 1976
TABLE III  Mechanisation in Agriculture in the Border Region, 1965-1976

<table>
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<th>MAGISTERIAL DISTRICTS</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1976</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Tractors</td>
<td>Water Pumping Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Odell</td>
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<td>202</td>
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*Magisterial district changed since 1965


Note: This is a summarised version of tables provided in the Agricultural Censuses.
Table IV  African Labour Costs as a Percentage of Total Costs

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Queenstown</th>
<th>Smaldeel</th>
<th>Cathcart</th>
<th>Fish R. Bush</th>
<th>Port Beaufort</th>
<th>Stutterheim</th>
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<tr>
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<td>21.74</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1979/80 %</td>
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<td>23.70</td>
<td>18.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASUAL (African)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976/7 %</td>
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<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.88</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978/9 %</td>
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<td>0.75</td>
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<td>22.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978/9 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979/80 %</td>
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<td>26.06</td>
<td>19.30</td>
<td>30.61</td>
<td>30.75</td>
<td>21.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Agricultural Study Group Figures kept at Graham Research Station
3. The Ciskeian Economy

It is important to preface this section by saying that the overwhelming feature of 'the Ciskeian economy' is the role it plays as an underdeveloped labour reserve in the South African economy.

The two most striking features of 'the Ciskeian economy' viewed internally, are the exceptionally high rate of unemployment and the equally remarkable low standard of living. Per capita income in the Ciskei was estimated at R262,00 per annum in 1976. About two-thirds of this was made up by earnings of people working outside the borders of the Ciskei. The precise level of unemployment is difficult to determine as no figures of it are kept. From the SPP-surveys and the Quail Commission evidence, it appears somewhere in the region of 35%, although it might be even higher given the unusually high proportion of people classified as not economically active in the area.

The Border economic region as a whole is characterised by slow development and rising unemployment. This is becoming a matter of increasing political concern for the state. It has been described by several state officials as 'a major flashpoint'. Recently the government announced major decentralisation incentives for the region. However, development in the Border region and the attempts at industrial and agricultural development within the Ciskei, are intended to, and indeed, have more effect at the political and ideological level, than at the level of alleviating unemployment and poverty.

'Economic development' in the Ciskei has to be analysed in terms of the extent to which it re-enforces political and social control.

Industry

Industrial development in the Ciskei has to be analysed in the context of the general policies of homeland development and industrial decentralisation since the war. Before then very little industrial development had occurred in the entire Ciskei/Border region. Since then, there has been some industrial growth but, as it has been largely dependent on
state intervention, patterns of industrial development have closely followed the vagaries of state economic planning, particularly as regards 'industrial decentralisation'.

Industrial decentralisation policy has always been bound up with political issues at least as much as with economic ones. Though economic/physical factors for example, water shortages or pollution excesses, are often invoked as reasons for decentralisation, the consistent threads running through the state's argument have been the reinforcement of influx control and the defence of apartheid. Precisely how this defence of racial capitalism was to be achieved has altered several times.

In the immediate post World War II period the Industrial Development Corporation, a parastatal body, was responsible for a measure of industrial development in conjunction with international firms. One guideline for the IDC was that employment opportunities for Africans should be located away from the main centres of industry and urban population. Thus Good Hope Textile Mills, a large textile mill which today employs over 4 000 people, was an IDC joint project built just outside Kingwilliam's Town. In 1960 the Border Industries programme was established with the brief of encouraging the location of manufacturing industry at growth points on the borders of the homelands. East London was one such designated growth point. While the programme was not very successful, much of the industry that might have been located in the region was established in East London, rather than in other areas of the Border region.

In the late sixties, decentralisation policy shifted towards the encouragement of industrial activity within the homelands. The political strategy of homeland independence required some industrial development within the homelands for primarily political and ideological reasons. Ideologically, it is required to legitimise the homeland regimes generally, and their pursuance of pro-capitalist policies. Without the factories at Dimbaza and the one or two agricultural schemes, the free enterprise system would have nothing to support its continued existence in the Ciskei. Politically the industries provide for the development of a small new petty bourgeoisie (technical and supervisory workers and lower level management) who, it is hoped, will provide a pillar of support for the homeland regimes.
Industrial development in the homelands required the injection of capital and expertise from the outside. This was provided in a two-pronged programme of public and private investment. The Xhosa Development Corporation was set up in 1965 to promote economic development in the Transkei and Ciskei. Later it was split into its Ciskei and Transkei components. The Ciskei National Development Corporation is financed by the Corporation for Economic Development (CED) (formerly the Bantu Investment Corporation) 'guided' by the Ciskei cabinet and run by 10 directors of whom five are appointed by the Ciskei government and five by the Minister of Co-operation and Development. The role of the CNDC is to promote economic development in the Ciskei. To this end, it has engaged in some infrastructural development, though this is mainly the responsibility of the South African Development Trust (SADT). Its main activities have been the promotion of commercial activity which involves little more than buying shops from whites and providing blacks with cheap loans to buy them, providing housing loans, and industrial development. It has established some industrial plants and taken over others which it continues to run and it also assists outside investors who invest through the agency system which we will discuss below. Its own undertakings in the Industrial Division in 1979 consisted of a profitable but capital intensive brewery in Mdantsane with outlets in that township, Sada and Zwelitsha; a complex of three factories, a home industry scheme and a bakery in Sada, employing a total of 557 people; and a cinema in Mdantsane.

TABLE V  
CNDA Own Undertakings 1979 - Industrial Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Undertaking</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Investment</th>
<th>I/E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mdantsane</td>
<td>Brewery</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>R2,2 million</td>
<td>R17 054,26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mdantsane</td>
<td>Brewery outlets</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>R275 000</td>
<td>6 875,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sada, Zwelitsha</td>
<td>Cinema</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>R220 000</td>
<td>44 000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mdantsane</td>
<td>Factory complex</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>R1,5 million</td>
<td>2 727,27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sada</td>
<td>Home industry</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>R125 000</td>
<td>7 352,94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sada</td>
<td>Bakery</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>R4 310 000</td>
<td>5 816,46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>741</td>
<td>R4 310 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The total number of employees of the CNDC was estimated at 'about 2 000 Ciskeians and about 105 whites' in 1979. Of those not accounted for in the table, 24 were employed in the 'Garage Division' (two garages); 78 in the Hotel Division; 182 permanent and 489 casuals in the Agricultural Division and the remainder must have been administratively employed. The Agricultural Division has since been transferred to the Ciskei Marketing Board.

In order to facilitate private investment from non-homeland citizens the agency system was set up in 1968. Until then, only homeland citizens and the appropriate parastatals were permitted to invest in the homelands. This policy was ideologically justified as reciprocation for the virtual ban on African business in the 'white' area. It is possible to ascertain deeper reasons for that policy, but we unfortunately have not the space to do so here.

The agency system allowed non-Ciskeians to establish factories in the Ciskei though they were not allowed to own their land or buildings. These had, and still have, to be leased from the CNDC (the 'Agents') but could be built to specifications. In theory, the establishments had to be transferred to Ciskeian owners after 25 years but in practice this provision is not taken seriously.

The Ciskei in its pristine state offers only one real attraction for capital - the vast supply of cheap and unprotected labour. It should be noted though that the educational level of this labour is not uniformly low. It is cheap because of the massive reserve army of unemployed present and their extreme poverty. It is unprotected because trade unions are effectively banned and neither the South African Wage Act nor the Industrial Conciliation Act operated or operates in the Ciskei. This means that Wage Determination and Industrial Council agreements which offer certain minimum conditions for workers in most of South Africa (though Border Areas are often exempted) do not apply in the Ciskei. The only protective legislation which apply are the Factories and the Shops and Offices Act though the extent to which they are enforced is uncertain. Cheap and unprotected labour is a strong, but not sufficient attraction for capital. Consequently, a series of incentives have been devised by various planning authorities for the homeland growth points. We reproduce below a summary of these incentives produced by the CNDC in 1981.
The following attractive concessions are made available to help industry in the Ciskei onto an economically sound basis.

- Loan capital at an annual interest rate of 4.75%.
- Factories built to individual specifications with annual rentals equal to 7.75% of the cost of land and buildings.
- Housing loans for key managerial staff.
- 40% railage rebate on manufactured goods.
- 50% rebate on harbour dues on goods shipped to any South African port via East London harbour.
- Up to 10% price preference on tenders for the Procurement and Disposal Boards of Black Authorities, South African Development Trust and the Governments of the National States.
- 5% price preference on tenders for the Procurement and Disposal Boards for all South African Government and Provincial bodies with the exception of the South African Railways.
- Cash grants to reimburse industrialists moving from the Witwatersrand-Pretoria-Vereeniging and Durban-Pinetown complexes to the Ciskei.
- Rebates on income tax payable:
  (a) 50% of the wages paid to Black workers during the first seven full financial years of establishment, and
  (b) 30% of the book value of the manufacturing equipment, at the rate of 10% per annum.

Note: These rebates are deductible from tax payable.

These tax concessions may be utilised over a period of 10 years, and may also be used by the parent company. If sufficient profits to benefit tax concessions are not made in the first ten years, a portion of tax concessions may, upon application, be converted to cash grants.

CAN YOU AFFORD TO MISS SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY?

Of these concessions industrialists we interviewed consistently indicated that the cheap capital/loans - the first two points listed - were the most important incentives other than the conditions of the labour force.

The availability of cheap loans and capital made cheap by state concessions has had, in some ways, a contradictory effect on the type of industry attracted. Labour-intensive industries, such as the clothing industry,
have not been attracted to the Ciskei. This may also be a product of the distance of the main markets. Conversely, a few industries involving heavy capital investment and a small labour component, such as chemicals, have been attracted. As can be seen in Table III, the most important industries are textiles (the clothing component of that category is very small - see Appendix A) where, though cheap labour is needed, a fair capital investment is also usually required, and basic and fabricated metal industries which have similar requirements. The hand woven rugs sector however is certainly one example of the exploitation of ultra cheap female labour in a labour-intensive process.

Most of the industrial development that has occurred in the Ciskei is located in Dimbaza and was established during the last five or six years. Appendix B consists of a breakdown of industry, investment and employment in Dimbaza 1974-79, drawing out certain factors. Several notable points emerge from this data.

Firstly, in almost all sectors the investment contribution of the para-statal bodies far exceeds the contribution of the private investors who manage the plants. These investments consist of expenditure on buildings and various forms of loans. This backs up our argument that capital made cheap by state intervention is a crucial factor.

Secondly, when one looks at the price of a job in 1980, Table VII shows us that it was about R7 345 on average, but Appendix B shows that it ranged between sectors from R2 666,67 in the Wood and Wood Products Sector to R29 455,34 in the fabricated metal products sector which was faster growing. This belies the claim that labour-intensive industry is the target of the industrialisation programme. Thirdly, the figures indicate that while at first the tendency was for labour forces to be largely composed of men, most sectors saw a rapid switch in employment patterns with the number of women employed rapidly exceeding the number of men (See Table VIII and Appendix B). The reason for this is simple - female labour is far cheaper than male labour, even in the homelands where pools of unemployed men exist. This is due to the fact that the employment opportunities outside the Ciskei are better for men than for women. Men at least have the potential opportunity to gain
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Enterprises</th>
<th>Capital Investment (R)</th>
<th>Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrialists</td>
<td>CNDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. DIMBAZA Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile, wearing apparel and leather</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1 090 063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood and wood products</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>216 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and paper products, printing &amp; publishing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals and chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber, and plastic products</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>678 306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic metal industries</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>596 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabricated metal products, machinery &amp; equipment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 074 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. OTHER Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, beverages, tobacco</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 395 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood and wood products</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>513 485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-metallic mineral products</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5 597 262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

employment as commuters or migrants, whereas very few women have. Consequently, in spite of the low wages, female labour turnover is much lower than male. As our case studies indicate, wage levels in the Ciskei are way below those outside, even when compared with miners' or construction workers' wages.

TABLE VIII  Black Employment in the Ciskei in 'Agency basis' Industry 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clothing, textiles &amp; Leather</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabricated metal products</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood &amp; Wood products</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, Beverage &amp; Tobacco</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Metallic Mineral</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>401</td>
<td>1239</td>
<td>1640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: It was not possible to obtain a sex breakdown for CNDC projects, or similar data post 1979. Derived from BENSO records.

Unfortunately we have not been able to obtain a comprehensive survey of wages in the Ciskei - this kind of information is, understandably, difficult to obtain. However, our general impression derived from interviews with workers and employers is that wages for black women average about R10.00 to R15.00 per week and for men approximate R20.00 to R28.00, though some women earn as little as R8.00 per week. There is a large differential in the remuneration of skilled labourers - usually black males - as they have the best chance of obtaining competitive employment outside the Ciskei.

One crucial question is how industrial development relates to resettlement - does it have substantial employment effects or is it a sop? There is no doubt that industrial development provides no kind of solution to the state-created structural unemployment in the Ciskei. In the period
1970 to 1980 when, as we have established, well over 100 000 people were relocated to the Ciskei, barely more than 3 000 industrial jobs were created in the Ciskei. In contrast, the number of contract workers to the mines increased by about 10 000.

Even in areas where substantial numbers of people have been resettled, the industry that does exist there does not necessarily employ those people. One such example we came across was the timber factories (there are two) at Keiskammahoek which preferred not to employ resettled people as they were 'less trustworthy and less reliable'. This is understandable. The people resettled to Elukhanyweni (next to Keiskammahoek) were previously either peasant farmers or wage earners at much better rates than these factories offered. They were understandably unhappy with working conditions and levels of remuneration.

The factories at Dimbaza employ mainly residents of Dimbaza. Most managers estimated that about 90% of workers were drawn from the settlement itself. Of the remainder some are drawn from surrounding villages which have grown substantially in recent times and some, particularly educated clerical and technical workers, commute from Zwelitsha. As we argue later even Dimbaza, where almost all Ciskei's factories are located, still exhibits a high rate of unemployment (possibly 30%) and a large number of residents who have to work elsewhere.

To sum up this section: little industrial development has occurred inside the Ciskei; in 1980 some 3 000 people were employed as industrial workers; industrial development is not proving to accommodate resettled people adequately, let alone the unemployment problem in the region in general; industrial development occurs only at great cost to the state (in providing incentives) and is thus limited by the resources that the state is prepared to allocate in this respect.

As far as border industry development is concerned little has occurred in the Border region in the last twenty years, and that which has has certainly played no role in any attempt to re-absorb resettled people in remunerative employment.
What then is the significance of industrial development in the Ciskei? We would argue that it is almost exclusively ideological/political. Development, industrial and otherwise, is needed to provide legitimacy for the regime and its pro-capitalist policies. Without this development, such as it is, the Ciskei state would have nothing to show for its 'rule' and the free enterprise system would have nothing but unfounded propaganda on which to base its future existence. To put it crudely: it makes the promises - of employment and welfare - almost believable - in the short run, at least.

In addition, the development of industry has contributed to the development of the petty bourgeoisie in the Ciskei. A condition for investment and receipt of incentives is that the firms train 'Ciskeians' to occupy mid-level administrative, clerical and technical posts. The extent to which this is enforced is not known, but it has had effects. This 'new middle class' it is hoped will form part of the support base for the regime.

4. Agriculture

No discussion on homeland agriculture can take place without full cognizance of the implications of the 1913 Land Act.

The physical limitations put on land in the reserves has made agricultural development for the majority of people an impossibility. While most people in the Ciskei cannot support themselves by agricultural production alone, it has nevertheless been an important supplement to the income of many migrant workers.

Although the Tomlinson Commission advised strongly against the 'one-man, one-plot' system prevalent in most of the reserves, and tried to lay the planning basis for the expansion and consolidation of a 'class of contented full-time Bantu Farmers' the plan was not implemented. The Commission itself expressed doubt about the political pragmatism of its agricultural plan which would have involved moving about 80% of the reserve population off the land. The state rejected the recommendations,
partly because of the high level of financing it would involve, and partly because of the political risks involved in moving so many off the land - risks that were accentuated by the diminishing power of the chiefs.

It is only with the current crisis in the Ciskei, generated partly by the vast resettlement of people in the last ten years, that agricultural planning has become an issue of some import for the local state. As with industry, we shall argue here that the primary importance of agricultural development policies in the Ciskei must be located, not at the economic, but at the political and ideological levels.

After consolidation, population density in the Ciskei is about 90 people per km². It is perhaps the most over-crowded rural area in South Africa already, and people from 'black spots' surrounding the Ciskei are still to be moved.

The vast majority of people in the resettlement camps, despite promises to the contrary, have no access to land and even those that do have little chance of surviving by means of agricultural production alone.

Most agriculture in the Ciskei is small-scale subsistence agriculture on land owned by the state (the 'Trust') and allocated by the chiefs. BENSO calculated income from farming and forestry in the Ciskei at just over R8 million per annum, i.e. just over R12 per capita. Only 34 700 hectares (ha) are actually cultivatable. This represents just over 10% of the total area of the Ciskei. There are about 30 000 plots in the Ciskei, allocated in the traditional tenure system by the chiefs, but only about 12 000 of these are viable farming prospects for subsistence purposes with able-bodied male heads permanently there. The average land holding is less than 1 ha. In all, less than 25% of those classified Ciskeian have land rights.

The possibilities for agricultural development within the parameters of the 'traditional' land tenure system are limited. The Ciskei Government is not even encouraging it. On the contrary, their agricultural policy seeks to re-structure relations on the land in such a way as to deprive more people of land and encourage the growth of a small middle class of capitalist farmers.
Since 1959 the emphasis on agricultural planning policy in the Ciskei has been to demarcate residential areas, cultivatable and grazing areas.

About 79% of the unconsolidated Ciskei areas has been planned in this way. However, agricultural planners in the Ciskei consider the recommended stocking rates in the grazing areas to be far too high. They recommend that the proportion of oxen be drastically reduced, and that tractors be used for ploughing instead, and that use of dairy cows for home-subsistence be 'seriously discouraged or ... only permitted where the cow and calf received feed supplementation'.

Recommendations like these are obviously going to have drastic effects on most subsistence/sub-subsistence farmers who cannot possibly afford tractors or feed-supplements.

The Chief Agricultural Planning Officer for the Ciskei, Mr. M. Lindström, said in an interview that land-use would be more effectively rationalised in terms of the Ciskei Agricultural Plan. The demarcation of the Ciskei into the three areas outlined above, and a concentration on stock improvement would mean a removal of people from small 'unproductive' (i.e. subsistence) homesteads to residential areas (i.e. resettlement camps) and a reduction or complete loss in the holdings of small stock-owners.

One of the cornerstones of this agricultural policy is a system of government-run irrigation schemes introduced recently. Here, it should be pointed out that only 3% of the Ciskei is potentially irrigable. Ciskeian government emphasis on the irrigation schemes, rather than on dryland agriculture, would not lead one to believe this however.

Interviews with management at three major schemes - Tyefu, Shiloh and Keiskammahoek - indicated that, at most 3 000 people, including settlers and labour employed, are supported by them.

Carefully selected 'settlers' are granted plots on the irrigation schemes ranging from 3/4 ha. to 12 ha. Usually 'settlers' are those with long-standing land rights and are chosen by the local Tribal Authorities in conjunction with officials from the Ciskei Department of Agriculture. People chosen are the more 'successful' commercial farmers who have a close relationship with chiefs and headmen in the area. At Tyefu (near the
Fish River) there are 62 farming plots, at Keiskamahoek 60 and at Shiloh 278, including 3/4 ha. food plots and 12 four ha. plots for those who show the promise of becoming 'commercial farmers'. The schemes are usually irrigated at great cost. In Keiskamahoek it costs about R20 000 to develop one plot. On all three schemes there are 'group' or 'tribal' farms run by the Scheme Management and supplied with readily available cheap labour from nearby resettlement camps. Average wages for these workers are extremely low. On the Keiskamahoek Scheme, for instance, they are about R1,50 a day for women and about R3,00 a day for men.

So far, none of these schemes have absorbed as settlers anyone from the surrounding resettlement camps - Glenmore in the case of Tyefu, Sada in the case of Shiloh and Elukhanyweni in the case of Keiskamahoek. Originally the plan for the Keiskamahoek dairy scheme urged that priority for the scheme be given to those resettled from Humansdorp in Elukhanyweni. However, neither interviews with people in Elukhanyweni nor with management of the scheme could substantiate this. It is possible that a few of those who moved voluntarily - mainly the headmen from Humansdorp - were given land on or near the scheme, but certainly no others. (See case study on Elukhanyweni for expansion on this point). Some of the resettled people from Humansdorp are employed on this scheme, but as ordinary wage labourers.

As with industrial development, the importance of these schemes lies not in their economic significance but in their political and ideological effects. Promises of land made to people in Sada and Elukhanyweni do not appear totally hollow, when people see the development of settler schemes on their doorstep.

Politically the openly expressed aim is to 'create middle class farmers in the Ciskei for stability'. With extreme limitations put on expansion of the schemes by the amount of irrigable land available, the strategy does not seem primarily aimed at agricultural development, but rather at political containment.

Overall the Ciskei agricultural policy means thousands of small farmers stand to lose their stock and land. Agricultural Betterment Schemes which have been in evidence in the Ciskei since the 1960s have had pre-
cisely these effects in the areas where they have been implemented. The new agricultural policy promises to generalise them.

Large-scale removals and resettlement of people within the Ciskei have been planned, off the land into 'site and service' schemes. Already there are 2,500 sites prepared at Peddie where people from Glenmore and surrounding villages will be moved to make way for the expansion of the Tyefu Irrigation Scheme. It seems that the Ciskei government is trying to create a class of middle and rich farmers who will support the state and employ some of the impoverished majority. For this majority, the Ciskei agricultural plan means loss of land, loss of livestock and tighter control in new 'site and service' schemes - in other words, resettlement camps.

5. Commerce

The commercial sector is very underdeveloped in the Ciskei, mainly due to the competition of large scale commerce just across the border - in East London, Kingwilliamstown and Queenstown for example. Within the Ciskei large scale commercial enterprises also operate one or two stores. Other limitations on small traders include the lack of loan capital (although the CNDC supplies some) and, of course, the licensing system. In 1977 there were 769 licensed traders of all kinds. Most of these ran small family businesses. The issuing of trade licenses is a political mechanism particularly powerful in some economies. In the case of the Ciskei licenses would seem to be limited to Sebe supporters.

6. Informal Sector

The informal sector in the Ciskei is totally unresearched. It is assumed to be quite large, ranging from small traders through shebeens and beer brewers to seamstresses. Suggestions to formalise and assist the informal sector are threatened by political considerations and economic vested interests embodied in the licensing system.

7. State Sector

The state sector is the largest employer of labour in the Ciskei. According to BENSO figures for 1977, it employs 12,043, although the Ciskei
Commission estimates about 13 000. Of these, 4 000 are teachers and about 7 000 civil servants.

There are probably about 2 000 semi or unskilled labourers employed by the state, working mainly on the construction of houses, roads and dams. Wages for these workers are as low as others paid in industry and agriculture in the Ciskei region. A truck driver interviewed in Sada, for instance, said he was getting less than R100 a month.

It will be argued later that civil servants and teachers in the employ of the state constitute part of the Bantustan petty bourgeoisie. But the point should be made here that they are not a homogeneous class that provides the state with a secure basis of support. They are severely circumscribed by the patronage politics that operate in this sector, determining not only possibilities of promotion, but even retention of their jobs. Nevertheless there is evidence of a growing amount of resentment towards the Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP) on their part.

Economically the possibilities of expansion in this sector are extremely limited. Apart from temporary jobs for semi/unskilled workers, the state can only offer positions to educated, middle-class people who will man the state bureaucracy.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE


3. Ibid, p.19 (Table 2).


The relevant section of the Act reads as follows:

5. Constitution or adjustment of Black tribes and removal of Blacks-

(i) The Governor-General (sic) may-

(a) define the boundaries of the area of any tribe or of a location and may from time to time alter the same and may divide any existing tribe into two or more parts or amalgamate tribes or parts of tribes into one tribe or constitute a new tribe, as necessity or the good government of the Blacks may in his opinion require;

(b) whenever he deems it expedient in the general public interest without prior notice to any person concerned order that, subject to such conditions as he may determine after consultation by the Minister with the Black Government concerned, any tribe, portion of a tribe, Black community or Black shall withdraw from any place to any other place or to any district or province within the Republic and shall not at any time thereafter or during a period specified in the order return to the place from which the withdrawal is to be made or proceed to any place, district or province other than the place, district or province indicated in the order, except with the written permission of the Secretary for Plural Relations and Development.

It continues with a series of procedural regulations. It would therefore seem to cover most removals of Africans other than those under influx control regulations who could be dealt with either under different sections of this Act or through other Acts (see Black Sash 1971 op.cit.), or Group Areas removals. We are not certain of this but it would appear then that most Africans relocated are moved under the authority of this, the Black Administration Act of 1927, Section 5 as amended in 1956 and 1973.


6. Control, 1979, op.cit., p.94.

7. Ibid., p.95

8. A variety of authorities including the Ciskei Commission indicate this.


10. Ibid.
11. Interview with Agricultural Extension Officer for Stutterheim-Cathcart, March 1981.

12. Interview with Agricultural Extension Officer for Albany, March 1981.


20. Ibid., p.63.

21. Surplus Peoples Project, unpublished results. See the figures on employment characteristics derived from the SPP data we have compiled in graphic form for each of the closer settlements we studied.

22. Informal discussion with Department of Physical Planning officials at the Conference on Development Research, University of Fort Hare, 1981.


25. Formerly the South African Native Trust, it has been the official financing body for homeland consolidation and infrastructural development.


27. Ibid.


29. This was confirmed in interviews with Ciskei industrialists.

32. Interview - CNDC officials, Dimbaza, 1982.
33. Tomlinson Commission quoted in Yawitch, op.cit., p.28.
34. BENSO, 1981, Table 70.
35. Ibid., Table 69. Also evidence submitted to the Ciskei Commission by J. McDaniel. These figures were calculated before consolidation. However, land consolidation would not affect this percentage substantially, because of the concurrent population increases.
39. Faculty of Agriculture, University of Fort Hare, 1978, p.59.
40. Ibid., p.83.
41. Interview with Mr. M. Lindström, Chief Agricultural Planning Officer in the Ciskei, Zwelitsha, March, 1981.
43. Interview with management official at the Keiskammahoek Irrigation Scheme, March 1981.
44. Ibid, and interviews with workers on the scheme, July 1981.
45. Interview with management official, Keiskammahoek Irrigation Scheme, March 1981.
46. For elucidating accounts of the effects of betterment see: Lacey, M. 'For Betterment or worse: a study of betterment schemes as part of the resettlement plan' unpublished paper, Rhodes University, 1980; and de Wet, C., 'Perceptions of change and changes of perception in a Ciskei Village', paper presented at the Conference of South African Anthropologists, 1980.
47. Interviews with traders in the Ciskei, March 1981.
48. BENSO, op.cit., Table 105.
50. Ibid., p.99. About 3.5% of the civil servants are white.
51. Interview in Sada, July 1981.
52. See interview with teacher in Sada, cited in Chapter 4.


Sources: 1. 'South Africa - a land divided' (Black Sash, 1982); 2. 'Republic of Ciskei' (BENSO, 1981)
Sources: "Industrial Development Proposals" (Office of the Prime Minister, 1981); "Republic of Ciskei" (BENSO, 1981)
SADA

Background

Sada, situated in the north-western Hewu district of the Ciskei, was started in 1965, primarily to house people removed from the Cape Midlands, Karoo and the Western Cape. It was proclaimed a 'self-contained' Bantu town in 1969.

The population of Sada is now somewhere in the region of 40 000. It is located in a dry, barren and extremely overcrowded part of the Ciskei, where there are minimal employment opportunities except for migrant labour. Designed as an industrial growth point, there are at present 4 factories there, employing about 800 people.

People complain constantly that the main problem in Sada is the lack of jobs. The other problem most widely spoken about is the huge housing shortage. Madakeni ('Village of Tears'), the mud hut settlement on the outskirts of Sada, has expanded rapidly in the past few years. There are at present about 400 huts there. People who live there are mainly those who have been evicted from their houses for falling behind with the rent, or who have come from the farms in the hope of houses and have been put on the interminable waiting list.

People who have to settle in Madakeni apply for a plot of land from the headman, for which they pay a small amount of rent per quarter (R1,00). If not capable themselves, local people build mud huts for them for a sum of about R40,00.

Housing in Sada is very differentiated. By 1969, according to Desmond, there were about 1 400 houses occupied and another 300 under construction. Earliest houses were 'one-roomed wooden huts with mud floors, no ceilings and a small window at each end'. Then one-roomed pre-fabricated houses were built. Later another room was added. This latter type of house is still in use.
When Cos Desmond visited Sada in 1969, so was the former type. However we could not establish if they were still used when we visited Sada. In the late 'sixties 2 and 4-roomed brick houses were built. While some of the earlier arrivals were allocated 4-roomed houses to themselves, most families arriving after about 1973 have had to share these houses with another family. Now all vacant 4-roomed houses are allocated to teachers, nurses, shopkeepers and government officials, although many of them build their own, quite substantial dwellings.

Our impression, based on the number of comfortable-looking houses, was that there was quite a sizeable middle-class in Sada, but apart from teachers, we didn't speak to anyone who could be described as part of this class. We probably would have gained a better understanding of class and power relations within the camp had we done so. Unfortunately, however, the people who helped us arrange the interviews, were not very encouraging about the prospects of exposing ourselves to people with CNIP connections, because it might have jeopardised any further interviews we wanted to do in the area.

Over a period of seven days we conducted 18 in-depth interviews and life histories in Sada. People were chosen from differing geographical areas in the camp and according to economic status. As indicated before, there was not a wide range in terms of class among those we interviewed. The people most accessible in July 1981 (when we were there) were obviously permanent residents. Thus we have quite a high proportion of women and pensioners in our sample. However, we conducted the interviews and life histories as household ones, rather than on an individual basis. In other words, we found out the work history and current economic status of every member of the household of the individual whom we interviewed. In this way, we hope we gained a more balanced picture.

Below is a catalogue of the types of people whom we interviewed:
NEA = Non-Economically Active; EA = Economically Active; P = Pensioners; 
DG = Disability Grant; E(local) = Employed locally; U = Unemployed; 
V = Voluntary; EcS = Evicted chose Sada; R = Resettled; HH = Household head; 
Y = Yes, N = No; L = Lodging; IS = Informal Sector; (IS Sec)= local service sector, 
(IMan) = local manufacturing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Econ. Status</th>
<th>Detail</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>House-size</th>
<th>HH</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>How moved</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Farm (Tarka.)</td>
<td>EcS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>E (IS Sec.)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4 rooms</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Shiloh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Farm (C'Cart)</td>
<td>EcS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>NEA</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Town (Wh'see)</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>EA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>EA</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td>2 rooms</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>E (scheme)</td>
<td>M</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Town (W'see)</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2 rooms</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Farm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>E (IMan.)</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2 rooms</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Farm V'stad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>E (IMan.)</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2 rooms</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Farm (C'cart)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>5 rooms</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Town (KWT)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>IS (Und.emp)</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Farm (St.berg)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>EcS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>No income</td>
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<td>2 rooms</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Farm (Craddock)</td>
<td>EcS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Farm</td>
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<td>U</td>
<td>mud hut (L)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* People who lodge are generally those who have been unable to get houses. Usually meaning unbearably crowded conditions e.g. 19-20 people in 4 rooms.

Reasons for Removals

Although we are primarily concerned with the implications of resettlement, the reasons why people were moved constitute an important part of the understanding of the dynamics of particular resettlement camps.
The Surplus Peoples' Project (SPP) figures show that 37.6% of their sample came from the farms, with approximately 51.5% coming from towns. They also indicate that 78% of those in Sada came 'voluntarily'. This word has been regarded with some suspicion in previous studies of resettlement. Here we use it to denote a distinction between those forcibly evicted and resettled, and those who have been forced in other ways to settle there. People who have come to Sada of their own accord are mainly driven out of desperation from white farms, or come from urban areas where persistent harassment under the pass laws has driven them out.

Many people from the farms described the misery of conditions there, and the total dependence on the white farmer for housing, food, clothing and a job. It was this insecurity and the marked deterioration in living standards over the past 20 years that have made many workers reluctant to stay. The only way that these workers can get better paid work is to register at a labour bureau and take out a contract to the towns. The only chance of getting near a bureau is to move to a homeland.

Of the 18 people we interviewed, 13 had come directly from white farms, most of them in the Tarkastad-Queenstown-Cathcart area. Of these 4 were evicted and chose Sada, 3 were resettled in Sada and 6 left voluntarily and settled in Sada.

Farms

Without exception, all those in the latter category had left because of the miseries of farm life. The only avenue of escape for farm workers is either to move to another farm (and any improvement is mainly a matter of luck) or to make a more permanent change, come into a homeland to be near a labour bureau. In a homeland there is a chance of taking out a contract and going to either the mines or the factories. And even if a contract is not immediately forthcoming, there is still a chance for a farm worker to get a house independently of the person who employs him.

One man (an unemployed contract worker) tried to get mine work from early on in his life. He was born on a farm near Kei River where his parents worked. He worked there for two years as a tractor driver, earning R40
a month (this was in the early 'sixties) and then took a contract to Springbok coal mine in the Orange Free State. There he was paid between R80 and R90 a month. ‘When I finished the contract after 6 months, I moved back to the farm. Soon after, though, I moved off the farm again because I had heard that people who wanted to move away from the farms could come to places like Sada. Many people moved away because the wages were very low on the farms and people thought that in Sada they could get better jobs’.

An unemployed woman in Sada told a similar story. Married to a farm worker in the Queenstown area she was employed as a seasonal worker. ’... I helped in the cutting of grain and for that I would get 25 cents for 100 bushels (early 'sixties). I also helped, with the other wives, reaping the mielies and ploughing. I used to get 15 cents a day for this. On Mondays I washed and Tuesdays I ironed and I got 40 cents a month for this. My husband was a general labourer on the farm, working on the fields and with the livestock and he was getting R8 a month. We stayed on that farm till 1970 when we came to Sada. We decided to leave because the farm life was very hard and the wages were low. We had heard that men and women could get places to live and jobs here. My husband gave a month's notice to the farmer and collected his R8 and left in March’.

But for people who have left the farms in recent years obtaining houses in Sada has been extremely difficult. One woman and her husband who were interviewed left a farm in the Steynsburg area for reasons very similar to those outlined above. They came to Sada in 1978 because ’... we had heard you get a place here. But there were no houses available when we arrived. The office said that we should build ourselves a mud hut. So we went to Madakeni and spoke to the headman. He gave us a site there and we paid someone from the area R40 to build as a mud house ...’

The other category of people who have come from the farms are those who have been evicted by farmers and have 'chosen' Sada. It is not clear to what extent the 'choosing' of Sada is entirely a question of 'free will'. Many people are simply evicted and dumped by the farmer at Sada or near a homeland border. These people have little alternative but to make their
way there and try to find a home. All the people who had been evicted from white farms were those who were either too old or sick to work. Usually if there is only one member of the family actually working on the farm, the farmer is loath to keep the rest of the family on as residents. It is this complete dependence on jobs for dwelling places on the farms and the subsequent insecurity that this brings on that drives many people away. It is worth quoting one Sada woman at length to illustrate the extreme insecurity which farm workers suffer:

"When I got married I moved around from farm to farm with my husband who was also a farm worker. My wages were R1.50 to R2.00 a month depending on the farmer. We moved around a lot, because if one of us had problems with the farmer, then the whole family had to move too. We found places to live where we could get jobs. If we lost our jobs, we also lost our houses.

I had 15 children before we finally left the farms to come to Sada. The last farm we were on my husband got £4 (most of the older people talk in terms of pounds and shillings) and food rations every week. We used to get meat at the end of the month. If the rations were not enough, we would get food on credit from the farmer and then he deducted money from our wages at the end of the month. We so often used to go to the farmer for food and cash that almost no month passed when we got our full wages.

We used to have some livestock on the farm, but by the time we left we had nothing, because it was claimed by the farmer to pay for the credit he had given us. We didn't have any land. Sometimes the children would do odd jobs on the farm and this would bring in a little extra cash, but usually there were no ready jobs for the children.

We left the last farm because my husband got ill with asthma. I was also out of work because I was sick. The only one working was my son. The one day he was drowned in a river so the farmer told us to leave as he couldn't keep us if none were working.

After we were evicted we applied to the magistrate in Tarkastad for a house (1965-1967). My grandson already had a house in Sada and the magistrate said we would get a house here, but it would take a long time.

Sada was the only place we knew - and people in the area told us that the government was building houses for those without homes. We couldn't go to another farm because we were both sick and no-one would take us."

From the interview it would seem that many farmers do not pay a predominant role in the actual resettlement of people, even if they are instrumental in evicting people from their farms. It is difficult for an entire family to enter the urban areas illegally and apart from going to another farm,
there is literally nowhere else to go. It is impossible to settle in a rural area in the Ciskei in the hope of getting agricultural land. The land just isn't available. And even if it was, access to land in the Ciskei is markedly differential anyway.

This is why people 'choose' to come to places like Sada after they have been evicted from white farms. Sometimes those evicted squat on nearby land and then the state comes in to remove them. (For instance at Kenton and Kabusi valley near Stutterheim).

The last category of people from the farms are those who were actually resettled in Sada. Again it seems that the state plays a more predominant role here than the farmers. If farmers themselves do take people there it is usually on the advice of a local magistrate or the local Bantu Affairs Office. One family was resettled in 1981 from a farm in the Queenstown district because the land was transferred to the Ciskei Government under the consolidation proposals, another came from afar in Venterstad (near the Vaal River) where land was claimed by the government to build a dam in 1970 and the local magistrate gave all the farm workers rail warrants to Sada, and a farmer in Queenstown had arranged houses and pensions in Sada for elderly workers on his farm.

The other majority category of removals that has affected people now living in Sada has been urban relocation. In 1967 the Coloured preference area of the Cape was extended from the Eiselen line (Kimberley-Colesburg-Humansdorp) to the Kat-Fish line (Aliwal North-Fish River). A number of townships in the Cape Midland and Karoo areas were affected by this. Whole communities of people in Middelburg and Burgersdorp were removed to Dimbaza, Ilinge and Sada.

Four of our respondents came from towns, but only two of them had been resettled. Both of them had come from the location at Whittlesea. When Sada was declared a township the entire location outside the then white town of Whittlesea, which is about 5 km. from where Sada is presently sited, was removed.

... the magistrate called a meeting of all the residents in Whittlesea and said that everyone in the old location must move to a new township further away in Sada. I can't remember the
'year, but we were the first group to come here (1965-1967). The magistrate didn't give us any reasons why we must leave - he only said that the whites were also leaving Whittlesea, so we must too.

The people were very angry and cried when they left the old location. They didn't want to move into a new place with lots of other people they didn't know. We were worried because of the coming misery.'

The 'other' category includes three people who originally came from the farms, but did not come directly, and a teacher from Kingwilliamstown, who had come to Sada because he could get his own house there, and both he and his wife were offered teaching jobs.

One man moved from Shiloh, a rural community about eight kms. away from Sada, because he, being originally from the farms, was never integrated into the community. This interview is expanded upon below in the chapter on political and social effects of resettlement.

It is difficult to say how representative our interviews were. Although thirteen out of the twenty people we interviewed came from the farms, the SPP survey indicates that only 37.6% did so.

Worker Histories

As indicated above, two of the major economic effects of resettlement have been 1) to concentrate a reserve army of the unemployed in rural areas and 2) to re-allocate labour.

In the case of removals to Sada, the major trend has been for the men moving from the farms or Midlands towns to take out labour contracts at the Labour Bureaux in Whittlesea. Most people interviewed who had household members away as migrants, said they had been contracted to the worst-paid mines, back to white farms, construction firms or to government jobs like dam and road construction, etc. 7

It is extremely difficult for women to get labour contracts. Many hope for scarce job opportunities locally while others migrate illegally to the urban centres (particularly Johannesburg) to look for domestic work. 8
There are practically no opportunities for local employment in Sada. There are 4 factories employing no more than 200 people each and there is the Irrigation Scheme at Shiloh which employs about 100 people permanently and seasonal workers occasionally. The only other local jobs are with the Ciskei Government (formerly the 'Trust' (SADI) which employs people in the building of new houses, roads, elementary maintenance and at the time of writing, a new dam which is being built in the Hewu district. Of all the permanent residents in Sada (according to SPP), only 1.7% were employed. The majority were either NEA (82%) or unemployed (16%). Two-thirds rely on old age pensions for their incomes and a further 16% on disability grants.

Of the eighteen people interviewed, six were NEA - either on a pension or waiting for a pension (some had other members of the household working), seven were unemployed and five were locally employed. Twelve people had members of their households away as contract workers.

In the course of our interviews, the predominant patterns of employment changes that emerged as correlating with resettlement are that people who have previously worked on the farms and moved to Sada have either taken contracts from the labour bureau in Whittlesea or have applied for government pensions or disability grants there.

The earlier arrivals (late 'sixties from the Midlands towns) and 'seventies from the farms were mostly the aged or disabled. Those still capable of working were employed temporarily by the 'Trust' (SADI), mainly in the construction of houses for those yet to be resettled. 'Trust' wages are notoriously low. Even in 1981, semi-skilled men (e.g. truck drivers) employed by the 'Trust' are earning no more than R100 per month, according to one informant. Often they are the sole breadwinners. In 1968, a man resettled from Whittlesea location was employed by the Trust building houses for R16 a month. For many of those affected by the early removals the Trust was the only source of income.

Although today there are marginally greater possibilities for local employment, wages are generally low and it seems most of those employed are women. On the Scheme, according to our interviews, men get paid R3 a day and women R1.50. One man, who worked for the Ciskeian Department of Agriculture, was earning R176 after working there for some 30 years. Two women employed
at a local factory earned R30 per month and one earned R20 per month. Wages for those employed on roads and construction sites vary from around R30 to R100 per month. Yet people are so desperate for work that often they are prepared to accept anything. One woman we spoke to had 2 daughters working on one of the dam construction sites in Hewu. They had not been told what their wages were to be and after three weeks were too afraid to enquire in case they lost their jobs. It is not difficult to see why most people, even if they are locally employed, have at least one member of their family away as a migrant.

Likewise women with husbands as contract workers are often forced to find employment locally in order to survive.

As we have mentioned, the predominant trend we found was for people who had come off the farms to take contracts to the mines or construction firms. A fairly typical example is that of a woman and her husband who left a farm in the Steynsburg area in 1978 because of the extremely low wages:

'When we arrived my husband got a two year contract to Rustenburg to work on the mines. Last year, he got another contract to Upington to work with a construction firm. I don't know how much he gets but he sends a little money back every month. I have not been working since we arrived, I have just started doing washing now (2 days a week) for the priest. I don't know how much I'm going to get because I've just started ...'

The SPP survey of Sada shows that the vast majority of those employed (85.5% with contracts) had got their jobs through the labour bureaux, while 9.35% were employed directly.

Our impression that most migrant men from Sada are employed on the mines or in construction is reinforced by the SPP data. The largest sector of employment for migrants is the mines, employing 35% of all migrant men. About 17% are employed in construction and 17% in electricity etc. About 8% are employed in manufacturing and 5% in agriculture.

Two-thirds of the women migrants are employed in the services sector and 19% in manufacturing. However women constituted only 18% of the total number of migrants from Sada.
Another feature of labour patterns in Sada is that there is very little consistency in the work contracts of migrants. A contract usually lasts six months to one year and one job rarely seems to last more than two years. Because of the huge influx from the farms to Sada, many people have little or no industrial skills and are forced to take the worst paid jobs requiring the lowest level of skills. Thus high turnover in these positions makes little or no difference to employers. The work history of an unemployed contract worker illustrates the lack of job permanence suffered by workers in the homelands. Born on a farm near the Kei River, he was trained to drive a tractor when he was older and for this earned R40 a month. (He couldn't remember any dates but came to Sada in the mid to late 'sixties - this was probably the early 'sixties).

'After that I went to Queenstown to the recruiting office and got a contract to Springbok coal mines in the Orange Free State. My parents stayed on the farm and the farmer didn't mind that I took a contract to the mines. My job on the mines was loading the coal underground. 'I was paid piece-work, according to how much coal was loaded. If I worked well, I could get R80 - R90 a month ... When I finished the contract after 6 months, I moved back to the farm. Soon after though I moved off the farm again, because I had heard that people who wanted to move away from the farms could come to places like Sada ... I came to Sada in 1963 (?) and lodged with my brother for 3 years. During that time I worked as a bus conductor on the route between Queenstown and Whittlesea. I earned ± R60 a fortnight with over-time ...'

After we moved to our own house, I went to the labour bureau in Whittlesea and got a contract to a canning factory in Paarl ... I was there for one year. The wages were quite good (he said R45 a week in 1970/71 - but this seems very high) ... I was a member of the union that was there, but I didn't get very involved because I was only there for a year. Before my contract expired, I quarrelled with the foreman and when I went to renew my contract the next year, the people at the office (labour bureau) in Whittlesea told me I could not go back there because of that quarrel. So I got another contract to an asbestos mine in the Northern Cape. There I got paid R80 a month. I remember there was a lot of dust, but we used to use boiling water to settle it. We had no masks. After 6 months my contract expired and I did not return to that mine. But I worked on contract again for a coal mine and did odd jobs in the area until I got a contract in 1977 to a jam and fish oil factory in Kempton Park. I started at R32 a week and by the time I left (beginning 1981) we were getting R42 a week. I got into trouble with the foreman there, and my contract was not renewed ...'

He had been unemployed for 5 months at that stage. He had applied for UIF benefits, but was still waiting for the unemployment card to be sent to the Whittlesea labour bureau.
The overwhelming economic feature about Sada (and in fact the whole Hewu district) is the extent of unemployment. Seven of the 18 people interviewed were either unemployed or underemployed and 3 others had members of their households unemployed. We conducted the interviews in July—a time when unemployed people were more likely to be available, and this must obviously be taken into account. However, we did take account of the economic status of all members of a household in our interviews. The total number of economically active household members (of the 18 households) totalled 39, out of which 10 were unemployed. Eight of these were women and 2 were men.

The Surplus Peoples Project survey data confirm the general impression obtained in our interviews; the very high proportion of Sada residents who were either unemployed or classified not economically active—in other words not actively seeking a job. Of the 632 people in households interviewed for whom economic status was obtained, 137 were migrants and 59 commuters. Of those the vast majority were employed. Of the 436 permanent residents, however, only 6 were employed. Twenty-four (30.8%) men of employable age (15-64) were unemployed, and 52 (66.7%) were classified NEA. Of the women of the same age group 40 (25.8%) were unemployed and 111 (71.6%) classified NEA. In other words, 2.6% of permanent residents of employable age were employed, 26.6% unemployed (mostly women) and 70% NEA. Why so many people of employable age classify themselves as not economically active is not clear. Certainly a large proportion of the women in this category are housewives, but are 66.7% of the men disabled or ill?

The impression that most unemployable people are women seems correct judging from the data. In Sada, most people are fully proletarianized in the sense that they are totally reliant on wage-labour for subsistence and social reproduction. There is no economic activity for women to engage in, other than wage labour. It seems clear that the remittances of wages of contract workers are not nearly sufficient to support an entire family in Sada.
The SPP Preliminary Report estimates that the Manpower Development Centre has placed 5,840 people from the Hewu district in employment, out of a total of 15,168 in the whole of the Ciskei. It is not surprising that more than one-third of those recruited by the MDC, with all its attendant disadvantages, come from this 'bleak and miserable district which houses Sada, Thornhill and Zweledinge'. The official population statistic for this area is just over 74,000.

The plight of the unemployed in Sada is particularly desperate. Often the sole income a family has is a pension payment/disability grant. A woman who arrived in 1979 after being evicted by a farmer said she had been looking for a job for the past 2½ years, but had not yet been able to find one. Her family's only source of income was her husband's pension of R66 a quarter for which he had waited 18 months. 'By the time he got the pension, we owed a lot of people money. We owe the shopkeepers so much, that often we cannot go there and have to go without food. None of my children are working. Some are at school and some are looking for work'.

Almost everyone we interviewed described the queues of people that wait outside the Whittlesea labour bureau every day in the hope that requisitions will arrive. People are reduced to accepting the most unfavourable of contracts. One woman told us of her husband's latest contract to a farm:

'Four months ago (early 1981), he got a 6 month contract to a grain farm in the Orange Free State. My husband got the job because he happened to be in Thornhill at the time and this farmer went to Thornhill and Whittlesea to look for workers. The only thing that's worrying me, though, is that the farmer said he was going to pay them in mielies and not in cash.'

The point here is not so much whether the allegation is true, but that, even given this perception (or misperception) there are still people available to take up these kinds of jobs.

However, despite the fact that most Sada migrants tend to be employed in the worst-paid industrial sectors, for many even this is a vast improvement over agricultural labour.
Social and Political Effects of Resettlement

One of the major political effects of resettlement has been the disorganisation and control of people. While on a general level it is easy to see how resettlement has had this disorganisational effect, it is important to realise that the crux of control is not in the mere existence of peripheral rural-situated areas to which people can be moved. It is the parameters of class domination and control within those areas that need to be examined, in order to appreciate the full political importance of resettlement. In other words, the operations of the local bantustan state and their effect on resettled people must be examined.

We have pointed out above that much of the literature on resettlement treats those places as undifferentiated masses of poverty and suffering. While this is certainly a justifiable first impression, it nevertheless ignores class differences in the camps and their political implications. There has also been a tendency to ignore the often strained relations between people in resettlement camps and rural-dwellers outside who have firmer historical roots in the area.

This section will look at the questions of class differences and political control within Sada and relations between Sada residents and those in the surrounding areas, mainly from the Tribal Authority area of Shiloh.

According to one respondent the land that is now Sada was originally a cattle-post for the people from the Shiloh area. His family moved to the area in 1939: It is worth quoting him in some detail to show the background to these relations:

'My father got a job looking after someone's livestock at this cattle post. Our family lived here ... There was much stock here then - cattle, sheep, horses, goats - like you don't see today. Mostly they were owned by the people in Shiloh. My father got paid 15/- a month and some food. He had a bit of his own livestock, too, which he had built up from Tarkastad (from a farm he worked on) ...

My father worked on the grazing lands until the Trust took over the land. (This was + 1980) and then we were all told to move to Shiloh ...

After the Trust took over the land, my father lost his job and went on a pension. We were lodging with people in Shiloh up to the time when Sada was started (1965). Then he decided to move into a temporary house in Sada because the headman was making things very difficult for us.
'The headman at Shiloh was feeling the sting of people coming in from the farms and even though we are Xhosa, they (Shiloh people) called us bad names (like 'farm people'). When they started this place (Sada) people from the farms were so pleased to have a place of their own, they called it Sulyimyembeze ('wipe the tears away'), but the whites said it would be too difficult for them to say, so we called it 'Sada' ('at last') from 'Sadasayifumanaiindawo' ('at last we have our own places').

This man gave us some idea of the historical roots of the tension, which, according to newer arrivals, certainly exists between the Shiloh and Sada people.

The Irrigation Scheme at Shiloh was started mainly to compensate people who had lost land to the Trust. In return for the loss of grazing land they have been given quarter-hectare irrigated 'food plots'.

The divisions between this tribal, partially peasant, community and a fully proletarianised, resettled community, are being entrenched by the local state. While some opportunistic headmen make vague promises of land to some of the more desperate in Sada, it is quite clear that no arable land will be allocated to 'outsiders'. (See chapter on Ciskei Agricultural Policy). The only relationship anyone in Sada has with the Scheme is as a wage-labourer on the 'Group' or 'Tribal' farm, part of the Scheme run by the Ciskei Government-appointed management. One resident of Sada, who works on the Scheme as a general labourer said:

'We have no land here, or livestock. In Whittlesea we had one cow, but no land. The office people made my wife sell the cow before she left Whittlesea, because they said there was no room for livestock in Sada. This is a township so no livestock is allowed. The land outside the camp is for Shiloh people only and people inside Sada cannot use it.'

Although a number of people came to Sada from the farms in the hope of acquiring land (some told us that Ciskeian chiefs had assured those who were about to be resettled that there was land available) their hopes were quickly dashed. Even the stalling of the government-appointed headman leaves little doubt in the peoples' minds that they are in quite a different position from the people in Shiloh.
An unemployed woman said that:

'No one has land in Sada and very few have livestock. Some people used to have pigs, but the government told them they were not allowed to have any livestock. In one meeting people asked the headman about land and he said that he would tell them what their rights were with regard to land. But it is only the Shiloh people who can get land.'

People in the Shiloh community felt obvious resentment to 'farm people' coming into Sada, resettled on their old cattle-post. Even though the Irrigation Scheme has compensated those who lost a considerable amount of land, there is the constant threat to Shiloh people of a huge mass of completely dispossessed people on their doorsteps. The Irrigation Scheme itself is surrounded by expensive security fencing, against the Sada people.

A few of the larger farmers (with the 12 hectare plots) employ labour from Sada. But numerically this is insignificant. More people are employed on the 'Tribal' farm.

In the light of the agricultural policy of the Ciskei government, the majority of people from Sada are not going to obtain arable land. For many, particularly those from the farms, resettlement has been the final step towards complete proletarianisation.

Sada is not a rural reserve, but a township created for the purpose of relocating the unemployed and unemployable sectors of the proletariat. A teacher who has lived in Sada for five years, summed up the situation:

'When I look at the situation here, I must only say that homelands are a passing phase. There is no land here for agricultural production. The people here are not supposed to own land or livestock. Even the surrounding land is of no use to Sada people, because it is all owned by the Shiloh people.

The plots on the Irrigation Scheme are given to the people who have always had land. So there is no chance of anyone from Sada getting plots. People depend on migrant labour. Recruits go to the labour bureau in Whittlesea and every day there are rows of people waiting.'
Internal Relations

While the Ciskei state has actively tried to create a supportive middle-class from the rural communities through the agricultural schemes, it has, at the same time, fostered the position of elements of the middle-classes in the urban areas (resettlement camps fall into this category) to facilitate control over the relocated.

In Sada, as in other parts of the Ciskei, political control over contract workers, their families and the unemployed has been extended primarily through the powers of economic allocation ceded to the headmen and other local state officials.

The lack of any independent economic basis for the middle-class in the Ciskei makes them completely dependent on their access to the state to secure their economic position. It is this close link between political power and economic position that is probably the major cohesive factor in the maintenance of control in the Ciskei by the local ruling class. This is because the securing of economic benefits through political affiliations does not apply to this new middle-class alone. Political loyalty, or rather subservience, is often the sole criterion whereby people in resettlement camps are allocated houses, pensions and even jobs.

Sada is divided into zones/wards and in each zone there is a headman (appointed by the government). The headmen in all the zones sit on a committee which people must approach if they want houses or pensions. Often local jobs are allocated through the headmen or committee but the allocation of contracts is a little more complex and will be dealt with later.

The shortage of housing and jobs in Sada is acute and is often used by headmen as a means of political control. Membership of CNIP, payment of party dues and loyalty to headmen appointed directly by the government are important criteria for the securing of either.

But often not even a Ciskeian citizenship card is sufficient to secure accommodation, etc. The ruling class in the Ciskei is so weak and divided,
and yet at the same time their powers of allocation so entrenched, that resettled people often suffer the effects of intra ruling-class rivalry.

In Sada, the most powerful man in the area in the 'seventies was Myataza, a shopkeeper and local MLA (Member of the Ciskei Legislative Assembly) in the area. The stories that circulate about him are confusing, but even so, serve to illustrate the point made above. Being the local representative to the Legislative Assembly people used to go to him with problems to do with housing and jobs. The people who had arrived in the area before 1978 remembered him as someone who helped them get pensions, accommodation and local jobs (e.g. with the 'Trust'). Whether he built up any significant personal following and so became a threat to Sebe, or not, is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, according to local people, he seems to have fallen enough out of favour with the headmen's committee (who are all loyal Sebe followers) to cause 'his' people to be discriminated against when it came to housing or tolerance of overdue rent.

A local clergymen told us that many of the people living in the mud hut settlement on the outskirts of Sada (Madakeni) were there because Myataza had induced them to leave surrounding white farms and settle in Sada on the pretext that houses and land were available. On arrival they found nothing of the sort and were forced to build mud huts in Madakeni. The story is full of imprecision and uncertainty. But, whatever the case, people in Madakeni are referred to by those in Sada as 'Myataza's people'.

Whatever relationship this story bears to objective reality, the interesting thing to note here is the perceptions of people. They are clear that an 'unsuitable' political connection can affect them adversely in a material sense.

One old man, a pensioner, commented on the housing situation:

'There are very few houses available ... and those that are are given to teachers and nurses. They kick people out who can't pay their rent ... Many people have been forced to go live in the mud huts ... There are committees here to solve problems like these ... The committee members are not really
'elected by the people. The people in the zones are told who's representing the area. The committee are all against Myataza and those who like Myataza are kicked out of their houses ...'

An unemployed woman explained why she liked Myataza:

'During Myataza's time he used to do things for us, but all the headmen tell you is to wait. Myataza used to get people jobs and because he owns shops in Sada he gave people food on credit. But even he is in a fix because so many people go to him ...'

Houses are in particularly short supply and the immediate power that the headmen's committee wields in this direction is significant. The unemployed and pensioners often find it difficult to keep up with the rent, which, according to the people we spoke to, ranges from R2,60 to R5,00 a month for two rooms. If they have problems paying rent, they are supposed to approach the committee, who can decide whether to evict them or not. If they are evicted, the person to whom the house is allocated must be able to pay the arrears before they move in - a stipulation that must exclude many. At least six people mentioned that people who were occupying empty houses now are all teachers and nurses. Others, who have been on the waiting list for years, are being conveniently overlooked. The teacher we interviewed told us:

'In Sada civil servants are given first preference when it comes to houses. The house that we now have has five rooms with kitchen and bathroom inside. There were five families living in this house when we arrived. When we needed the house these people were sent to Oxton by the Department of Interior which organises houses. But there are still teachers without houses, despite the fact that they are given first preference.'

The power of the committee stems not from their ability to provide the homeless with housing, but from their ability to allocate much needed houses on a discriminatory and preferential basis. The major criterion for the committee is the political affiliation of the applicant. To quote the teacher once again:

'... Ciskei citizenship cards, even CNIP membership cards (with proof that party dues are paid) - having these extends to all things here - it is most important.'

Pensioners, who get R66 every three months and unemployed women, who are
getting no remittances, are in a particularly vulnerable position. They face the possibility of being evicted at any time, and are almost entirely dependent on the goodwill of the headman in their zone, or the committee. There is no prescribed 'period of grace' for those who cannot pay. Mercy is wholly in the hands of the CNIP officials.

Similar 'rôles' apply to the allocation of pensions and local jobs. Sometimes people have to wait up to two years for their pensions to be transferred to Sada, after they have been moved. In order to apply for a pension, it is necessary to go through the headman who will then take the applicant to the superintendent's office. Mere entitlement to a pension is not a sufficient guarantee it will be obtained. Co-operation from the headman is vital.

An old widow had been waiting for a pension for more than a year. She had four grandchildren to support and her rent (for two rooms) amounted to R3.60 a month. Her daughter worked as a domestic servant in Johannesburg (illegally) for R40 a month, but had recently lost that job. She had no other source of income:

'I applied for an old age pension when my husband died (more than one year ago), but I have received nothing yet. I went to Whittlesea to apply, but they said I had to see a doctor who has to confirm that people can no longer work. Then they told me to take the forms to Sada, to the headman. The office (superintendent's office) told me to wait, but I have heard nothing yet ... The burden here is very heavy. I have problems at the clinic. It costs 50c and I have no money. I can't take any of my grandchildren there if they are sick, unless I borrow money. We are starving at home ... I can't get food from the shops on credit, because the shopkeepers know I have no money. Sometimes the people here and in Madakeni help each other and give each other food and money. Were it not for this I would be finished by now from hunger ...

I have tried to see Myataza about my pension, but I can't get hold of him. I have gone to the headman in my ward a number of times, because I want him to get me food from the magistrate's offices. Now the headman has promised to take me to the office again to try to fix up my pension.'

Being viewed in a favourable light by the headman and the committee is also helpful in securing jobs. A man employed by the Irrigation Scheme told us how the committee works and how they had helped him:
'The main problem here is job opportunities. There is a committee at Sada which is supposed to handle complaints. It is appointed by the Ciskei Government. In each zone there is a headman, a treasurer and a secretary - and they sit on the committee. The headman in my zone is a teacher. I have been to the committee twice with complaints and so far I have been satisfied. Once I went when I wanted work and they helped me get the job on the Scheme and I also went to them to fix up pensions for the old people who came with me from the farm ...'

In Madakeni, people looking for local jobs have to register with the headman first and he then allocates whatever jobs are available. They also have to apply to him for a plot on which to build a mud hut.

However awesome and oppressive this control over resettled people sounds, it should be remembered that it is not monolithic. The position of those with powers of economic allocation becomes threatened when there is little or no opportunity to put those powers to use, in other words, when there is nothing to allocate. Apart from the huge numbers of unemployed, the housing shortage is assuming serious proportions in Sada. Even CNIP membership and loyalty to the headman is not necessarily a guarantee any more and this is becoming increasingly obvious to the residents of Sada.

Chiefs and headmen have been placed in positions to serve directly the interests of the Ciskei Government, but material support to back up their authority is just not forthcoming. People are becoming increasingly alienated and suspicious - and the immediate target of their suspicions are the local headmen. The committee and other government officials have come to rely increasingly on an ideology of promises to maintain their position. The factories and the Irrigation Scheme are only the beginning of what is to come, they tell people. More houses will be built and more jobs will be created. The headman in Madakeni, unable to give people any satisfaction, has made (according to two residents) elaborate promises of land and new houses. But that was one year ago, as one woman pointed out, even now 'not even the foundations have been laid'.

An unemployed woman in Sada said:

'Our main problem here is the jobs and the small house we live in. At night when we want to sleep we have to take
'all the tables and chairs outside to make room. At meetings with the headman in our zone, he promises that new houses are going to be built, but we have seen nothing yet.'

Early in 1980, Maqoma (then Minister of the Interior) told a meeting of Sada people that a new factory would soon be established in the area. However, the hopelessness of this promise becomes increasingly apparent to people.

The other central contradiction facing the Ciskei authorities is that most people in Sada have no basis in the rural areas at all. Whether they come from the farms or the towns, none have been subject to the remnants of pre-capitalist ideological relations, as has been the case in the rural areas of the Ciskei. Government-appointed headmen in these areas usually have historical roots in the area as shallow as those over whom they exercise their control. One of the headmen in Sada, for instance, is a shopkeeper from Paarl; another is a teacher, originally from King-williamstown. No resident is allowed to own land or even livestock.

For the vast majority of people, there is absolutely no chance of being allocated arable or grazing land. Authority of the chiefs in the rural areas has been based on their powers of allocation over land (albeit powers granted to them by the central state). As pointed out above, the imposition of 'tribal' ideology in a situation where there is no material basis for it, poses severe problems for the local ruling class in their attempts at containment and control.
EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS (ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL STATUS) OF PEOPLE RELOCATED TO SADA

PERMANENT RESIDENTS

- employed
- unemployed
- not economically active

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<th>Age Group</th>
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Note: The diagram illustrates the number of people in different age groups and sex categories, categorized by their employment status.
EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS (ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL STATUS) OF PEOPLE RELOCATED TO SADA

MIGRANTS (all employed)

COMMUTERS (all employed)

EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS (ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL STATUS) OF PEOPLE RELOCATED TO SADA

f stemmet 1982
Background

Elukhanyweni, in the Keiskammahoek district, is a resettlement camp established in 1977. It consists of about 400 wooden houses - three-roomed - all built without floors. A smaller section of the camp consists of pre-fabricated houses (2/3 roomed) - but most people live in the former type of dwelling.

The degree of diversity in Elukhanyweni is not of the same order as that in Sada or Dimbaza. The origin of the inhabitants is the same, as by and large, is their class position. This is not to suggest that there are no divisions in the camp, indeed there are deep and serious divisions. And in many ways these divisions are more clear-cut and more assimilated into the political consciousness of the people than in the case of the other two camps.

The general attitude of the people is very different from attitudes expressed in Sada and Dimbaza. Whereas in the latter two places - the general attitude (especially among those who had come from the farms or the Midland towns) was one of resignation - an attitude which has arisen from the fact that there are obviously no real alternatives for these people - in Elukhanyweni the attitude was almost unanimously a complete rejection of the Ciskei in general, of Elukhanyweni in particular, and a desperate longing to return to their homes in the Humansdorp area.

We only conducted 10 formal interviews in Elukhanyweni, partly due to time constraints and partly due to the fact that many people did not want notes taken while they spoke to us. We stress that the final 10 written interviews do not reflect the number of people to whom we actually spoke. Many of our interviews were conducted as group discussions and a number of other informal group discussions took place. In all, we probably spoke to about 70 people in the area. What struck us most forcibly in all our conversations was the degree of unity among the people, not in an organisational way, but at the level of consciousness.
Reasons for Removal

Elukhanyweni is the product of a typical black spot removal. All the people now living there come from the Humansdorp/ Tsitsikamma district. They originate from four villages in the area: Snyklip, Doriskraal, Wittekleibos and Palmiet Rivier. In these villages each family had 5 morgen of land which they cultivated and many had substantial numbers of livestock. Landholding in the villages seemed to have been on a quitrent (freehold) basis. Equal amounts of land were allocated by the headman to members of the particular tribe that lived in the region. A small annual fee was paid to the magistrate.

All the people we spoke to were allocated 4½ morgen for cultivation and ¼ morgen for their houses and gardens. Although plot sizes were equal, there were economic differences among the people. Many of the more established families had better land. Livestock holdings were also very unequal. Some families were completely self-sufficient, but most contained at least one wage earner. The wage earners from Tsitsikamma did not generally go further afield than Humansdorp or Port Elizabeth (sometimes Langkloof) and used to come back over the weekends to help with the farming.

It was difficult to ascertain for how long this particular community had lived in Tsitsikamma but according to informants land was granted to this particular community (all Mfengu) by the British Government in the late 19th century. From the late 1940s and especially during the 1950s many people started moving off the white farms in the Humansdorp area because land which they had cultivated for themselves, was expropriated by the farmer and their livestock was restricted. The implementation of laws against 'squatting' and labour tenancy on white farms affected a number of Africans in the Tsitsikamma area. People in this position who had historical and family links with the Tsitsikamma community were allocated land in one of the 4 villages. Of those we spoke to, however, none had been allocated land after 1957.

From information we received during our interviews, it seems that government pressure on the Tsitsikamma people to move began at some time in the 'sixties. However, it was only in December 1977 that they were successful in removing the majority. All but a few of the removals were forced
removals in the widest sense of the term. After countless eviction notices and general intimidation and harassment had failed, police vans surrounded the villages in December 1977 and, armed with rifles, ordered people to pack their belongings onto GG trucks in which they were driven to Elukhanyweni. There they were put into tents because the wooden houses were not yet ready. Those with livestock were given little time to get rid of it and were constrained to sell at below market prices to local white farmers. The vast majority were not compensated for their land, but only their houses.

There was a small group in Tsitsikamma, however, who moved voluntarily to the Keiskammahoek district a short time before the entire community was moved. This group consisted of the headman of each of the 4 villages and (seemingly) a number of the more successful farmers around them (this is deduced from various informants). These people were all given land in Keiskammahoek soon after they arrived, and were allowed to keep most of their livestock. They were, and are, known as the inywaki by the rest of the community (literally means meerkat, meant to refer to collaborators).

The major division in Elukhanyweni and the surrounding district is between these inywaki and the 'volunteers' who opposed the removals.

Most of those we interviewed provided vivid descriptions of the villages in Tsitsikamma and the removals. A retired teacher spoke of his bitterness at having been removed:

"We were moved from Humansdorp at the end of 1977. I taught there for 30 years. Humansdorp is my home. We were forced to move. It was proclaimed act (sic). We got compensation, but it was not worthwhile ... We are all from the Tsitsikamma area. We are a "reserved" people. We had our own plots of land and could make a good living out of it. We had 4½ morgen of arable land and ½ morgen for the house. Almost everyone had livestock there.

Then they declared from Cape Town to the Gamtoos River a white area. As far as we know and as far as our forefathers know this is the first time they have done such a thing.

For years before the police forced us to move, GG had threatened to move us, but we couldn't believe it. They told us there was a place at Elukhanyweni for us, but we couldn't believe this also.

Before all this happened (the removals) there were people from Tsitsikamma who came here. They came without our knowledge. They were not forced to come here they chose it. Those are the blighters and we are suffering through them ..." (He then named some people)
An elderly man, who now works on a local dam construction site in Keiskammahoek, also told us how he came to the Tsitsikamma villages and how he left. He was born on a white farm in the Humansdorp area, where his father was allowed to use some of the land and keep his own livestock:

'... the old farmer died and the sons sold the farm. The new owner introduced new rules ... The workers could not use the land anymore and had to cut down on the livestock. My father decided it was not worth staying on the farm, so we went to the 'reserve' in Snyklip.

This was in 1948. We approached the headman there and he gave my father 5 morgen. You had to have roots in the village to get land, outsiders were not granted land. My father had roots in the village. We paid R1 a year as tax to the magistrate.

When we got to Snyklip I got a job at Churchill Dam (just to the north of Humansdorp) ... I worked there until we were moved to Elukhanyweni, by then I was getting R18 a month. At weekends I used to return to Snyklip to help with the farming. We also had a lot of livestock there.

When the GG moved us in 1977 they said that all the Africans in Humansdorp had to go back to their Kings in the homelands. We got no compensation for the land, because they said it was government land. We only got compensation for the house. We had to sell our livestock before we came here. We got offers for our livestock from the white farmers in the area, but they set the prices ...

When we arrived we were put into tents. We moved into the wooden houses before they were finished and put in the floors ourselves. The government just put up the frame ...'

An old woman whose family lived in Doriskraal village for 20 years before they were moved described some of the struggles around the removals:

'For long before we arrived, there had been threats that the government wanted us out. The village was divided between those who were resisting the move and those who were talking to the government. These were the volunteers who joined the PAC in fighting the removals. Their call was Mayibuye iAfrika. Those who were not supporting the resistance were called inywaki. These inywaki were those who came in the delegation to Keiskammahoek and those who did not support the resistance to the removals. The 'volunteers' were collecting money, at the time we were moved, to get legal help to resist moving. If you refused to give money, you were called an inywaki. This business of 'volunteers' and inywaki has been going on a long time. Twenty-two years ago, when I moved to Tsitsikamma, there were volunteers and inywaki.

When the inywaki had gone to Keiskammahoek in a delegation, and the volunteers were crushed, the police came in 1978 and put us into trucks. They pulled down our houses and put our corrugated iron and other belongings on the trucks ...'
We managed to find a man who had been a member of the delegation which had come to Keiskammahoek. He did not live in Elakhanyweni, but had his own land and house nearby. Whilst in Snyklip, he had built up an impressive flock of sheep and was one of the richer farmers in the village. He had never had to work for wages then, and still doesn't, because he has always made an adequate living out of farming. He told us how he had come to be part of the delegation

'While we lived in the village, the government asked for a delegation from the four villages to visit Keiskammahoek and report back to the people on the area, because the people had already been told to leave (early 'seventies?).

At first I was not part of the delegation, but an official from the Keiskammahoek scheme had come down and he saw how well I had done with my sheep and was impressed by my bales of wool that I sold at the Humansdorp market. He suggested to the (Ciskei) government that I be included in the delegation.

When we got back from Keiskammahoek we advised people to accept the offer. But people refused to move. My argument was that one has to accept in order to ask.

The government first moved all those who had accepted the offer. I was part of this group. When we arrived here, we were settled in Elukhanyweni for a while and then moved, because the land that was allocated for us was far from the camp. So we built our houses nearer our fields ...'

It is perhaps only a speculative point, but it would seem that the long delay between the first eviction notices being served and their actual enforcement was due to the level of organisation and resistance in the villages. It was only after the state had successfully divided the community that they were able to effect the removals with the necessary force.

As in the other camps, but in the case of Elukhanyweni particularly strongly, an understanding of the reasons for and manner of arrival are crucial for an understanding of the social relations within the camp now and their potential effects.

Work Histories

Because it was an entire community that was uprooted, there are not an abnormal number of pensioners and other NEA people in Elukhanyweni as there were in the early days of both Sada and Dimbaza. Of the 10 formal
interviews, there were 3 pensioners, 3 locally employed, 1 self-sufficient and 3 either unemployed or underemployed. Seven people had members of their households away on contract - five in Humansdorp and two in the Langkloof apple farms - and one pensioner had a son who worked in the Maintenance Department for the Ciskei Government in King Williamstown.

The interesting trend that emerged in our interviews was that those who had held jobs previously in Humansdorp usually retained them, but on a contract basis. Others who only worked on a casual basis before were subsequently forced into full-time wage-labour as they had no other means of support. Apart from a handful who are employed on the Irrigation Scheme and at the local CNDC-sponsored saw-mills and the nearby Sandile dam construction site there are no opportunities for local employment.

Most of the elderly people we spoke to complained that there was no future for their children in the Ciskei because there were absolutely no possibilities for employment, local or otherwise.

Even if employment is found, all people in Elukhanyweni have had to accept a very severe drop in their standard of living. While most families in the Tsitsikamma villages had at least one member working in Humansdorp or on neighbouring farms, wages were by no means the only source of income.

Now the entire community (except those who voluntarily moved and were granted land to cultivate) are completely dependent on some form of cash income - be it a pension/disability grant or wages. The high level of unemployment and excessive pressure on the land in the Ciskei has meant a very severe deterioration of living standards for the inhabitants of Elukhanyweni. As the old teacher whom we interviewed put it:

'We are suffering through one thing now - our children are jobless. They are turning into thieves. It's a new thing since we moved here."

Those who managed to get local jobs or contracts have had to accept a considerable drop in income. The old man who had worked at Churchill Dam in Humansdorp was offered a job at the local dam construction site in Keiskammahoek. This dam (Sandile) is eventually going to supply the Irrigation Scheme and Keiskammahoek. Mr. K. had got the job after the foreman had found out that he had worked on dam sites before. He is paid
R99 a month - R19 lower than his wage in Humansdorp - and in Humansdorp he had his own land as well.

Young people tend to return to Humansdorp as quickly as possible either on a contract or illegally, if necessary. An old woman told us:

'Most of my children are working back in Humansdorp. We stay with three grandchildren and one great grand-daughter. My three unmarried daughters are all in the PE-Humansdorp area, one as a domestic, one works for National (road construction) and the other is a farm worker. Mostly we live on our pensions, but sometimes they send us money.'

One woman said that her husband's employers in Humansdorp had refused to re-employ him unless he got a contract from Keiskammahoek. This entailed a marked drop in wages for him:

'... (before we were moved) ... my husband was working for National (Provincial Administration) on the roads, where he was paid R135 a month. He worked there until 1978 - until just before the removals, then he had a quarrel with the foreman and left. He got another job in Humansdorp and had just started when we were moved to the Ciskei. His employers told him he had to get a contract from Keiskammahoek if he wanted to carry on working. So he came here and got a contract to 'Bosbou' in Kleinbos. It is forestry work. He earns R84 a month (including overtime). He is doing his best to send money back but it is very difficult.'

She works on the Irrigation Scheme at Keiskammahoek and described the conditions there:

'We have many problems there. The women workers have been told to channel their complaints through the foreman ... but he doesn't care ... the men workers have got a committee of their own, but they won't let women join as they say it is for men only.

The women are not willing to form a committee. They took the job there knowing they'd have to do what they are told. The manager says if there is a complaint he wants to know who started it. Then he asks if we don't want work and he sacks the people who complain.

The foreman has his own favourites, too, and some women are now getting R1.75 a day. We start work at 7 a.m. and end at 5 p.m. on weekdays. On Saturdays we work from 7 - 12, but sometimes we have to go back after lunch. There is no overtime pay ...'

The employment patterns in Elukhanyweni are similar in some respects to those in Sada and Dimbaza. People are added to the pool of migrant labour and are compelled to take out contracts. Again, the impression we gained was that a substantial number of men take out contracts to the mines from
KwaTeba recruiting office in Keiskammahoek, or return to Humansdorp to work in the construction industry - usually for the Provincial Administration on the roads.

But there is a crucial difference between migrants from Elukhanyweni and those from Sada and Dimbaza. For many of those in the latter two places, especially those from the farms, the ability to take out a contract, even to the mines, constitutes an improvement. But for those who have been removed from the Tsitsikamma villages, this is certainly not the case. There, most people were conveniently employed near to their homes or had no need for regular employment, being able to make a reasonable living off the land.

Now, if they want to retain their old jobs in Humansdorp, they have to take out contracts. With the level of unemployment being what it is, people in Elukhanyweni cannot exercise a wide range of choice with regard to their jobs.

Of the 557 members of households for whom useful returns were received by the SPP 283 were permanent residents with 117 migrants of whom the majority were men, and mostly in employment, and 157 commuters. Of the 'commuters', 109 were young and classified NEA. We can only assume that these people were scholars who commuted to school. The majority of migrant men employed were in the construction industry (30.9%) and the mining industry (30.9%). Of the women, 75% were employed in the service sector, presumably mainly as domestic workers. Of the commuters, most men were employed as construction workers and most women in the service sector.

As far as the permanent residents are concerned, once again we see reflected the very low employment ratios. Of permanent residents, 3.9% were employed. About twice as many women as men were NEA and unemployed.

Social and Political Effects

The major divisions in Elukhanyweni are those that became most apparent at the time of the removals i.e. those between the inywaki and the 'volunteers'.
According to informants some of the headmen from the old village have been co-opted by the Ciskei Government and now play an important rôle in the control of the resettled people.

Conditions in Elukhanyweni, as has been indicated, are particularly bad. The area has not yet become a township in the way that Dimbaza and Sada have. The people suffer from a marked lack of facilities and are particularly isolated. The camp is about 4 - 5 kilometres from Keiskammahoek the nearest town. There is no public transport - and the private transport they use only in emergencies, because it is beyond most people's means. According to an informant, it costs about R5 - R7 to take a taxi to the hospital at St. Matthews, a distance of about 11 kilometres. Living conditions are generally appalling. A report in the Argus estimated that since 1978 at least one child has died every two weeks from diseases associated with malnutrition.11

The houses are all three-roomed for which people do not pay rent. When people were first moved to Elukhanyweni the houses were not yet complete and they had to live in tents. Most of them moved in before the houses were finished and, because of poor weather, many of them were obliged to roof and floor the dwellings themselves. Many also added another room, as they could not fit their families in. Most people are extremely dissatisfied with their houses:

'The houses are very badly built. When there are strong winds the whole house shakes and cracks come into the walls. If the wind is strong enough it can remove the whole roof. If this happens, we can report it at the office.'

Another major complaint among the people is the shops (or rather lack of them) and the price of food and fuel. There are no proper shops inside Elukhanyweni - only private shops. The nearest proper shops are at Keiskammahoek. The private shops are more expensive than the shops in the village, so people try to do their shopping there. The most expensive shops extend credit and because so many rely on remittances or quarterly pension/disability payments, it is very difficult to use cash regularly. An old woman on a pension told us how the credit system in Keiskammahoek worked:

'When we arrived, the magistrate told us there was one shop where we could get food on credit, but because there were no jobs, people couldn't pay. When the account ran above R100 people
thought this was too much, so they went to other shops which were cheaper, but did not extend credit. So the first shop went to the lawyers and now the lawyers are giving out summons to those who owe money. They say the summons will be withdrawn if they continue going to that particular shop. The owner doesn't expect people to settle the whole account, but if they have money she wants them to go to her. But although it has cost me a lot, I decided to settle my account and finish with that shop. Now I buy at another shop. Other people are going to jail if they have not settled their account and are found buying at another shop.'

Because people rely so heavily on credit, they are completely at the mercy of shopkeepers who can set any prices they wish. A woman whose husband is away on contract work referred to the same shop extending credit in a way that illustrated the extent of the power the shopkeepers can exert over the people of Elukhanyweni:

'The shops are very expensive. Often I have been forced to buy on credit but the shopkeepers always charge you more. There is one shop in Keiskammahoek where I owed R38; then it went up to R56. Now they have sent me a summons to appear in court, saying I owe them R101.91. Some people have already been charged and sent to jail. I got my summons last year in August. This year I asked a lawyer to send the summons to my husband, who would fix it up, but still I got another summons last month.'

Conditions of the shops, the houses, land, transport, clinics and most importantly the lack of jobs were the problems that were discussed by everyone we spoke to. As in Sada and Dimbaza, in Elukhanyweni there is a committee to which people are supposed to go with their problems. It was difficult to establish exactly how the committee works, but it seems that the core constitutes the headman who came in the delegation from the Tsitsikamma villages. Anyone else on the committee is appointed by the headman. One resident explained:

'There is a committee here with people on it from all four of the old villages in Tsitsikamma. The members are appointed by the headman. This committee deals with problems of work and land. For maintenance problems you go to the committee and they go to the office. The headman allocates land and a few people (those who moved voluntarily) have got it through him, in other areas.'

The committee also has some informal power over pension payments and disability grants. All those on pensions/disability grants in Humansdorp had them transferred to Elukhanyweni. However two pensioners complained they had to wait for between 9 months and 2 years for their pension to be
transferred and they said they know of similar cases. The man who waited 2 years was one of those accused of being a 'ringleader' in resisting the removals. There is also general confusion over how much they are supposed to be getting - some get R66 per quarter and others get from R76 to R86.

'We don't get paid one particular amount for our pension sometimes it's R76 for 3 months and sometimes it is R86. Whatever it is nearly all our pensions go to pay debts at the shops.'

Pensioners and those on disability grants complain that if they miss a payment they cannot get a back payment. This was never the case in Humansdorp they say. When people arrived they had to go through the headman to ensure that their pensions were transferred. Today payment of their pensions depends on their relations with the headman. It also depends on their political loyalty to the Ciskei ruling party, CNIP. Two pensioners and a woman on a disability grant complained that before their pensions are actually paid out to them, a variety of 'taxes' are imposed by the headman:

'Last time I went to get my pension, I had to pay R1 tax for my dog. The clerk refused to give me my money until I'd paid. The headman also stands around pension queues to collect money from the people for CNIP ...'

It was difficult to establish exactly how the headman system worked in Elukhanyweni. From our interviews it appeared that each of the Tsitsikamma villages had their own headman (either one or more) and most of them arrived in Keiskammahoek in the 'delegation'. But there appear to have been some dissidents among the headmen, who failed to comply with the eviction notices. One old headman was sent to Tshoxa (near Kingwilliamstown), according to one informant, and given land there and not in Keiskammahoek. This was to cut off his influence.

'There was one good headman from Humansdorp, but the government said he was too old to continue. There was another young man from Humansdorp who the people wanted as headman, but the government offered to pay him only R22 a month, so he refused to come here to work.

Then the other old headman, Mr. S., (one of the inywaki) organised his group and he was reappointed headman by the government.

This headman chooses the committee. Some of those on the committee are headmen from the other villages who were in the delegation. They have power here. We had to go to them to get our pensions transferred from Humansdorp. But I had to wait 2 years to get my pension.'
Some people told us that the headman for Snyklip was now headman of Elukhanyweni. But all of them named the same group of people as inywaki who were now headmen on the committee.

Although the power of this committee derives from much the same sources as those in Sada and Dimbaza, i.e. powers of economic allocation by the state, it differs crucially in the respect that it has no ideological legitimacy among the people. This is not to suggest that the basis of the 'tribal ideology' in Sada and Dimbaza is any more substantial, but rather that because in the latter two places the origin of people is disparate, there has been no common history or organisation. Whereas in Sada and Dimbaza the imposed and restructured system of tribal ideology has nothing to sustain it - and thus it is structurally contradictory - in Elukhanyweni there is conscious antagonism to it. There is certainly a perception of the connections between the delegation which came voluntarily and those who got land and those who exercise control in Elukhanyweni on behalf of the Ciskei Government. As one woman put it:

"We are supposed to take our problems to the committee. The committee is appointed by the headman and there are people from each of the 4 villages in Humansdorp. The headman here comes from Snyklip village. He was part of the inywaki delegation to Keiskammahoek. He owns a pirate shop here and has his own land and is a member of CNIP. I don't know how the committee members are appointed but what I do know is that when my husband and I enquired about the removals from Humansdorp we were told by the headman to keep quiet, because we were newcomers in the area ..."

This feeling of disenchantment was one that was fairly generally expressed. After complaining about the lack of public transport and jobs and inadequate clinic facilities one woman explained:

"These problems are dealt with by Ciskeian government officials (the headman and committee). But they are refusing to listen to any complaints, because they say that the first thing we must do is forget about Humansdorp and take up Ciskeian citizenship and then we'll be treated as Ciskeian people. The committee is appointed by the headman and is supposed to take complaints from the residents to him. But the headman says we cannot solve our problems unless we take Ciskeian citizenship. So some people are taking it up, but nothing is getting better, no problems are being solved. The problem is that there is no organised spirit to fight our problems ..."

The ideology of promises might have some efficacy but in Elukhanyweni it is severely undermined by the extreme deterioration in living standards.
that has correlated with their move to the homelands. While promises of land still persist, the only people who have so far got land are those on the committee and connected with the headman. Some say that 17 people from Humansdorp got land and these were all part of the 'delegation'. Those who have been granted land, have land about eight kms. away from Elukhanyweni at a place called Peter's Farm. The one dissident headman got land at Tshoxa (near Kingwilliamstown). No land has thus far been granted in Elukhanyweni - something which substantiates the rumour cited to us by people, that it is to be turned into a 'proper township'.

The existence of the irrigation scheme nearby might also have some ideological effect on the people of Elukhanyweni, but because the Ciskei Government appears to most people there as an instrument of political oppression, the hope for land is expressed in a much more ambivalent and disillusioned way than it is presented in Sada, e.g.:

'Land is another main point of grievance. The government says we are in a location now and we cannot have land, but they say they are discussing the matter. Xaba (then Minister of Agriculture and vice-president) has promised us land and Xaba is a progressive man. But the soil is poor. There are no minerals here. We believe we are going to get land. People (but not all in Elukhanyweni) have got land in the Irrigation Scheme through Xaba ...'

Land ownership is a particularly important determinant of social relations between people in Elukhanyweni, and the more settled rural dwellers in the surrounding villages. Nobody actually living in Elukhanyweni has land (those of the delegation who were granted land are not living there), whereas many of those living in the surrounding villages have access to land. Some informants described the feelings of resentment many of the villagers have to the people in the resettlement camp:

'We have nothing to do with people above. They hate us like hell. They say we have stolen their children's land.'

One man interviewed worked on one of the villager's land on a sharecropping basis. This was the only such case we came across, although according to this informant other people in Elukhanyweni had been offered land in Xulu on the same basis. It seems that, although people have land in Xulu none of the young men and few of the younger women are available to work it, most of them being absent on contracts. Thus renting the land out on a sharecropping basis often suits the older residents of Xulu very well.
However according to Mr. K. who works in the Xulu land people in Elukhanyweni have not been quick to take up the offer because '... they still feel they're going to Humansdorp and don't want to waste time'.

From our interviews it was clear that this belief was most firmly held, but another more immediate reason for the reluctance to enter into a share-cropping relationship with the Xulu people might be the necessity to earn a regular cash income in Elukhanyweni which would constrain people from working on the fields.
EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS (ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL STATUS) OF PEOPLE RELOCATED TO ELUKHANYWENI

PERMANENT RESIDENTS

- employed
- unemployed
- not economically active

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EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS (ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL STATUS) OF PEOPLE RELOCATED TO ELUKHANYWENI

**COMMUTERS**
- employed
- unemployed
- not economically active

**EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS (ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL STATUS) OF PEOPLE RELOCATED TO ELUKHANYWENI**

**MIGRANTS (all employed)**
DIMBAZA

Background and Reasons for Removal

Most of those we interviewed in Dimbaza had been forcibly resettled there. Fifteen out of 20 families were resettled. Five were from the Cape Midlands towns, mainly Middelburg and Burgersdorp, from where whole townships were moved; five were resettled under the Group Areas Act, all from the Western and South Western Cape; four were resettled from urban areas under influx control laws and one was an ex-political prisoner who came off Robben Island and was banished to Dimbaza. Four came voluntarily, two from the farms, while one was a teacher looking for a job and the other came from Peddie for political reasons. One family was evicted from a white farm at Paterson (near Humansdorp) and chose to come to Dimbaza because they were able to get a house there.

The bulk of the removals from Middelburg and Burgersdorp took place between December 1968 and February 1969. Desmond quotes figures specifying the origin of these people. There were 203 families from Middelburg, 67 families from Burgersdorp, 39 families from Cape Town, and a few from other towns, mainly in the Cape. These people were victims of the 'Eiselen Line' policy which declares the Cape Province west of a line from Aliwal North to the Kat River a coloured employment preference area. Since 1955 when the policy was first announced, the government planned to 'freeze' the existing position with regard to the housing for families of African workers. In 1966 the African 'labour complement' of employers in the Western Cape was frozen. All women and children were to be sent 'back' to the reserves and men already in employment who did not qualify to remain in the urban areas under Section 10 1(a) or (b) were only allowed to return to their employment as contract labourers.

According to informants, the removals from Middelburg and Burgersdorp happened in three major stages. Many of the first and second groups to arrive in Dimbaza seem to have been women and children and men who were too sick or too old to work and the unemployed. By the end of 1969 virtually the whole locations at both Middelburg and Burgersdorp had been moved. Previously employed men registered at the local labour bureau to return to their old jobs in the district from where they had come.
Conditions were appalling at Dimbaza (then called Mnxesha) at the time when the initial mass resettlement took place. Desmond described Mnxesha in 1969: '... here was grinding poverty, squalor and hardship equal to the worst places I had seen - I doubt whether I have ever seen anything worse than this. It was as bad as any of the horror pictures from Biafra'.

There were no shops, one clinic opened belatedly after a number of infant deaths, no taps, shallow pit latrines and small two-roomed 10x16 zinc, or one-roomed prefabricated houses.

Although the local Bantu Authorities had not bothered to maintain the locations in Middelburg and Burgersdorp because they were expecting the people to be resettled, conditions were nevertheless much worse in Dimbaza for those who came in the first three groups from these places. Apart from living and health conditions which were dangerously inadequate, many people (especially women) in casual employment lost their jobs and were unable to find others in Dimbaza. People on pensions or disability grants often had to wait up to two years to get them transferred.

By May 1969, Desmond noted that there were over 90 graves in Dimbaza, 70 of which were children's. As he points out the 'bulk of the population only arrived in December-February 1969'. The government provided children and the aged with food rations valued at R2.30 (adult portion) per month. But these were not nearly sufficient to stave off starvation in Dimbaza in the early days.

The people who had been moved from Middelburg recounted aspects of their removal, but not in such graphic detail as the people in Elukhanyweni. An old woman, now on pension described how she was resettled:

'I arrived in Dimbaza in 1969. I was one of the first arrivals from Middelburg, Cape. I was already unemployed when I left and was getting a disability grant. I was not entitled to a house in Middelburg, because although I was born there, I was not married. I was given a rail warrant to Dimbaza and moved with my two (adopted) children after I lost my house, because the old male relative who had owned it, died. When I came to Dimbaza, I lost my disability grant, but later I applied for a pension and I got it in 1970. In Middelburg I worked in a butchery, but I left because I was sick.'
'The first house I got at Dimbaza was a pre-fab one. In 1970 there were terrible rains and the whole house collapsed. After that I was moved to a two-roomed house.

When I arrived there was only one shop some distance away on a white farm. Most people had brought very little money with them from Middelburg. At first we paid no rent and were rationed with food by the government. This kept us alive ...'

Another woman, now unemployed, described the years of insecurity in Middelburg on a temporary permit, before she was moved:

'My husband and I were originally from Graaff Reinet, but we moved to Middelburg, Cape soon after we were married (early 'sixties). There was a labour bureau there and a chance of getting a better job. But we couldn't register there because we were not from Middelburg. So we got permits to stay there every two months for which we paid 20 cents a month. My husband worked on a farm and I worked as a domestic in town. My husband was a sheep-shearer, but after two years he got sick and had to leave his job. Our permit to stay there was not renewed. I carried on working in Middelburg illegally. I had to go to and come back from work in the dark, so as not to be noticed ...

In 1969, however, the authorities caught up with us. We were taken by trucks to Rosmead Station and then by train to Kingwilliamstown. The GG trucks took us to Dimbaza. We were not told where we were going when we left Middelburg.'

Five people we spoke to had been moved out of towns in the Western and South Western Cape. Some had been evicted from 'coloured' townships under the Group Areas Act and others might have been moved in accordance with the 'Eiselen line policy'.

It was difficult and under the circumstances, somewhat pointless to elicit from people the exact legislation under which they had been resettled. But those from the Western Cape seemed to think it was the Group Areas Act which had prevented them from staying.

An old pensioner described how he was moved from the Great Brak River (near Mossel Bay) to Dimbaza:

'We came in December 1969 from the Great Brak where I had been a Bowling Green caretaker for 15 years. I got sick at work just before we were moved and I had to have an operation. The doctor put me out of work and I got a disability grant. Then the government found me and told me that because I lived in a coloured area I had no rights in the Mossel Bay area. My family and I were given rail warrants to Dimbaza ...
'I had bought a house in Mossel Bay for £5, but I was not compensated for it when I moved. I could also not get my disability grant after coming to Dimbaza.'

Others who were evicted from their homes in the Western Cape were given the choice of various towns in the Ciskei, usually Sada, Ilinge, Dimbaza and sometimes Mdantsane. People chose their new places according to the availability of housing and jobs.

A young woman who works in one of the Dimbaza factories said her whole family had been moved out of a 'coloured area' in Grabouw in 1968:

'When we were evicted, Bantu Affairs gave us the option of a house in Sada, Mdantsane or Dimbaza. We were told it was easier to get a house in Dimbaza, so we chose to come here ... But when we arrived we found it very rough and so my father decided to stay with the family a while and not to return to Grabouw.'

The last category of those resettled were those forced out of urban areas because of harassment under the pass laws. Women, more than men, have been affected in this way by influx control legislation.

An unemployed woman, whose husband is away on contract work, told how she came to be in Dimbaza:

'I was born in the Burgersdorp location and my husband was born on a farm in the area. When we married I was working as a domestic in the area and he was working at Rembrandt in Paarl. Soon afterwards he moved back to Burgersdorp where he worked for himself making fencing.

Because my husband was born on a farm we were told we had no rights in the Burgersdorp township, even though I was born there. He could not return to the farm because he had already left to look for other work. We could not get our own house in the location and there were no good jobs here for us, because we did not have proper papers. The location superintendent advised us to come here in 1976. He told us there were houses here and in Zwelitsha.

But when we arrived there were no houses available. We had to wait in 'hostels' where other new arrivals were housed. We waited six months and then we were given two rooms in a four-roomed house.'

An unemployed migrant worker related how his mother and he were endorsed out of Johannesburg after she divorced her husband:
'I was born in Cape Town and I moved to Johannesburg with my mother and stepfather and went to school there. In 1967 I started work, but I worked without a pass because my stepfather did not want to register me as a son.

In 1970 I went to Queenstown for circumcision and while I was there my mother divorced her husband. After the divorce she was no longer able to stay in Johannesburg and Bantu Affairs offered her a choice of three places: Sada, Ilinge (now part of the Transkei) or Dimbaza. She could no longer register in Johannesburg so she decided to find a house for her children and chose Dimbaza because her brother lived in East London. She was given a four-roomed house, but she carried on working in Johannesburg as a cook in Oppenheimer's Buildings. I returned from Queenstown and registered in Dimbaza. Now my mother gets an old age pension and she returns to Dimbaza every month to collect it.'

Of the four who came voluntarily, two came from white farms (in Bedford and Alice), one came from Peddie for political reasons after Sebe took over from Mabandla and one was a teacher from Port Elizabeth looking for a particular job.

Those who came from the farms had reasons for leaving similar to those who went to Sada. A woman who came from a farm in the Bedford district explained:

'We decided to move on our own. You feel very insecure on a white farm. If you get into a quarrel with a farmer he can just kick you out and you have nowhere to go. So we made an application for a house in Dimbaza through the magistrate's office in Bedford. We could choose to live in Sada, Ilinge or Dimbaza, but we got a house here.'

An interesting case was that of the woman who had moved from Peddie to Dimbaza for political reasons. She owned two plots in Peddie, where she had moved from Craddock in 1976:

'We stayed in Peddie until there was a change in government. When Sebe took over from Mabandla, the Fingoes in Peddie started fighting the Xhosa, saying that they (the Xhosa) were on Sebe's side and must move. Then Sebe found his people other places in Zwelitsha and Dimbaza so I bought a plot here.

One of the main reasons I decided to leave Peddie and come here is because I was active in Sebe politics and this is a Sebe area.'

She added that she thought it would be possible to return to Peddie now, because people had joined the ruling party and there was a place for Sebe supporters.
It is difficult to assess the extent of this type of voluntary internal resettlement in the Ciskei because of lack of supporting information. This was the only such case we came across. It indicates interesting aspects of Ciskei politics, however, and we will return to an examination of this interview in our section on politics.

There are certain problems with the cataloguing of these reasons. One is that while three quarters of the people we spoke to had been resettled from Midlandstowns or the Western Cape or other urban areas, the SPP survey shows that two-thirds of households had moved voluntarily. A number of people we interviewed commented that there was a considerable influx of people into Dimbaza from other parts of the Ciskei and from surrounding white farms, looking for work in the factories. The housing shortage is severe and many people either lodge or try to evade the authorities and squat in the mud hut settlement on the outskirts of Dimbaza - Emadakeni.

The population of Dimbaza by the end of 1969 was between four to five thousand. Most of these people had been moved from Burgersdorp, Middelburg and Cape Town. People resettled from other areas in the Western Cape started arriving in the early 'seventies. Today the population is over 20 000. After major resettlements to Dimbaza stopped in about 1974, it is clear that a substantial number of people must have come voluntarily after industries began to be established. Official figures from the CNDC Investment guides estimate that in 1979 the population was 12 000, while in 1980 it was 18 000. It is probable that their 1979 estimate was too low. Nevertheless, an astounding increase in population is indicated and since resettlement to Dimbaza has effectively ceased it is fair to assume that many of these people came from other parts of the Ciskei looking for work.

The majority of our informants were older arrivals and thus our 'resettled' proportion is likely to be high.

Work Histories

Of the 20 people we interviewed, six were NEA, of whom four were pensioners, and fourteen were EA, of whom eight were unemployed, three were locally employed, two were involved in the informal sector and one was a landowner. Sixteen of the 20 families had one or more members of their family away as migrants or commuters.
Like Sada, the predominant pattern in employment changes has been for men to take contracts, either back to their places of previous employment or elsewhere. Many of the early arrivals got jobs with the 'Trust', building houses and preparing the township for those who were still to be moved. Unlike Sada, however, Dimbaza offers a few more opportunities for local employment, although by no means sufficient to reduce the unemployment rate significantly. (See section on industry). Most people employed in the local factories are women.

The earlier arrivals from the Midlands towns and Western Cape generally experienced a severe deterioration in employment conditions and living standards after moving to Dimbaza. Those too old to take out contracts were employed at extremely low wages by the S.A. Development Trust ('Trust'), the body responsible for 'development' in the homelands. Much of this work (especially for women) was regarded as 'poor relief' by the government.

One of the resettled women from Middelburg said she had been a domestic in the town, while her husband had been a sheep-shearer on a nearby farm, before they had been moved. On arrival, her husband worked for the Trust, building houses for R15,00 a month. He did this for four years, until the deterioration of his health made it impossible for him to work. She was also employed by the Trust, when they first arrived, felling trees. She was paid '£4' (+ R7,00) for three weeks work and then told that the jobs were for women without husbands. (Most of the older people still talk in terms of pounds).

A young woman whose family was resettled in Dimbaza from Grabouw in 1969, told how her father had had to accept about one-sixth of his previous wages once he had moved. In Grabouw, he worked for a fruit packaging firm where he was earning about R25 a week. Some time after he arrived, he obtained a job with the 'Trust' as a labourer. He was paid R16 a month.

Another woman, whose family had also been moved from Middelburg, said that her husband had been a labourer with the Department of Roads, while she had been a domestic servant in the town. They were resettled in 1970 and her husband had worked for two years as a petrol pump attendant for the Trust at a wage of R18 a month. She had found work in a hotel in Kingwilliamstown, where she worked until 1977. Her wage then was R48 a month.
When Desmond visited Dimbaza in 1969 (then Mnxesha) he estimated that about half the men were migrants. His impression then was that many men had been told to leave their families in Dimbaza and return to Middelburg and Burgersdorp with a labour contract, if they wanted to retain their previous employment. Five people we spoke to, who had been resettled either from the Midlands or the Western Cape had returned to their previous jobs after taking out a contract. Some, who were unable to get contracts, returned 'illegally' to their previous jobs.

A young scholar we spoke to said that her whole family had been resettled from Wellington in 1969. Her father was working in Riebeek West at a cement factory and her mother was a domestic servant in the Western Cape, while they were living in Wellington. As soon as they arrived in Dimbaza, both parents returned to the Western Cape - her father to the cement factory and her mother to domestic work. She was not sure if either of her parents had returned on contract.

The young woman whose family had been resettled from Grabouw said two members of her household had returned to the Western Cape on contract - one to the Appletiser factory in Grabouw and one to a 'stocking factory' in Cape Town.

We spoke to an unemployed woman in Dimbaza whose family had been resettled from the Somerset East district. She, her father, son, husband and her brothers were working in Somerset East and Cookhouse doing domestic, farm and construction work respectively. Immediately they had been resettled, she returned to Cookhouse to do domestic work and then went to Cape Town ('illegally') where she got a job in the I & J factory in Diep River at R14 a week. However, because of pass-law harassment, she was driven back to Dimbaza two years later. Her husband and brothers have taken out contracts back to the dams in Somerset East and her son is on contract to Savage & Lovemore in Port Elizabeth, where his wage is R80 a fortnight. She has been out of work for five years (her last job was the I & J job) and has been unable to find anything suitable in Dimbaza.

The most frequent job categories mentioned in Dimbaza (among migrants) were farms, construction firms and the mines. Five people we interviewed said
that either they or members of their families had taken out contracts to farms in the Western or Eastern Cape. Four informants or household members had, at some stage, taken out contracts to the mines.

As in Sada, there is little consistency in duration and type of jobs of migrants. The unemployed contract worker, whose mother had been endorsed out of Johannesburg, had had five jobs in nine years. He first got a job with CTA (Ciskei Transport Authority) working on road construction for two years. In 1973 he was contracted to a grape farm in Robertson. When he returned he got another contract to the Department of Water Affairs in Gouda. After this contract expired (1975) he went ('illegally') to Cape Town, where he lodged with a relative and worked as a gardener. Because of harassment by the BAAB inspectors he left Cape Town in 1978 and obtained another contract to a gold mine on the Reef. He worked there until 1980. He did underground work, for which he was paid R2,20 a day, rising to R4,40 by the time he left. When his last contract ended, he returned to Dimbaza. Since then he has not been able to find a job. He got no UIF card from the mines, but collected a lump sum of R580 when he left (deferred payment). He said that he had been unable to get a job in the factories in Dimbaza since his return, because the stamp in his pass says 'mining' and employers there have told him 'to stick with the mines, as I have no experience in factories'.

Whether this is the real reason or not, men stand little chance of finding employment in the local factories (see section on Dimbaza industry). In most sectors, the complement of male labour has actually declined in the past five years (see Appendix 2). Anyway, local wages in manufacturing are so low that most men consider it a priority to take out a contract, despite the fact that this means separation from their families. A woman whose family had moved voluntarily from the farms in the Bedford district described how her husband could not afford to keep a local job:

'My husband) ... got a contract through the office to Welkom. He worked there for six years for a construction company. Then (+ 1978) he decided to be near his family so he came back here and got a job in the bicycle factory. His wages were R15,00 a week - lower than what they were in Welkom ... He worked there for two years. Last year (1980) he got a contract to Johannesburg to work for SASOL. The wages were too low here in the bicycle factory. They are better in Johannesburg and he still sends money back to the family here.'
She (the respondent) had once worked in the overall factory in Dimbaza. She described the conditions in this factory and some of the difficulties that workers there experience in pressing for improvement:

'I worked there (the overall factory) for four years. I earned R3,50 a week, then, but now I know the women earn R8,00 a week. I left because the money was very little and I had a baby and couldn't get a day off ... So working in the factory was not easy. At the time I thought I was lucky. I applied at the gate and got a job. But the manager at the factory was very strict - the supervisors too. There is a long line of people making overalls and if you are slow you hold up the whole row - that is why they are strict.

At one time we asked the boss for an increase in wages (this was when we were all earning R3,50 a week). He refused this. So we decided to go on strike and we stayed outside the gates and refused to go in. While we were there, the Ciskei police moved in and spoke to us one by one. They threatened us and told us that this was the wrong way to do things. They told us to appoint one person to speak to management, but we did not do this and the police went to speak to the boss. Then they came outside and told us that we would be getting an increase of 50 cents every month until the wages reached R8,00. This was more than five years ago. After the strike the boss told us that the best thing was to have a joint committee to be used by the workers and by him, and we could take our complaints to him and he could take his complaints to us. He told us that we could have a meeting in the dining hall and we chose some workers to be on this committee. This committee was functioning all right and it did take complaints to the bosses. In winter they changed the starting time from 7.00 to 7.30 a.m.'

We spoke to three people who were presently locally employed in manufacturing and two who had been in the past. This number does not reflect the proportion of people employed in local manufacturing industry in Dimbaza; we deliberately sought out people in this position so as to get an idea of wages and working conditions in various factories there. Of the three presently employed, two were women working in SATV and Xhosa Rugs, and one was a man employed at Dimbaza Foundries. Of the two previously employed, one was the woman quoted above and the other, a man - an ex-political prisoner, who worked as a laboratory assistant in Ciskei Paints in 1974 for R17,00 a week.

The SATV worker said she worked a five-day week for R15,27. Some women on the factory floor got R17,26 a week - but that is the highest wage she knew of. She started (in + 1980) with R13 a week, but the increase had
been granted in the previous three months (April - June 1981). They have no committees at all. If there are any complaints they are simply told to leave, as there are many people in Dimbaza without jobs. She said the workload was very heavy, but that the workers were too afraid to complain. It takes a week on-the-job training to learn the skills necessary for the job. She estimated that there were about 300 workers employed there, of which three were men. It was not easy for her to get a job at the factory, she said. She registered at the office as unemployed and then waited outside factory gates for 'some months'. She knew the supervisor at SATV, which is how she got a job there.

The woman at Xhosa Rugs said she had got her Junior Certificate in Dimbaza and then applied for a job 'personally' at the factory as well as registering at 'the office' (the superintendent's office) as unemployed:

'I started working for Xhosa Rugs, a German firm, in 1979. The wages start at R15 a week for the first month when basic training is given. After that we are given our own machine and paid piece rates. It is possible to get up to R6 a day on these rates ...

If we have complaints, we are supposed to take them to the supervisor, who takes them to management. There used to be a committee elected by the workers, but management persuaded us to rather take our complaints to the supervisor ...'

At piece-work rates she is now making between R20 and R30 a week. She estimated that there were 'over 100' workers in the factory, of whom six were men.

The man we interviewed who worked in Dimbaza Foundries had been a contract worker since 1970, when he left school (before he had written his Junior Certificate). He took a contract to a grape farm in Montagu, after failing to find work locally. Here he got R12 a week. He was then unemployed for a year. In 1973 he obtained a contract to a coal mine in Natal for nine months. He worked underground for two months for a wage of R3,51 a day; later he got a job 'in the office working with clock cards' for R4,20 a day. He returned to Dimbaza in 1976, intending to take out another contract.

',... but a friend organised a job for me at Wilcox Sweets in Kingwilliamstown. I worked there until the end of 1977, getting R18 a week. Then I spoke to a priest in Dimbaza, who spoke to the supervisor at the Foundries and they gave me a job there. I wanted to work closer to home to save on transport. (Return bus fare from Dimbaza - Kingwilliamstown is 80 cents). Here I am being paid 65 cents an hour ...
At Dimbaza Foundries they make steel products. It is mainly men who work here. The workers complain that the work is heavy and the dangerous thing for us is the dust. A worker I know once started coughing up blood and the boss sent him to a doctor. The doctor said that his lungs were covered with this dust from the foundries. This worker was out of work for a whole year having treatment, but he was forced to return as he had no money. I do not know if there is compensation for cases like these ...

I work as a welder in the factory. I had basic training (on the job) for two weeks and after that the supervisor taught me. I and some other workers are being sent to a trade-school in Zwelitsha to learn more about welding. At the moment I work with two qualified welders from Mdantsane.

The workers are not happy with their wages and working conditions. Late last year (1980) the bosses started a foreman's committee, but the workers said "No". We wanted our own committee. We chose a committee in April 1981 and told them to ask the bosses for an increase. But before the committee could meet with them, the bosses called a meeting of all the workers. We were told we were not allowed to have meetings inside the factory. An increase would come, but only in November. Meanwhile if we had complaints, we were to go to the chief foreman (a white) who would take the complaints to management. We had to take these complaints as individuals. The bosses would not recognise our committee. "We were afraid of losing our jobs and felt that continuing with the committee was too difficult. So we dissolved the committee a month later" (in May)."

These interviews highlight the problems of workers' organisations in the Ciskei. In addition to the pressure exercised by the local state against any worker organisation there is the most basic form of economic control: with an unemployment level of over 30% and with the skills required for most jobs being relatively rudimentary, the balance of class forces is particularly unfavourable to the workers. What is notable, though, is not the extent of disorganisation among Dimbaza's working class, but in fact the preliminary attempts on the part of workers to organise themselves to improve their conditions. We are not suggesting this is a widespread phenomenon, but it certainly struck us in some of the interviews we conducted.

The other feature of Dimbaza industry worth noting is that while most jobs do not require extensive training, the few semi-skilled/skilled positions that are filled by Africans, are extremely lowly paid, relative to equivalent jobs, even in the Border region (e.g. East London). The welder,
for instance, was earning 65 cents an hour, while the laboratory assistant (in 1974) earned R17 a week. It is not surprising that most men would rather hold out for a contract. Employers seem well aware of this and are thus reluctant to employ men, when there are better job opportunities outside the Ciskei available.

Of the 585 people accounted for in the SPP survey of Dimbaza, 42 were migrants and 132 classified as commuters. Of the migrants, as might be expected most of the women were employed in the service sector. Of the men, a high proportion was employed in the transport sector and a slightly smaller proportion in the service sector. In this case the sample of migrant workers is really quite small and the results may not be significant. Of the commuters, it seems that the men were fairly equally distributed between manufacturing, construction and services. Women commuters were predominantly employed in the service sector and manufacturing. The relatively high proportion of commuters, both male and female, employed in the manufacturing sector is due to Dimbaza's proximity to Kingwilliamstown where, in 1976, 5 552 Africans were employed in manufacturing industry at an average weekly wage of R18,17.16

Of the 203 permanent residents of Dimbaza, aged between 15 and 64 interviewed, 35 were employed and 65 (32%) classified as unemployed. Of those locally employed, most were in manufacturing. It must be recalled here that Dimbaza is the 'industrial growth point' of the Ciskei - the only place where manufacturing industry has developed at all. If Dimbaza is relatively well off with about a 30% local unemployment rate and about three times as many residents employed away from Dimbaza as locally, it doesn't bode well either for the rest of the Ciskei without any industry or for industrial development in the Ciskei as an answer to unemployment.

Social and Political Effects

Dimbaza has undergone a marked character change since its inception in 1968. From being a rudimentary site-and-service scheme, with minimal facilities, it has become the only significant 'industrial growth point' in the Ciskei.

However, as pointed out above, even the establishment of 34 factories in Dimbaza has not made any substantial impact on unemployment there.
But this is not to suggest that the growth of manufacturing industry there has had no effect. Generally, however, the effects have been felt at levels other than the economic.

The most obvious effect has been the enormous influx of people into Dimbaza from other parts of the Ciskei or from white farms. The extent of this influx is suggested by the two sources cited in our section on 'Reasons for Removal'. The first is the CNDC statistics which indicate an increase of 6 000 from 1979 to 1980 and the second is the SPP Survey, which estimates 2/3 of their sample to have moved voluntarily. We can only assume that the SPP sample consisted of relatively new arrivals.

When the state first started resettling people in Dimbaza in early 1969, conditions were particularly bad. Ironically, it was the extent of the squalor and poverty in Dimbaza that made its name notorious in many parts of the world.

According to the early arrivals, there were no running water in Dimbaza when they arrived, no clinics and no shops. Many houses were 2-roomed prefabricated houses, which collapsed after very heavy rains in 1970. Water was brought to the camp in tanks on tractors. The nearest shop was on a white-owned farm over 3 kilometres from the camp.

In the early days of Dimbaza, pensioners and women without husbands did not pay rent. However, in the last five years (it was difficult to establish an exact date) all the pensioners told us that they had been told they would have to pay rent or they would be evicted. Some had even been told that they had to pay arrears for all the years they had been exempt from the rent. One woman on pension said she had been allocated a 4-roomed house for herself and her children on arrival, for which she did not pay rent:

'But now I have to pay R9.20 for every two months. When we first arrived I was told that pensioners would not have to pay rent, but now Ciskei government officials have threatened to kick my children out when I die, unless I pay rent now.'

In circumstances when over 70 children died in the first 4 months of 1969 and where rations were being issued to adults on a wide scale, it was clearly impossible to demand rent from people.
However, after the establishment of the factories and a subsequent influx of people into Dimbaza, housing has been in particularly short supply. As in Sada, rents and sometimes back-payments have been demanded from all residents with houses. A mud hut settlement on the outskirts of Dimbaza has mushroomed in recent years, housing those who have been evicted from their houses, or new arrivals who cannot find lodging in the township.

The housing shortage is used by the local ruling class as a political weapon. The 'committee' in Dimbaza is called the Advisory Board, and it seems that substantial powers of allocation of housing lie in their hands. According to informants, applications for houses or complaints about the maintenance of houses go through this Advisory Board. One informant, an unemployed woman, said:

'If we have complaints about housing or amenities, we can't go on our own to the offices (Ciskei Government) but we have to go through the Advisory Board ... (When we arrived) ... we were first put into a two-roomed house, but after applying through the Advisory Board for a bigger house and waiting about five years, we eventually got a four-roomed house.'

It was difficult to establish exactly how the Advisory Board was established. Unlike the committees in Sada or Elukhanyweni, its members did not consist solely of government appointed headmen, but the CNIP connection was nevertheless very strong. Although many informants spoke of members to the Advisory Board being 'elected' not one had ever taken part in any election process, not even those who had been there since 1969.

The woman who had arrived from Peddie to Dimbaza after Sebe took over from Mabandla was an active member of CNIP and the Advisory Board. Although it was not easy to prove a particular line of questioning she told us something about the nature and functioning of the Board:

'The A.B. has on it two people from each ward (zone). There are also committees in the street who collect money. The A.B. tells the street committees when to collect money. The money goes to the Ciskei Government, and at the moment (July 1981) it is going towards the Ntabakandla (Independence) celebrations. The money also goes towards expenses of members of the A.B. - for instance if a member of the Board dies, then money is collected for the funeral.

The A.B. has authority in so far as if you want to go to the superintendent's office for anything, you have to go through the Board first e.g. if you want a house or to apply for a pension. We don't have so much control over contracts, but we
'have some. The office tells us first when the contracts come from Zwelitsha, then we announce this to the people at the meetings. Then we recommend them to the office. (We found it very difficult to either prove or clarify this point).

The members of the A.B. are appointed from the (street) committees. If you have served the committee well then the A.B. chooses you to become a member. The committees are elected in meetings called by the A.B. People vote by show of hands ...'

It should be pointed out that she was the only person who described the election process thus. Every other person we spoke to said they had never taken part in any elections. Some respondents were more critical about the Advisory Board. An old woman pensioner said that the Board had only 16 members - 2 for each of the 8 zones. The membership of the Board had changed once since 1970:

'The only people who stand for membership are those who are members of Sebe's party. The Board has recently issued all residents with Ciskei citizenship cards, if people don't take the cards they are threatened with being thrown out of their houses. People are afraid to complain because they have nowhere to go ...'

She outlined the major problems in Dimbaza: high transport costs (it is 80 cents return to Kingwilliamstown), few jobs, and high food prices in the local shops. 'But we have been told (by Ciskei Government officials) that we are not allowed to have meetings among ourselves to discuss these problems. We must take all the problems to the Advisory Board'.

An exceptionally outspoken teacher, who had once challenged Sebe in a public meeting described the Advisory Board as 'rubbish': 'It is bureaucratic and only represents Sebe ...' This man had been unable to get a teaching job and had had a part-time job doing carpentry in a shop in Dimbaza. He had lost his job after challenging Sebe. He has also been waiting for a house since 1973 and applied to the Board more than 2 years ago for a pension, which he still has not got.

By contrast, the woman on the Advisory Board told us that she was, then, living in a shack on the plot she owned. She would rather apply for a rented house, than build her own on the plot:
'I think I will be able to get a house to rent quite easily, because I'm a member of the A.B. The superintendent told me that I cannot lodge with other people, because I have served the government well - I must have my own house.'

According to our informants, the Advisory Board does have real powers of allocation over houses, pensions and disability grants. It is the Board which takes applications for these benefits to the 'office'. Many people who were resettled from Middelburg and who were drawing pensions there complained they had to wait for up to two years for their pensions to be transferred to Dimbaza. It was only by applying through the Advisory Board that they managed to get them. Others who are rightly or wrongly counted as political opponents can have their applications effectively blocked. The old teacher who made his political views known is 73 years old and still waiting for his pension.

As far as control over the allocation of contracts and local jobs is concerned the Board's powers do not appear to be so extensive. Nevertheless, it appears that members of the Board are the first to be informed when requisitions arrive in Dimbaza. They are responsible for informing people and it is clear that this can be done on a selective basis in times of unemployment.

As far as local jobs are concerned, at least four informants said they were easier to get if applicants did 'favours' for the supervisors. Again there are obvious controls on workers implicit here, but they have been spelt out in greater depth in the previous section.

The working class in Dimbaza (including the unemployed and NEA) is completely dependent on wage-labour for its reproduction. No one may own arable land in Dimbaza and because it has been proclaimed a township, no one is allowed to keep livestock.

The people in surrounding rural areas though still retain some access to land, although in most cases it is not nearly sufficient for subsistence and reproduction. We came across two cases where there was evidence of some sort of relationship between people in Dimbaza and those outside. One woman told us that women who worked in the factories often employed 'nannies' from the surrounding areas to look after their children.
Another said there had been occasions in the past when people suffering severe economic hardship had worked on the land of those outside Dimbaza, in exchange for food. But, according to our informants, the people inside Dimbaza are now perceived as better off than those outside. One old man, who had been resettled from the Western Cape in 1969, said:

'The attitude of the people outside the camp has changed since we first arrived. At first people called us an ageya (thieves), but since the factories have been built many people from outside Dimbaza come here to find work. Many people want to get a place here.'

In many ways the establishment of industry in Dimbaza has had more effect on the ideological and political level than on the economic. The 'ideology of promises' has more concrete basis in Dimbaza than in Elukhanyweni or Sada. The number of factories in itself is impressive even if the number of jobs they have created is not. While most people we spoke to complained about the lack of jobs, many were hopeful that the factories would be able to accommodate a greater proportion of the unemployed. One unemployed woman said:

'In one meeting here they (the A.B.) told people they were going to make more factories on the other side of Dimbaza - but they have not said anything further and it is difficult to get the right information from them. There was also a rumour from them that more houses were going to be built, but I haven't seen anything yet.'

Others like her waver constantly between scepticism and hope.

But increasingly, as promises fail to materialise, complete disillusionment with the local state becomes widespread. There seems to be little chance of the local state establishing ideological legitimacy in the eyes of the people. It maintains a cohesion through direct political repression on the one hand and through its agents' powers of economic allocation on the other. As pointed out in the section on Sada, the latter strategy has severe limitations. The political tolerance level is particularly low for the Ciskei ruling class. A former political prisoner told us he had even been prohibited by CNIP officials from belonging to any local burial society.
EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS (ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL STATUS) OF PEOPLE RELOCATED TO DIMBAZA

PERMANENT RESIDENTS

- employed
- unemployed
- not economically active

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EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS (ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL STATUS) OF PEOPLE RELOCATED TO DIMBAZA

**MIGRANTS (all employed)**

**COMMUTERS (all employed)**
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. The Benso estimate is about 29,000 in 1979 (Statistical Survey 1980, Table 25). However this is based on the number of housing units. Our estimate of the population of the mud hut settlement on the outskirts of Sada is at least 5,000, which Benso exclude from their calculation. SPP estimates are in the region of 40,000.

2. CNDC, Private communication to Alan Hirsch, 1981


4. ibid., p.95.


6. For instance many ex-farm workers said they used to be allowed to keep small amounts of stock on the farmer's land. These alternative sources of income have gradually been whittled away.

7. Observation and interviews over ten days in Sada, July 1981; SPP Preliminary Results, 1981.

8. ibid.

9. All SPP figures have been rounded to the nearest figure.

10. See Green and Hirsch, 'Jobless Proletarians and Baseless Headmen' paper presented to SAIRR Conference on Urbanisation, October, 1982. We argue that resettlement camps are in fact towns, in the sense that their inhabitants are materially and culturally divorced from any aspects of rural life. They are completely dependent on wages/pensions for survival, and not, in any sense, on products from the land. Although some would find it odd calling these isolated 'ghettos in the veld' 'towns', we use the term to distinguish them from rural settlements.

11. The Argus 25/3/82

12. SAIRR, Laws affecting race relations, 1948-76.


14. ibid.

15. CNDC, Information for potential investors, 1981.

CHAPTER FIVE  IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The most important effect of resettlement at a general level has been the extension of political and economic control over the working class. On an economic level, resettlement in some cases has been the final step to proletarianisation and in others it has served to canalise and reallocate labour in a more 'efficient' way.

Resettlement has also been used to further division within the African working class. Once in a homeland, the only legal way to get out is by taking out a contract at a labour bureau, and going to the cities or farms to work as a migrant labourer. New strategies of the state, reflected particularly clearly in the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions, aim at creating real material divisions between those locked into homelands by the pass laws, and those legally entitled to live in the urban areas. There has also been a clear attempt to create division between the employed and unemployed.

The Riekert Commission has recommended the easing of restriction on the 1.5 million Africans 'qualified' to remain in the urban areas, while at the same time severely restricting the already scant mobility of migrant workers based in the homelands.¹ The shifting of vast numbers to the homelands and their 'containment' in closer settlements has effectively extended control over that section of the population excluded from Riekert's reformist measures.

But what the interviews show is that the control exercised over these people by the local state apparatus is as much a central part of maintaining cohesion in those areas, as is the central state's grand strategy of shifting people to peripheral areas. The peculiar form of power exercised by the local state is located in a contradictory nexus of pre-capitalist ideological relations with almost no surviving material basis.

There seems to be a frantic searching on the part of Ciskei's rulers for an ideology that will provide even a rudimentary cohesion and legitimacy, as is reflected in Sebe's alternate appeals to 'tribalism' on the one hand, and the virtues of the 'free enterprise system' on the other.
The ideology has a poor level of sustenance, though. On the economic front, things look increasingly bleak for the Ciskei. Despite generous decentralisation incentives offered by the government, the area holds no great attractions for industrialists. As the recession in South Africa gets worse, the queues outside the labour bureaux get longer (this is not to mention the deliberate government policy of giving employment preference to those with Section 10(1) (a) or (b) rights. The generally appalling standard of living in most resettlement camps is plummeting even further.

All this presents severe political problems for the Ciskei local ruling class, and the central state (although the local ruling class are likely to feel the threat more quickly).

In this final chapter, we would like to touch on two general areas arising partially out of the interviews. These are: (1) how the Ciskei state concretely tries to control various sections of the working class located in the Ciskei; and (2) some aspects of political control.

Control of the Working Class and the Unemployed

The Ciskei and Border region, with one of the highest population densities in Southern Africa and one of the highest unemployment rates, is considered a particularly volatile one by the state. The rapid and marked rise of population in the region has only aggravated the unemployment problems. It now stands at 30 to 35% of the economically active population. In the 'urban' areas of the Ciskei it numbers at least 45 000. The political problems posed for the local ruling class and the central state by this vast mass of unemployed cannot be underestimated.

Other than those people classified 'Ciskeian' who live permanently in the 'scheduled area', it is possible to divide the Ciskeian working class into three categories (as the state does) - migrant contract workers, 'frontier commuters' (who commute across the border to work) and the internal working class. Approximately 77 000 fit into the first category (apart from illegal migrants), 40 000 into the second and roughly 10 000 into the third, of whom about 6 000 are industrial workers and the remainder divided between construction, transport services, commerce and agriculture. The latter refers to people working for wages alone on the agricultural schemes.
The growing labour surplus is hardly likely to be absorbed in the Border region or in the internal Ciskei economy, both of which are extremely underdeveloped and have little prospect of improving. The largest sector of employment inside the Ciskei is the civil service sector, employing 13,000 including 4,000 teachers, and which is largely inaccessible to unskilled workers who form the majority of the population.

The only 'solution' available to the ruling class then is to increase the number of contract workers to the mines and towns from the Ciskei. This is not an easy task. The Ciskei region has never been an important supplier of migrant labour. As the Surplus Peoples Project notes: '... hundreds and thousands of Ciskeians have left the region on a permanent basis to settle in the urban areas since the region was first annexed in 1847.' In 1978, the Transkei, with a population less than three times that of the Ciskei, sent six times as many migrants to the mines.

The new-found availability of a large reserve army will not in itself suffice to induce employers to recruit labour from the Ciskei as opposed to other areas. The Ciskei Government has realised this, and so, with the help of some seconded Pretoria officials, has embarked on a programme for 'marketing' 'suitable' and partially trained migrant and commuter labour to various sectors of the economy, notably construction, farming and services.

The Manpower Development Centre and the Extension of Control over Migrants

The Manpower Development Centre (MDC), as it is euphemistically called, is the most recent manifestation of this attempt to supply labour 'better suited to meet the employers' needs.' It is also a clear sign of how the new petty bourgeoisie that has been built up in the Bantustan government is operating further to control and disorganise contract workers. So far, the Centre (based in Mdantsane) exists alongside the existing labour bureaux and it is not yet compulsory for workers to register there. Whether it will eventually replace the labour bureaux is a matter of some debate in Ciskei government circles.

The Centre's self-proclaimed aim is to act as an employment agency and a training centre to produce semi-skilled workers, but in fact its aims
are somewhat more ambitious. While it is true that it provides a few people with basic 'skills' needed, for instance, in the construction industry, and that it supplies recruiters and employers with labour, its objectives include ones which will guarantee employers the most 'suitable' and 'well-behaved' workers.

Apart from what it calls 'Specific Practical Training' it offers employers the novelty of 'Orientation Training' for their potential employees. The aim of this, in their own words, is to 'give the new employees as much information as possible about the employer and the job being offered, as well as advice on how to behave while away on contract work'. The 'advice' includes useful tips on 'Discipline at work and the consequences of breaking a contract'; 'Motivation to work well thereby improving job opportunities for other Ciskeians'; and 'Information on Works Councils, Works Committees and Trade Unions'. In the light of Sebe's oft-repeated statements on the 'subversive nature' of the independent trade union movement in East London and particularly his systematic harassment of the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU) it does not take much imagination to speculate on the nature of the 'Information' offered in this course.

But the MDC obviously does not have enough faith in the power of words alone. If workers refuse to be persuaded by the reasonable dictums of the 'Orientation Training' programme, the Centre has other, more substantial means at its disposal. Workers have to fill in detailed forms when they register for work at the Centre. One of these forms goes to the boss when a worker gets a job, the other is kept by the Centre. Details of the worker's work record are then sent back to Mdantsane. If a worker 'misbehaves' or 'breaks his contract' in any way (for instance, if he is involved in a strike), the Centre can then send those details to the headman or chief in the area where the worker's family lives. He is blacklisted by the Centre as an 'unreliable' worker and the chief/headman can punish his family still further by denying them access to land/a house/pension or whatever.

Thus the Centre hopes to extend control over potentially 'troublesome' workers by threatening to punish them in three ways: (1) they lose their
job; (2) they stand little chance of getting another because they are 'blacklisted'; (3) their families are threatened in the rural areas because the chiefs are given powers of punishment.

Registration at the Centre is not yet compulsory. However, because of the massive unemployment and the desperate poverty in the region, many have been forced to register there in the hope of getting jobs. The Centre claims to have placed 15,000 in employment in 1980.9 By April 1981 they claimed to have had 23,000 registration forms returned to them by chiefs and clerks at the tribal labour bureaux, who have been delegated to register workers in their areas.10 Certainly for people forced to register there the controls are harsh. As one of the officials himself said: 'Once a man gets into our clutches he never really gets free of us because we know more about him that he does about himself'.11

What degree of success this MDC will have is a question that is separate from that of its purported objectives. The contradictions within the bureaucracy itself, and between the centralised bureaucracy and the chiefs in the outlying areas, may in itself pose a formidable enough stumbling block, not to speak of the well-voiced opposition of the largest independent trade union in the region, SAWU.

But perhaps the best example of the dichotomy between the well thought out aims of the Ciskeian bureaucracy and their actual administrative and political inability to realise them at the moment is shown in an interview with one of the resettled women in Elukhanyweni in the Keiskammahoek district.

After complaining about the lack of job opportunities in the region, and pointing out that the only hope for the men is to take a contract, either at the labour bureaux at Keiskammahoek or at Kwa Teba to go to the mines, she notes:

'There has been a man coming around to try to recruit people for work. He is called Mashukulu and is employed by the Ciskei Government. He says he is from the MDC and is trying to get jobs for Ciskeians in the Republic. Last time he came was in June and he went around speaking to people and broadcasting over Radio Xhosa. He said that there were jobs in Grahamstown for people doing cotton-picking. When he was asked about the job he said that the pay was 4 cents per kilo of cotton and if people could pick 200 kg. a day, they could earn R8 a day. He said there was a labour-shortage in the cotton-fields because the previous people came from the
'Transkei and now Matanzima had put a stop to it. So the next day a bus left with many women. They were told to bring pots and pans and blankets, but everything else would be provided. So these people left, but they all came back four days later. None of them understood anything about cotton-picking before they left. If they had they would have known they could never make R8 in one day ...'* 12

Unable to provide workers with at least minimally acceptable standards of employment the MDC had resorted, in this case, to deceit in the recruitment of labour. The Centre's ability to provide employers with 'happy', 'suitable' workers is obviously predicated on their ability to provide workers with jobs that are worth taking.

This quote shows that even in an area where there is widespread unemployment, workers are reluctant to take MDC jobs even as a last resort. The Centre's task of 'marketing Ciskeian labour' seems to be one subject to all the constraints incumbent on the over-developed, yet inefficient bureaucracy of the homeland petty bourgeoisie.

**Control over Commuters - Repression of the Trade Unions**

Frontier commuters is the term coined by the state to denote workers who live within the boundaries of areas declared part of a homeland, yet who commute daily or weekly to work in 'white' urban industrial areas.

In the Eastern Cape, all workers who live in Mdantsane and work in East London, 20 kilometres away, are classified 'Ciskei' citizens, a fact which has numerous implications - all of them disadvantageous - for these workers. 'Frontier commuters' fall under the jurisdiction of the Ciskei Government and will become dependent on it for social security pay-outs when they leave or lose a job, and for houses. Because they live in a homeland, it means they do not qualify for Section 10 rights, even though they have always lived in an urban area.

Most 'Ciskeian' commuters live in Mdantsane and Zwelitsha and work in East London (a total of 29 000 commuters) or in Kingwilliamstown (7 000 commuters) which is about 7 kilometres from Zwelitsha. Many commuters who work in the industrial area of East London are members of an independent trade union.
Total membership of the three unions - the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU), the African Food and Canning Workers' Union (AFCWU) and General Workers' Union (GWU) - is probably in the region of 15 to 20 thousand.

The rapid growth of the independent trade union movement since the inception of SAAWU in the Eastern Cape in March 1980 has put the Ciskei authorities slightly off-balance. The trade unions represent the only form of democratic opposition to CNIP in the region.

Moreover the state's attempt to 'stabilise' the region as much as possible, by trying to attract industry with promises of substantial tax and transport concessions, and with wage rates that are lower than in other industrial areas in South Africa,\(^\text{13}\) has been a difficult enough task as it is. SAAWU and the existence of other independent unions, if nothing else, do not promise to make it an easier one.

Whether Sebe's perceptions of the political threat the Eastern Cape trade union movement poses to him and his ilk are well-founded or not, is beside the point. What is to the point is that for nearly two years, Sebe and his police have severely harassed and tried to repress worker organisation in East London.

Since the strike in April 1980 at Mdantsane Special Organisation (a Ciskei Government employment project) involving 1 000 workers, SAAWU has been banned in the Ciskei. The apparent absurdity of this may strike those for whom homeland 'independence' represents little more than a farce. But for workers living in Mdantsane and working in East London, the situation is a humourless one. Workers' meetings cannot be held in the township but have to be held 20 kilometres away in East London. Organisers who try to do union work in the township (informing workers of meetings, etc.) risk instant arrest. The leadership of SAAWU has been detained on several occasions by the Ciskei police. Workers from all three unions have been at various times intimidated, arrested, interrogated and most recently even shot at by Major-General Charles Sebe's soldiers and police.\(^\text{14}\)
However, despite the concerted attempts to crush trade union organisation and control commuters more effectively, workplace organisation has in the past acted as a partial constraint on Sebe's government. Some of their more outrageous acts have been counter-balanced by management, reacting to pressure from workers. Their interventions have on at least two occasions secured the release of detained workers at Wilson Rowntree in 1980 and the 230 detainees in September 1981.

Control of the Internal Working Class

The 10 000 or so workers employed inside the Ciskei are, of course, in the worst position of all. The network of controls exercised over residents of the Ciskei have been spelt out in the previous section. The few lucky enough to get jobs in one of the 40 manufacturing establishments, on the agricultural schemes or with the 'Trust' (now the Ciskei Government) are not in a favourable position to bargain over the wages and working conditions that management chooses to set.

The majority of people employed in the factories and on the schemes are women (see Table VIII) whose wages, as pointed out previously, average around R10 a week. The extent of unemployment and the subsequent indiscriminate firing that follows any expressed dissatisfaction on the part of the workers, are effective means of control in themselves. Add to that the general direct dependence on CNIP headmen and chiefs for houses, etc., and organisation in the workplace becomes exceedingly difficult. Workers inside the Ciskei are well aware of these constraints, as the interviews conducted with workers in Dimbaza illustrate.

Apart from the 6 000 people working in manufacturing, there are about 1 500 employed on the agricultural schemes and about 2 500 to 3 000 working in construction, services and transport. The main employers are either the Ciskei Government or the Anglo-American owned LTA; many of those employed are from the resettlement camps, where unemployment is so high that wages of R1,50 a day become an almost attractive proposition.

There is one more aspect to control over the working class and unemployed based in the Ciskei. The present strength of the Ciskei authorities - widespread unemployment and immiseration - is at the same time their self-
acknowledged weakness. The extent to which patronage politics and straightforward CNIP intimidation can check the rising anger and despair of the people has definite limits which have been indicated above.

But the ideological importance of projects like the agricultural schemes and industries should not be overlooked. Often projects like these are presented by the Ciskei Government as promises of new beginnings. According to residents at Madakeni (the mud hut settlement on the outskirts of Sada), the headman has made continual pleas to the people to be patient, because soon houses will be built, more factories will be established in the area and Shiloh Irrigation Scheme (about 5 kilometres away) will provide people from the camps with arable land. In Dimbaza, too, the existence of 33 factories, the potential for new jobs and the concern for preserving the chances of getting one, has particular effects on an ideological level.

Suffice it to say that as with 'tribal' ideology, this developmentalist ideology has its own objective limits. The marked lack of success in attracting further capital investment in the Ciskei and increased removals of people into the area will tend to undermine any coherence or materiality this ideology might hold.

Political Control Inside the Ciskei

A theme emerging from our interviews is that political control over the mass of contract and local workers and their families is not extended through repression alone, but is located in the powers of economic allocation ceded to the chiefs and local state officials by the South African state.

The way in which the state has intervened to strengthen the rôle of the chiefs has been outlined above. Here we will discuss some of the dynamics of the politically dominant class in the Ciskei.

Because of the almost complete lack of an independent economic basis for the ruling class in the Ciskei, they are completely dependent on their access to the state to secure their economic position. 'The state is the main point of access to economic position in the Ciskei.'
This close link between economic position and political power is probably the major cohesive factor in the maintenance of control in the Ciskei by the local ruling class. The securing of economic benefits through the state is not a phenomenon applicable to the new petty bourgeois ruling class alone. For the mass of people living in the resettlement camps or the rural areas, membership of CNIP, loyalty to the local chief or headman and dutiful payment of party dues, are the ways to secure houses, pensions, land, local jobs, Unemployment Insurance Fund payments and sometimes labour contracts.

It is necessary to elaborate briefly on the nature of classes inside the Ciskei - an extended analysis of which the interviews alone did not allow. Perhaps the most important feature of the local dominant class is that it is ultimately dependent on the South African state for its position. But this does not mean that it has no political importance of its own, nor that its political effects are negligible because it is a bunch of 'puppets'. The reality of the power of Sebe's party in the Eastern Cape is of an order that surpasses the 'puppet' analogy, as is witnessed by the seriousness of CNIP's sustained attack on the trade union movement in East London. 16

The most powerful fraction of the dominant class in the Ciskei comprises the top state officials (MIAs, Cabinet Ministers, and top civil servants) and chiefs loyal to the CNIP, the ruling party. Thirty-three of the 55 members of the Ciskei Legislative Assembly are chiefs (who are not elected but hold their seats 'ex officio') and seven out of the eight Cabinet Ministers are chiefs. The bulk of the petty bourgeoisie are junior civil servants (7 000 of them), teachers, nurses, clerks, small traders and headmen.

Generally the petty bourgeoisie are a supportive class to the Ciskei ruling class - mainly because their position depends on loyalty to CNIP and the chiefs - but they are by no means an homogeneous class. The number of people who can be described as petty bourgeois number probably just over 14 000 (that is 7 000 civil servants, 4 000 teachers, 1 000 traders and 1 000 to 2 000 small farmers financed by the Ciskei Marketing Board and agricultural scheme plot holders). There are also about 12 000 small farmers with rights to land in the Ciskei and with male heads permanently there,
although their position is more difficult to determine. However, it is likely that those with land rights would be those more firmly entrenched in the rural (as opposed to the resettlement) areas and those who have closer links to the chief.

The mass of the 'de facto' population of the Ciskei are contract workers and commuters and their families, the unemployed, partially employed and pensioners from the farms and towns. There are about 40 000 commuters living in the Ciskei, 60 000 'legal' migrants that have registered with the labour bureaux and 17 000 migrants on the mines. There is also a very small internal working class of about 10 000.17

Research among resettled people in the Ciskei has clearly indicated the disorganisational effects of the political practices of the local ruling classes. The pivotal position of the chiefs with regard to allocation of the means of reproduction is one of the most important factors behind the undermining of collective class organisation among the dominated classes located in the rural areas. Allocation of houses (certainly in the resettlement areas) pensions and other social security payments, and contracts are all centralised in Zwelitsha - the seat of the Ciskei Government. But on a local level this allocation is controlled by chiefs and headmen.

Contracts from recruiters which arrive at Zwelitsha are allocated to chiefs/headmen from different areas. It seems that the number and types of contract allocated to a particular area are done so on the basis of loyalty of each particular chief to CNIP.18 Contracts go to the local magistrate's office and the chief/headman is delegated to inform people in the area that a particular number of contracts have arrived. As well as extending control over contract workers, this is an effective way of ensuring that chiefs themselves toe the CNIP party line.

In the case of resettlement camps (e.g. Sada and Dimbaza) the committees appointed by the headmen inform people that contracts have arrived. The state has tried to extend this control, by the 1979 amendment to the Black Urban Areas Act, which threatened employers with a R500 fine if they employed 'illegal' workers. Before this it was easier for 'illegal' workers to use the 72 hour visiting limit to find employment first and then register in the towns. Now it seems that employers will be reluctant to take on 'illegals'
at all, and prospective workers will have to register along with thousands of others at the tribal labour bureaux. In this way it is possible that dependence on the chiefs and headmen for jobs will be increased.

But this control, both over and by chiefs, is by no means of an absolute or unproblematic sort. It is an uneven and differential control, varying from area to area, depending mainly on the level of unemployment. It nevertheless has an important ideological and political effect on the dominated classes who depend on wage labour for their means of subsistence.

If contract workers manage to escape the gamut of controls over the allocation of jobs themselves, by acquiring contracts directly through recruiters or the labour bureaux, their families remain prisoners to the whims of Sebe's party in the Ciskei. The chief's powers of allocation of land in the rural areas have been extended to the (Ciskei) government-appointed headmen who allocate houses in the 'self-contained Bantu towns' otherwise known as resettlement camps. In areas where the housing shortage is acute, like Sada or Dimbaza, the discriminatory allocation of housing serves as an effective (at least in the short term) means of political control. The headmen in the resettlement camps, or councillors chosen by them, usually form committees through which all grievances, or requests for houses and pensions have to be channelled.

In the case of political control in the resettlement camps, however, there are particular contradictions which face the Ciskei authorities and which should be borne in mind. Most of the resettled people have no basis in the rural areas at all. Whether they come from the farms, the towns, or 'black spots', none have been subject to any of the remnants of pre-capitalist ideological relations, as has been the case in the rural areas of the Ciskei.

Government-appointed headmen in these areas usually have roots as shallow as those over whom they exercise their control. As was shown in the case of Sada, headmen can come from anywhere from Paarl to Kingwilliamstown.

Sada, Dimbaza, Oxton, etc., are all proclaimed townships. This means that no resident can own land or even keep livestock in the area. People
who are allocated land in the surrounding villages are those outside the camps who have historical connections with the area, the tribe and the chief. For the vast majority of resettled people there is absolutely no chance of being allocated arable or even grazing land, especially in the light of the agricultural policy of the Ciskei. This discrepancy is certainly apparent to most of the resettled people interviewed. Thus it seems that the weapon the Ciskei authorities are using to enforce political control in the resettlement areas is not only without ammunition, but is badly corroded. There is very little basis to the 'tribal' ideology imposed on the resettlement areas.

Certainly in the short term, this particular type of political containment has 'worked'. Direct dependence on CNIP chiefs and headmen for daily needs - houses, jobs, pensions - have had pertinent effects at the level of political organisation. One of the reasons for this might be that until at least the mid-1970s most of the resettled people were the elderly or disabled. However, with an increasing number of young people growing up in those areas, and more working people being 'endorsed out' and forced to settle in the township in the homelands the contradictions may well be accentuated to show the state's (that is, South Africa and its Ciskei branch) fundamental inability to effect new political solutions to the problem of containment of the working class based in the rural areas.

Conclusion

In this paper we have argued that the general rôle of the Bantustans in the apartheid period have been to serve as relocation points for the surplus population generated by changes in capitalist relations and for the canalisation of labour to sectors of the economy where it is most needed. Crucially, they have also maintained the conditions of existence of the capitalist-mode of production, by politically disorganising the masses.

On a more specific level, we have argued that the Ciskei - and indeed other homelands - has to be taken seriously. The class struggle has particular dynamics in the peripheral areas that have peculiar political and economic implications. 'Independence' is not only a farce. It has real and substantial effects on the material conditions of the working class, and hence on class struggle.
This paper has presented a largely interpretative account of the way in which those most deeply and directly affected by the homelands policy perceive those effects. It also tries to explain, through the medium of interviews, the objective material conditions and power relations that pertain in the Ciskei.

The interviews were not conducted in a broad, survey-type manner. Rather, they were concentrated and in-depth, with a strong emphasis on a life history component. There are certain insights to be gained from this type of interviewing. It forces the interviewer to take account of people's perceptions and to try to locate them in an objective understanding of the situation, instead of ignoring them as many of the broad survey questionnaires tend to do. It also allows people, in a limited way, to tell history themselves.

Although the presence of the writers curtails the control of the people over the telling of their history, we have tried to root this account of resettlement in the Ciskei on their information and perceptions.

We hope this paper contributes to a knowledge of how a substantial section of the African working class has been forced to live their lives, locked away in barrenness by apartheid capitalism.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. Duncan, S., Talk on the homelands, given at the University of Cape Town, March 1982. (This figure of 1.5 million excludes dependants).

2. ibid.

3. Quail Commission estimates.

4. This point is made in the SPP Preliminary Report on the Eastern Cape.

5. ibid., p.4.

6. ibid.


8. Interview with the Director of the MDC, Mr. C. Myers, March 1981.

9. ibid.

10. ibid.


12. Interview in Elukhanyweni, July 1981.


19. See case studies.

20. See the article on 'Ciskei independence' in Social Review, No. 14, 1981, for an account of the effects Ciskei independence can have on various strata of the working class.
## APPENDIX A

### INDUSTRIES IN THE CISKEI

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<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>TYPE OF INDUSTRY</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASSOCIATED LEATHER PRODUCTS (PTY) LTD</td>
<td>Dimbaza</td>
<td>Splitting of Leather</td>
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<tr>
<td>BARKOR INDUSTRIES (PTY) LTD</td>
<td>Dimbaza</td>
<td>Hand Spinning of Mohair</td>
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<td>BARKOR MAITE (PTY) LTD</td>
<td>Dimbaza</td>
<td>Hand Weaving of Carpets</td>
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<td>CAT CLOTHS AND TEA TOWELS (PTY) LTD</td>
<td>Dimbaza</td>
<td>Interior Decor Items</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tea Towels with local motif</td>
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<td>CISKEI ADVERTISING</td>
<td>East London</td>
<td>Advertising</td>
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<td>CISKEI METAL INDUSTRIES (PTY) LTD</td>
<td>Dimbaza</td>
<td>Ground Flat Stock Steel for Tool Making Industry</td>
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<td>Saw Milling</td>
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<td>Printers</td>
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<td>Bicycles</td>
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<td>Keiskammahoek</td>
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<td>Education and Information Systems</td>
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<td>NAME</td>
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<td>Dimbaza</td>
<td>Plastic Balls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WERCO KERAMIEK (PTY) LTD</td>
<td>Alice</td>
<td>Ceramics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XHOSA WEAVERS (PTY) LTD</td>
<td>Dimbaza</td>
<td>Hand Woven Carpets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANDLA MANUFACTURERS (PTY) LTD</td>
<td>Dimbaza</td>
<td>Toys and Crochet Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPHA NYWERHEDE (PTY) LTD</td>
<td>Dimbaza</td>
<td>Leather Safety Products</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX B

**INDUSTRY, INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN DIMBAZA BY AGENCY SYSTEM 1974-1979**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TEXTILE, CLOTHING AND LEATHER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories No:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Investment</td>
<td>31000</td>
<td>49300</td>
<td>156600</td>
<td>637300</td>
<td>784700</td>
<td>913500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XDC/CNDC Investment, shares, loans and buildings</td>
<td>72678</td>
<td>91209</td>
<td>215500</td>
<td>490534</td>
<td>865651</td>
<td>1 122725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Investment</td>
<td>103678</td>
<td>140509</td>
<td>372100</td>
<td>1 127834</td>
<td>1 650351</td>
<td>2 036225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment: whites</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment: 'Black' total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (incl. 'Other')</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>755(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0) **Money: Capital/Labour ratio**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(4) ÷ (9)</td>
<td>1 672.23</td>
<td>2 651.11</td>
<td>2 296.91</td>
<td>2 737.46</td>
<td>3 167.66</td>
<td>2 696.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS**
| **MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT** |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Factories No:        |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Private Investment   | 10000 | 58200 | 38600 | 53600 | 1 399800 | 1 331300 |
| XDC/CNDC Investment, shares, loans and buildings | 6305 | 109420 | 87800 | 82840 | 1 627558 | 5 355063 |
| Total Investment     | 16305 | 167620 | 126400 | 136400 | 3 027358 | 6 686363 |
| Employment: Whites   | 1     | 2     | 3     | 3     | 19    | 25    |
| Employment: 'Black' total | 15    | 65    | 30    | 15    | 198   | 198   |
| Total (incl. 'Other')| 16    | 67    | 33    | 18    | 217   | 227(4) |

8) **Money: Capital/Labour ratio**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(4) ÷ (9)</td>
<td>1 019.06</td>
<td>2 501.79</td>
<td>3 830.30</td>
<td>7 599.77</td>
<td>13 950.96</td>
<td>29 455.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) One 'other'
(2) 228 000 CNDC share capital
(3) 1 562 000 ditto
(4) 4 'Others'
### APPENDIX B Continued

#### INDUSTRY, INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN DIMBAZA BY AGENCY SYSTEM 1974-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) CHEMICALS &amp; CHEMICAL PETROLEUM, COAL, RUBBER &amp; PLASTIC Factories No.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Private Investment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25000</td>
<td>65000</td>
<td>75000</td>
<td>75000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) XDC/CNDC Investment, shares loans and buildings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76792</td>
<td>139700</td>
<td>146149</td>
<td>146149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Total Investment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>101792</td>
<td>204700</td>
<td>221149</td>
<td>221149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Employment: White</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Employment 'Black' total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Total (incl. 'Other')</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Money Capital/Labour ratio (4) ÷ (9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 655.11</td>
<td>9 304.55</td>
<td>9 214.54</td>
<td>9 214.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) WOOD &amp; WOOD PRODUCTS - INCL. FURNITURE Factories No.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Private Investment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>161000</td>
<td></td>
<td>27700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) XDC/CNDC Investment, shares loans and buildings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2599(1)</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>128876</td>
<td>158267</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Total Investment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2599</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>289876</td>
<td>185967</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Employment: White</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Employment: 'Black' total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Total(incl. 'Other')</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Money Capital/Labour ratio (4) ÷ (9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>123.76</td>
<td>177.42</td>
<td>8 282.17</td>
<td>9 298.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Loan
(2) One 'other'
## INDUSTRY, INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN SECTORS NOT CONFINED TO DIMBAZA.

### AGENCY BASIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WOOD &amp; WOOD PRODUCTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories No.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2(^{(1)})</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Investment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50000</td>
<td>362000</td>
<td>641000</td>
<td>365000</td>
<td>392700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XDC/CNDC Investment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>172814</td>
<td>415400</td>
<td>646394</td>
<td>520727</td>
<td>679301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Investment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>222814</td>
<td>777400</td>
<td>1287394</td>
<td>885727</td>
<td>1072001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Employment

- **White**: 7, 12, 9, 9, 14
- **'Black' male**: n.a., ?, 244, 138, 158
- **'Black' female**: n.a., ?, 169, 159, 212
- **'Black' total**: 179, 374, 413, 297, 370
- **Total (incl. 'Other')**: 186, 386, 422, 317\(^{(2)}\), 402\(^{(3)}\)

#### Money Capital/Labour ratio

\[
\frac{(4)}{(9)} = \frac{1 197.92}{2 013.99} = 0.592625
\]

- **FOOD, BEVERAGES & TOBACCO**
  - **Factories No.**: 1, 1, 1, 1
  - **Private Investment**: 559000, 969000, 970000, 970000
  - **XDC/CNDC Investment**: 1 450000, 1 653884, 1 709094, 1 668646
  - **Total Investment**: 2 009000, 2 622884, 2 699094, 2 638646

#### Employment

- **White**: -
- **'Black' male**: 18, 14, 20, 21
- **'Black' female**: -
- **'Black' total**: 321, 300, 350, 350
- **Total (incl. 'Other')**: 339, 314, 370, 374\(^{(4)}\)

#### Money Capital/Labour ratio

\[
\frac{(4)}{(9)} = \frac{5 926.25}{8 353.13} = 0.729485
\]

---

(1) Figures = elsewhere i.e. = not Dimbaza 1978, see no entry Dimbaza 1978.
(2) 'Others'
(3) 18 others
(4) 3 'others'
### APPENDIX B Continued

**INDUSTRY, INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN CISKEI, SECTORS NOT CONFINED TO DIMBAZA - AGENCY BASIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(1) NON-METALLIC MINERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRODUCTS (not coal or oil)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories No.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(2) Private Investment</strong></td>
<td>10600</td>
<td>16600</td>
<td>15800</td>
<td>15400</td>
<td>15500</td>
<td>15500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(3) XDC/CNDC Investment</strong></td>
<td>20902</td>
<td>37181</td>
<td>57800</td>
<td>89800</td>
<td>135664</td>
<td>165885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(4) Total Investment</strong></td>
<td>31502</td>
<td>53781</td>
<td>73600</td>
<td>105200</td>
<td>151164</td>
<td>181385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(5) Employment: White</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(6) Employment: 'Black' male</strong></td>
<td>?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(8) Employment: 'Black' total</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(9) Total Employment</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(10) Money Capital/Labour ratio</strong></td>
<td>( \frac{4}{5} )</td>
<td>137.00</td>
<td>5094.76</td>
<td>5009.52</td>
<td>5598.67</td>
<td>4424.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A PRIMARY SOURCES

Evidence submitted to the Ciskei (Quail)' Commission

1. Correspondence with individual commissioners and Ciskei Government.
2. Evidence A - E; oral and written evidence; papers commissioned and unsolicited.
3. Index A - TR: Background papers.
4. Answers from Administration Boards to questionnaire.

Interviews

The following people were interviewed/consulted:

**February 1981:**
- Cecil Manona - Researcher at the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown.
- Andre Roux - Member, Surplus Peoples Project, Eastern Cape, Grahamstown.
- Geoff Antrobus - Lecturer, Agricultural Economics, Rhodes University, Grahamstown.

**March 1981:**
- Jacqui Cock - Member, Surplus Peoples Project, Eastern Cape, Grahamstown.
- John Clacey - Agricultural Extension Officer for Albany, Bathurst, and Alexandria, Grahamstown.
- Jan Marais - Agricultural Extension Officer for Port Beaufort, Stockenström, Victoria East, Adelaide.
- I.W. van der Merwe - Agricultural Extension Officer for Queenstown, Queenstown.
- Peter King - Agricultural Extension Officer for Stutterheim and Cathcart, Stutterheim.
- D. Hart - Development Manager Ciskei National Development Corporation.
- P. du Plessis - Economist, Dohne Research Station, Dohne.

Managements of five Ciskei factories:
- Southern Combing (Dimbaza)
- Keiskammaheoek Sawmills (Keiskammaheoek)
- Dimbaza Foundries (Dimbaza)
- Xhosa Rug (Dimbaza)
- van Leer (Dimbaza)

Management at three Ciskei Agricultural Irrigation Schemes:
- Tyefu - manager
- Shiloh - Mr. J. Every
- Keiskammaheoek - Mr. D. Page

- Frans Jacobs - Benso Economic Adviser to the Ciskei, Zwelitsha.
- G. Godden - Ciskei Secretary of Agriculture, Zwelitsha
- M. Lindström - Chief Agricultural Planning Officer for the Ciskei, Zwelitsha

South African Allied Workers' Union (SAWU) Officials:
- Sisa Mjikelana
- Thozamile Gwetha
- and workers who were members of SAWU, East London

**July 1981**
- Five workers from Good Hope Textiles, Kingwilliamstown, East London.
- Various SAWU officials and members, too numerous to name, East London.
- General Workers' Union and African Food and Canning Workers' Union local branch officials, East London.
18 people in Sada
10 people in Elukhanyweni
20 people in Dimbaza

Priests
- Father C. Cook - St Mathews Mission
- Father W. Ntlolo - Dimbaza
- Father Mfenyana - Sada
- Moravian preacher - Sada
- Moravian priest - Shiloh

Ray Magida - Border Council of Churches social worker, Kingwilliamstown.
'Vuyani' - researcher at ISER, Grahamstown.

Newspapers
1979-1981
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Daily Dispatch
Rand Daily Mail
The Star
Sunday Tribune

Surplus Peoples Project: Preliminary results of questionnaires administered in Dimbaza, Elukhanyweni and Sada, 1981.

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Loxton, Hunting and Assoc., A Preliminary plan for an irrigation scheme at Keiskammahoek, Ciskei, undertaken for the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Ciskei, 1976.


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South African Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations 1960-1979, Johannesburg, SAIRR.


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Kooy, A., Farm labour in the Karoo, in Wilson et.al. (eds.) Farm Labour in South Africa, op.cit.
Lacey, M., For betterment or worse: a study of betterment schemes as part of
the resettlement plan, Unpublished paper, Rhodes University, 1980.

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Molteno, F., The historical significance of the Bantustan strategy, Social

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struggle in the countryside, Economy and Society, 5,3, 1976(a).

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Palmer, P.N., Industrialising the national states: the Bophuthatswana example,

Perks, W. and P., Farm labour in the Cathcart district, Saldru Farm Labour

Simkins, C., The economic implications of African resettlement, SAIRR
Conference Papers on Resettlement, 1981.

Simkins, C., Agricultural production in the African reserves of South Africa,

Surplus Peoples Project, Preliminary report on the Eastern Cape region,
Unpublished, 1981.


Van der Vliet, E. and Bromberger, N., Farm labour in the Albany district,

Wolpe, H., Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segregation
to apartheid, Economy and Society, 1,4, 1972.
To anybody interested in what is happening in Southern Africa at the present time, it is clear that an understanding of changes taking place in the field of labour is crucial. The whole debate about the political implications of economic growth, for example, revolves very largely around different assessments of the role of black workers in the mines and factories of the Republic. Many of the questions with which people involved in Southern Africa are now concerned relate, in one way or another, to the field generally set aside for labour economists to cultivate. The impact of trade unions; the causes of unemployment; the economic consequences of different educational policies; the determination of wage structures; the economics of discrimination; all these and more are matters with which labour economists have been wrestling over the years in various parts of the world.

At the same time there are many who would argue that these issues are far wider than can be contained within the narrow context of 'labour economics'. These issues, it is pointed out, go to the heart of the whole nature of development. In recent studies, commissioned by the International Labour Office, of development problems in Columbia, Sri Lanka, and Kenya, for example, leading scholars have identified the three crucial issues facing these countries as being poverty, unemployment, and the distribution of income. Thus the distinction between labour and development studies is becoming more blurred as economists come face to face with problems of real life in the Third World.

It is here too that an increasing number of people are coming to see that study of the political economy of South Africa must not be done on the assumption that the problems there are absolutely different from those facing other parts of the world. Indeed it can be argued that far from being an isolated, special case, South Africa is a model of the whole world containing within it all the divisions and tensions (black/white; rich/poor; migrant/nonmigrant; capitalist west/third-world; etc.) that may be seen in global perspective. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the economy of Southern Africa (for the political and economic boundaries are singularly out of line with each other) is one of the most fascinating in the world. It is one on which far more research work needs to be done, and about which further understanding of the forces at work is urgently required. It is in order to attempt to contribute to such an understanding that Saldru is issuing these working papers.

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