Political power and poverty:
An examination of the role and
effect of influx control
in South Africa
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Carnegie Conference Paper No.83
Introduction and Summary

This paper is rather long -- but the essential thread of its argument can be briefly summarised.

Its primary purpose is

* To gauge the perceptions of prominent government policy formulators and administrators about poverty and the causes of poverty in South Africa.

* To compare these perceptions with the results of the research conducted, amongst other things, during the course of the Carnegie Inquiry.

The central focus of the paper falls on the system of Influx Control -- its role in the process of impoverishment in South Africa and its purpose within the country's political economy.

The paper concludes that Influx Control can be regarded as a major structural cause of poverty in South Africa as well as an essential pillar of the existing power structure. Retaining the essential components of the existing balance of power remains the central goal of present government policy. Therefore it will not be possible to eradicate the major structural causes of poverty without far-reaching political and social change including, amongst other things, the phasing out of influx control and an urbanisation policy geared providing the necessary infrastructure to support each citizen's free choice of where to live.

The most important section of this paper begins at page 28, where the interviews with senior government technocrats and administrators start. The rest of the paper leads up to this section but forms important stages in building up the argument.
The paper begins by placing the development debate in a broader, international context, focussing on the differences between those who argue for an urban bias in strategies against poverty and those who plead for a rural focus.

The features which make the South African debate on poverty and development essentially different from that in other developing countries are outlined.

The paper then focusses primarily on one of these features -- the rigid application of influx control -- and analyses the process of change that this system is presently undergoing in South Africa. It argues that the attempts at the reformulation of influx control gives one of the most fascinating insights into the problems the government faces in restructuring apartheid and attempting to apply coercive measures in an incentive-based "reform package."

The paper's detailed conclusions begin at page 47.
Where is poverty more severe -- in urban complexes or rural areas? And where can it best be tackled effectively?

These questions have long been the subject of debate between development economists concerned with poverty in developing "third world" countries.

The answers are important because they form the basis of appropriate strategies for action against poverty.

It would be comparatively easy to answer this question if "poverty" could be defined empirically, measured reliably and compared relevantly on the basis of an urban/rural divide.

But this has proved extremely difficult because of widely divergent determinants of poverty in rural and urban contexts.

In an attempt to assess the comparative extent of poverty various "measuring devices" have been formulated -- such as "poverty datum lines" or the concept of "basic-needs" that came to the fore during the 1970's.

Yet even where it is possible to determine the relative deprivation on the urban/rural divide it has proved far more difficult to reach agreement on strategies for action against poverty because these depend on answers to a range of equally important questions:

* what are the causes of poverty?

* what are the social, political and economic options available in devising strategies for action against poverty?
What is the likely impact of these strategies in different geographical contexts?

Is a long term strategy against poverty possible within the parameters of available options or must those options be broadened by changing the political and economic framework?

On the basis of this interwoven network of questions, development economists have reached widely divergent ideological and practical conclusions concerning the diagnosis, extent and remedy for poverty in African countries.

One of the central dividing lines is between those who plead for an urban bias for strategies against poverty, and those who argue that the primary focus should be on rural development.

Richard Sandbrook -- although extremely critical of conventional theories that urban industrialisation can provide an escape from poverty for African countries -- argues strongly for an urban bias.(1)

The outline of his argument is briefly as follows:(2)

1. The rate of urbanisation in African countries is the highest in the world and according to projections will continue to gain momentum, shifting the problems of poverty irrevocably to slums and shantytowns in urban complexes.

2. While average incomes in urban areas are generally higher than rural areas, urban incomes are more unequally distributed, resulting in the urban poor suffering both absolute and relative deprivation. Furthermore, comparison of cash income on a rural/urban basis is not a reliable indicator of relative degrees of poverty. City dwellers are totally reliant on a cash income and city life involves greater expenses than rural living.

3. The urban poor are prone to specific diseases passed on through the contamination of water, food and soil and those borne by air or passed on by human contact.

4. While urban dwellers are generally as well or better fed than rural dwellers, the nutrition of those who live in urban slums and dense, uncontrolled squatter settlements tend to be worse (or no better than) those in rural areas.
5. To improve their condition the urban poor are dependent on education. While it is generally assumed that urban-dwellers as a whole benefit from the urban bias in the location of schools, there is a strong disadvantage faced by the urban poor "who usually have the same lack of access to education as their rural counterparts."(3)

While accepting that it is impossible to "solve" urban poverty if rural poverty proceeds apace, Sandbrook argues that an urban bias in the strategy against poverty makes sense because ultimately radical political and economic changes are needed to devise meaningful strategies for action against poverty -- and pressure for such restructuring is more likely to come from the "urban elements."(4)

He argues that wealth redistribution, land reform, a restructuring of production, consumption and political institutions are needed to tackle poverty in African countries. "The radical protest that produces this change is likely to emerge first in the expanding cities of Africa."(5)

Michael Lipton takes a fundamentally different approach in his book "Why Poor People Stay Poor".(6)

He is equally dismissive of the conventional notion that development based on urban industrialisation and infrastructural modernization are effective ways of dealing with poverty in Africa. However, Lipton argues strongly for a rural focus in the fight against poverty.

He argues:

1. In the past 30 years almost all Lesser Developed Countries (LDC's) have enjoyed growth and development on an unprecedented scale -- yet hardly any impact has been made on mass poverty which is located primarily in the rural areas.(7)
2. A significant contributory cause of this situation is that virtually all growth and development has been undertaken with an "urban bias". This "imbalance between city and country" is not only "the main single component of inequality, it weakens the poor" -- while increasing the economic and political power of a small urban labour aristocracy. (8)

3. The allegedly higher and unstoppable immigration of rural poor to urban centres is a "myth." Most of the rise in urban population in LDC's is due to natural increase -- and the rural poor rarely "vote with their feet," escaping their poverty by urban migration. Many who migrate are merely temporary migrants. (9)

4. An urban bias in strategies against poverty encourages the better-off rural villagers to migrate to urban centres, aggravating the condition of the bulk who remain behind. (10)

5. Any serious programme to counter poverty would have to remove this bias by seeking to achieve national self-sufficiency in food, raise agricultural incomes, expand agricultural employment and employment in the smaller towns and provide basic health, educational and environmental services to rural dwellers. "What is needed is simple: a much larger share of all sorts of developmental resources -- savings, aid, brains, dollars, administrators -- for rural areas and agriculturists; and within those, concentration of resources on the poor, weak and inefficient." (11)

6. However, it is politically expedient for governments to entrench the urban bias in dealing with poverty, even though this exacerbates inequality, because it increases the chances of political stability "in the twenty-five year horizon." "The articulate 'labour aristocracy' of the cities is small enough to be bought off with part of the surplus extracted from the numerous but inarticulate rural poor." (12)

7. The strategy also increases economic stability because it is conducive to a process of "capital intensive industrialization that, however inefficient and unjust, is thereby enabled to provide growing wages and profits to its few participants." (13)

"The basic conflict in the third world," says Lipton, "is not between capital and labour, but between capital and countryside, farmer and townsman, villager and urban industrial employer-cum-proletarian elite." (14)

These are the divergent perceptions of two development economists dedicated to finding strategies against poverty in Africa and third world countries in general. To what extent are their arguments helpful in understanding the problem of poverty in
South Africa?

In South Africa many similar conditions apply as in the rest of Africa -- often in exaggerated form: developed cities and underdeveloped rural areas; Excessively large income disparities between the wealthy and the poor (15); a large and growing pressure for urbanisation.

But there are several factors that make the problem of poverty in South Africa incomparable with the problem in the rest of Africa.

The first is the fact that South Africa's urbanisation process has proceeded along fundamentally different lines from that of other African countries, given the comparative stages of economic development. The primary reason for this fact is that the South African government has, in a large measure, succeeded where its African counterparts failed, in applying a rigorous counter-urbanisation strategy.(16)

Charles Simkins, who has undertaken the most recent and thorough demographic analyses in South Africa, underscores the extent to which influx control has distorted SA urbanisation patterns.

Using a historical and comparative analysis, he shows how influx control -- rigidly applied by the Nationalist government during the 1960's -- managed to reverse the urbanisation trends of the previous decades, when South Africa experienced a level and rate of urbanisation consistent with its level of economic development. (17)

With the overriding aim of relocating as many Africans as
possible into the "homelands" and preventing those who were there from coming to the cities, the government applied a rigorous control of mobility. This resulted in the proportion of Africans living in urban areas outside the homelands actually falling -- from 29.6% in 1960 to 26.7% in 1980. (18)

As the major urban and metropolitan centres are situated outside the homelands, it is clear that the "urban tide" had indeed been turned -- even if not to the extent the Nationalists would have wished.

Projecting future trends, Simkins concludes that if current controls remain, the proportion of Africans in the major cities would remain unchanged by 1990 and would actually drop somewhat by the year 2000. (19) If, on the other hand, controls were abolished, only 1.5 -- 5-million people would find their way to urban areas in the short and medium term. (20)

Even Flip Smit vice president of the HSRC, whose famous projection (that 75% of all blacks will be urbanised by the year 2000) has been used as an official yardstick has modified that prediction, saying that after doing additional calculations he expects a maximum of 50 - 60% will be urbanised. (21)

This undermines the foundation of an argument such as Sandbrook's -- (that counter-poverty measures should be focussed on urban areas) -- because this analysis is postulated upon an immediate history of massive urbanisation and an irrevocable future shift of population and the problems of poverty to the major cities. (22)
Yet this does not imply that Lipton’s alternative of massive rural agricultural development (23) is available as an immediate strategy for tackling poverty under present circumstances. There are several reasons for this. One is the fact that South Africa, in common with many other countries, has followed a course of concentration of land ownership in large units, and increasing mechanisation of agriculture.

But another major reason is uniquely South African: the land has been rigidly divided on a racial basis, leaving 13% available for the use of the vast majority of rural people. That 13%, widely dispersed in uneven portions, has been further sub-divided into ten unequal units on an ethnic basis and parcelled out as alternative countries for South Africa’s 10 ethnic groups.

The bulk of rural land is legally reserved for ownership and occupation by whites and the government has had great “success” in moving Africans off white owned land into the “homelands”. Indeed Simkins has calculated that the greatest population shift of all has taken place from the “white” rural areas into the “homelands”. Through policies such as population removals and influx control, the proportion of Africans in rural areas outside the homelands actually dropped from 35,1% to 20,6% between 1960 and 1980 while the proportion of Africans inside the “homelands” showed a corresponding increase from 39,8% to 53,1%.(24)

This means that a great proportion of the rural poor are a landless, unemployed proletariat legally prohibited from owning or farming the land outside “homeland” boundaries -- and
without any access to the land within these boundaries. (25)

This situation is likely to be exacerbated as "agribusiness" moves into the homelands, while influx controls continue to prevent the dispossessed from migrating to the cities in search of a livelihood.

It is no coincidence that two of the factors that make South Africa's poverty debate incomparable with those of other developing countries are also the two major pillars of the apartheid policy:

* the partition of the country into "homelands" is the centrepiece of the attempt to create alternative political channels for various "ethnic groups" comprising the country's black majority. (26)

* the influx control system (coupled with population removals) is designed to keep a significant number of Africans within or near the boundaries of the territories ascribed to them, while counteracting the counter-ethnic "melting pot" effect of unregulated migration to large metropolitan complexes. (27)

The combination of these factors is central to the government's attempt to construct an ethnically-based political alternative for Africans that excludes the option of participation in a common system -- in order to secure and perpetuate the exercise of overall control by the white minority.

Demographic manipulation and land partition also have a profound impact on the problem of poverty in South Africa -- affecting its location, extent and the range of options open for tackling poverty within the parameters of official policy.

It has led analysts to conclude:

1. That poverty is most acute in South Africa's rural areas due to overcrowding, landlessness, unemployment. (28)

2. That this situation has been gravely exacerbated by the rigid application of influx control, population removals and the
grossly inequitable division of land entrenched through the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts. (29)

3. That rural development and agricultural self reliance amongst the rural poor are impossible unless the population pressure on the land is significantly eased and land reform introduced. (30)

4. That the pressure towards urbanisation will continue to escalate -- and that urbanisation should be permitted. (31)

5. Although rapid urbanisation brings serious problems they are easier to tackle than the problems of mass rural poverty and unemployment. (32)

6. The process of urbanisation must be balanced by comprehensive rural development strategies. (33)

This is the view taken by economists and analysts concerned with the problem of poverty in South Africa -- an analysis that has significant difference with those applicable to other countries.

It is clear that the preconditions for tackling poverty on the basis of this analysis would mean a serious erosion of two of apartheid's central pillars: Demographic manipulation (through influx control and population removals) and rigid, ethnically-based partition of the land.

This paper will focus on the aspect of demographic manipulation -- with particular emphasis on the machinery of influx control.

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One of the most important developments in South Africa during the past five years have been the attempts by the government to restructure apartheid.

The aim of this paper is to examine this restructuring process, assess its pace and direction and attempt to determine whether the restructured face of South African politics is likely offer a broader range of options for strategies against Poverty.
This paper is based on in-depth interviews with key political and economic planners, technocrats and administrators involved in formulating the government's revised strategy.

It attempts to establish:

1. Whether there is a dominant "official view" of poverty in South Africa.
2. Whether strategies are being devised to counter poverty.
3. The new political parameters within which strategies for action against poverty will be devised.
4. Whether the restructured policy will open significant new options in the struggle against poverty.
5. Whether the restructured policy is likely to undermine the structural causes of poverty -- with particular emphasis on attempts at demographic manipulation through influx control.

DEFINITIONS

Before the analysis proceeds it is important to define certain terms:

"TRADITIONAL" APARTHEID -- WHAT IS IT?

This refers to the apartheid policy as formulated by Dr H F Verwoerd and implemented by his successors until the announcement by Prime Minister P W Botha of his intentions to establish a "confederation."

"Traditional" apartheid is built on the following basic tenets:

1. The understanding that no political rights could be granted to Africans within a common political framework without inevitably provoking the demand for full and equal political rights within that common framework. (34)

2. Such a process would inevitably lead to the demise of white political control. (35)
3. Therefore an alternative had to be found — formulated and defined by Verwoerd as "total territorial apartheid." (36)

4. The principle of territorial partition, entrenched in 1913 and 1936 was developed into the concept of "independent national states" conceived to provide alternative citizenship and political channels for the black majority on an ethnic basis. (37)

5. This goal could not be achieved without the required demographic distribution of blacks on an ethnic basis — ethnic concentration in specific geographical areas had to be preserved to give content to the policy. As Verwoerd put it in his speech during a Senate debate on May 1, 1951: "The only alternative (to the whole of South Africa becoming a Bantustan) is deliberately to see to it that the whole of South Africa does not become a country occupied by Natives and therefore run by Natives. If we could succeed just to that extent in keeping the Native population in the reserves and getting them to live there, even if they do work in the white areas in industries which are scattered about near to their areas — if we could achieve that measure of separation, — then even if the two million or so who are now there remain behind in our towns and the three million approximately who are in the rural areas remain here, — white South Africa will be saved." (38)

6. The corollary of this was that all blacks in white urban areas were regarded as "temporary sojourners." A recognition of permanence would ultimately bring with it demands for political participation in a common system. (39)

7. Attempts to achieve demographic control were undertaken by decentralisation strategies, influx control, population removals and the limitation on housing construction in the urban areas. (40)

The classic official exposition of the policy of apartheid was that of Dr Connie Mulder who told Parliament in 1978:

"If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as black people are concerned, there will be not one black man with South African citizenship — Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way and there will no longer be a moral obligation in this parliament to accommodate these people politically."

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RESTRUCTURED APARTHEID, WHAT IS IT?

Over the past four years a revised version of government policy has slowly begun to take shape, launched and labelled as "Reform."
It is a two-pronged strategy. The initiative that has been most prominently in the public spotlight over the past year is the attempt to formulate a new constitution to draw coloureds and Indians into a common system with whites.

The second, and potentially more important leg of the strategy, has been an attempt to restructure the Homelands policy -- the centrepiece of the government's attempt to provide an alternative for black political participation.

The major objective of the revised apartheid formula is the establishment of a confederation between "independent homelands" and the so-called "common" or "white" area of South Africa based on a "new regional economic strategy with economic development co-operation transcending political borders." (41)

At the heart of the economic strategy lies an unprecedented multi-million incentive scheme to attract industrial development to the homelands. The sum earmarked by government for this purpose more than doubled between 1982 and 1983, rising from R100-million to R230-million. (42)

Far more clarity exists on the economic plans for regional decentralisation than on the accompanying political strategy.

In brief, the economic plan divides South Africa, including the independent and non-independent "homelands" into eight development regions demarcated according to "development needs, development potential, functional relationships and physical
characteristics." (43)

Within these regions there are 11 deconcentration points (areas close to existing large metropolitan areas) and 49 industrial development points (21 in so-called "white" South Africa and 28 in the "homelands.") Development points are intended to be alternative growth points to "counter-balance existing metropolitan areas."(44)

This is coupled with a multi-million Rand decentralisation incentive package -- a massive R230-million last year -- to subsidise rail transport, harbour services, road transport, electricity, housing and training and particularly direct cash payments linked to the number of workers employed. In the top priority Eastern Cape/Ciskei area, for example, a monthly cash payment of R100,00 per worker will be paid to each industrialist for seven years.(45)

In addition from January 1984 the Development Bank of Southern Africa began operating. The government hopes it will make available "some R650-million a year for development and expansion projects...by the mid-1980's and well over R1 000-million by the end of the present decade." (46)

This economic strategy differs from the traditional apartheid formula in that it adopts a regional approach in which development areas are demarcated across "political boundaries" giving functional considerations a higher priority than the purely political objectives of previous schemes.
The political and constitutional goals of the strategy are far less clear.

The idea of the so-called "constellation of States" was first mooted by the Prime Minister during the debate on his vote in Parliament in 1979. The term was extremely vague and left much room for speculation. It has now fallen into disuse and has been replaced by the recognised constitutional term "confederation." The Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, gave a comprehensive definition of his understanding of the concept during the censure debate in August 1981.

He said:

"A confederation comes into existence when two or more independent States create interstate structures by treaty in order to promote co-ordinated actions for the realization of common goals.

The following principles will have to apply:
Firstly the sovereignty of member states may not be affected. Secondly equal status for member states must be guaranteed and a member state must have the right to withdraw from certain spheres of co-operation if it wishes to do so. Thirdly, the existence of such a confederation does not prevent member states from liaising with one another bilaterally. Fourthly, a member state is not prevented from withdrawing from the confederation in its own interests if doing so would suit its purpose." (47)

He emphasised that this did not imply the creation of a "Super State" with power over individual "member states."

Formulated in this way, the plan in no way deviates from the policy of creating independent "homelands" through which blacks are stripped of their South African citizenship and any claim to political rights in a united SA. The plan differs from the traditional apartheid model in that it involves "some consultative structures and even secretariats to formalise co-operation and interaction," (48)
The big issue that the revised apartheid strategy has still to address is that of so-called "Urban Blacks."

The one significant shift made in this field has been the recognition of the "permanence" of a certain category of Africans in the "white area and especially in the cities." (49)

However there is no clarity on the political structures that will have to be worked into the framework of government policy to "accommodate these people politically."

Although the Black Local Authorities Act (1982) gives virtually full and autonomous status to black municipalities on the same basis as white local authorities, further political rights for "urban blacks" is one of the most contentious issues in official circles today.

During the censure debate last year, the Prime Minister announced the formation of a special Cabinet committee (consisting of seven Cabinet Ministers) to investigate "the problems of urban black constitutional development." (50)

Mr Botha said the Inquiry should be seen as the beginning of a process to give "legitimate accommodation" to black aspirations, but made it clear that the committee would approach the problem of black political rights within the framework of "National Party principles."

The committee only began meeting regularly from January 1984 -- almost a year after it had been established.
It is not necessary in this paper to analyse the reasons for the restructuring of apartheid. This has been comprehensively done in a previous paper. (51)

The major aim of this paper will be to try to assess whether this shift will broaden the scope for implementing strategies against poverty -- and particularly whether it will bring with it meaningful changes in the influx control system.

**INFLUX CONTROL -- WHAT IS IT?**

The phrase "influx control" is used in this paper to refer to all attempts to restrict the urbanisation of blacks, whether through pass laws, housing permits, deportation, prevention of illegal squatting or workplace control through fines on employers of "illegal" labour. (The various influx control mechanisms are dealt with in detail in another "Carnegie paper" No 81 by Arthur Chaskalson and Sheena Duncan.)

Influx Control was not the invention of the Nationalist government in its process of entrenching the apartheid policy -- but it was an indispensable component of this policy from the start. (52)

It is not necessary for the purpose of this paper to trace the historical development of influx control. But it is necessary to analyse its role in the development of apartheid. And it is essential to analyse the government's attempt to restructure influx control mechanisms in the process of reformulating apartheid.
As outlined above, demographic manipulation and control of movement of the African population was of central importance to traditional apartheid.

One of the major legislative mechanisms used to enforce influx control has (for almost four decades) been Section 10(1) of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No 25 of 1945 and its subsequent amendments.

"Section 10" as the provision has become known, prohibits any black person from remaining in a prescribed area for more than 72 hours unless:

a. He has resided continuously in the area since birth or

b. He has worked continuously in the area for one employer for at least 10 years or lived in the area lawfully and continuously for at least 15 years or

c. "such black" is the wife, the unmarried daughter or the son under the age of 18 years of any black mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) above who has lawfully entered and lawfully lives with "that black" in the area.

d. Permission for "any other black" to remain in the prescribed area has been administratively granted.

This system is enforced primarily by the "dompas" method, which requires that blacks produce their "passes" or reference books on demand at any time.

Since 1968 there has been a progressive decline in the number of persons prosecuted for pass law offences, (despite a relative upsurge in 1983). However, this downward average trend cannot be taken as an indication that influx control has been relaxed.
As Savage points out, a range of legal mechanisms can be used to supplement pass laws and remove Africans from white areas that are not reflected in prosecution figures -- for example those who are summarily prevented from entering or are endorsed out of urban areas as well as citizens of "independent" homelands who are excluded through the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act of 1972. (53)

The widespread belief that the government considers low prosecution figures important for its image is underlined by the indication, in minutes of a 1974 meeting in Pretoria between police and Senior Bantu Affairs Commissioners, that top officials had manipulated pass law figures to avoid unfavourable publicity. (54)

In addition a freeze on the building of houses for blacks in urban areas between 1968 and 1977 and a rigid application of anti-squatter provisions in the law have been used to counter increased influx of blacks to the urban areas.

In the process of restructuring apartheid several unsuccessful attempts have been made to change this system, ostensibly to remove the "hurtful and discriminatory" aspect from it while making influx control more effective.

The inside story of the attempt to reformulate the influx control system gives one of the most fascinating insights into the problems the government has faced in restructuring apartheid, exposing the collapse of consensus this has caused and the problems associated with attempting to apply essential apartheid
measures in a reform package.

A history of this attempt is important for the purpose of this paper.

In 1977 -- one year after the watershed Soweto uprisings during which the pass laws were identified as a major source of grievance amongst blacks, -- the government appointed Dr P J Riekkert to conduct an investigation into legislation relating to the utilization of manpower, including influx control legislation.

The Riekkert commission's report was tabled in Parliament in 1979.

Its most significant aspect was the stated recognition that South African cities had a settled black urban population -- a shift from the traditional apartheid policy in terms of which all urban Africans were regarded as "temporary sojourners."

Its major recommendations were:

1. That influx control should be linked to the availability of work and of approved housing.

2. That the 72-hour limit on non-qualified blacks in urban areas was discriminatory and should be scrapped.

3. Africans with permanent residence rights under section 10 should be allowed to have their families join them in urban areas -- as long as approved housing is available.

4. That section 10 rights be transferable from one "prescribed" area to another.

In its white paper the government shied away from scrapping the 72-hour limit and applying controls solely at the places of work and residence. However it accepted the two recommendations aimed at improving conditions for urban dwellers with "Section 10" rights.
The government then began to seek ways of testing whether a system of influx control administered at the home and workplace could be implemented effectively.

The first attempt was the so-called "Bloemfontein and Pretoria experiment" by which dompas demands on the street were suspended in these two cities in favour of the alternative system suggested by Riekert.

The experiments were short-lived -- and they appear to have been a total failure measured by the yardstick of the government's aim to apply "effective" influx control.

As the Director General of Co-operation and Development, Mr J Raath put it in an interview: "What that experiment showed was that you can't have an effective system in which you don't ask for reference books. The influx of blacks increased by thousands in Pretoria as a result of the six month period where the reference-book-on-demand system was suspended."(56)

The Government then drafted the Black Community Development Bill which was published in the Government Gazette on October 31, 1980 to elicit comment and response.

The stated aim of the Bill was to translate the Riekert recommendations (that right of urban residence depend on a job and an "approved" place of residence) into law.

There was also widespread expectation that the Bill would confirm
the permanent urban residence rights of a category of African city dwellers -- those with "Section 10" rights -- but this did not materialise.

On the contrary, the Bill:

* sought to effectively remove city rights attained under Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act.

* made urban rights dependent on "bona fide employment" and "approved" housing -- with the clear implication that an urban resident could lose his rights to be in the city if he lost his job or his house.

* Provided for a maximum R500 fine for employers of illegal labour and a maximum R250 fine for a "disqualified" person found in an urban area.

There was so widespread an outcry against the Bill that it was withdrawn and referred to a commission under the chairmanship of Mr Justice E M Grosskopf with a mandate to find a way of translating those sections of the Riekerl report that had been approved by the Government into law; viz "to grant recognition to the settled black urban dwellers and to regulate the process of urbanisation and rural settlement." (57)

The Grosskopf commission report was never published and the government studiously avoided publicising the issue. But photocopies found their way out of the narrow circle of those who received the report for perusal.

The Commission's starting premise was the belief that "Continued urbanisation should be regulated but cannot be halted." (58)

The Commission recommended:

* That all people with Section 10 rights be regarded as permanent urban residents with the right to remain indefinitely in urban areas -- even if they lost their job or their house.

* That all people with five years lawful residence in one or more urban areas should qualify for permanent urban residence --
and that this should apply retrospectively.

* that wives, husbands and dependents of Permanent Urban Residents should also be granted city rights.

* that contract workers should be eligible to qualify for city rights.

* that citizens of independent homelands should be able to qualify on the same basis for city rights.

* that visitors should be allowed without a permit to enter urban areas for a period of 90 days per calendar year.

* that the system be enforced by requiring employers to keep a register of workers and that they be severely punished for employing "unauthorised persons."

* that owners of houses likewise be required to keep particulars of all persons resident on the premises -- "with particulars of their rights to be so resident."

"Moreover premises may be searched but only pursuant to a search warrant issued in the usual way by a magistrate or justice of the peace if it appears from information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for believing that any person is unlawfully resident on such premises."

* that temporary residents who lose their jobs should be granted a six month period in the cities to find a new job.

* that provisions requiring a person to produce on demand an identification document should be repealed.

* that the 99-year leasehold system be converted to freehold.

Although the Grosskopf commission still supported a system of influx control -- which is anathema to those who believe that no pass laws can be just laws because they exclude a category of people from full and free participation in a common economy and society -- the Grosskopf recommendations certainly would have entrenched the permanence of Africans in the cities and made rights to permanence easier to acquire than under the present "Section 10" qualifications. In other words they would have opened the door for a gradual process of increasing urbanisation.
The Government maintained an official silence on the Grosskopf report. But the response of the Department of Co-operation and Development, was succinctly spelt out by Mr Johan Mills, then Director General of the Department in a report to the Secretary of the Committee revising the legislation on Black Community Development. This report also found its way out of the narrow circle for which it was intended. (59)

Mr Mills (who was also a member of the Grosskopf Commission) expressed his "serious reservations" on aspects of the report "particularly the question of influx control."

He based his objection on the fact that the Grosskopf recommendations would undermine "effective influx control to ensure that idle and unwished elements do not flood our cities."

He objected to

* the recommendation that permanent urban residence rights be granted after a five year period of residence in urban areas on the grounds that too many people would qualify for such rights.
* the recommendation that temporary residents who lose their jobs should be granted six months to seek employment.
* the recommendation that visitors be allowed without a permit for 90 days per year.
* the suggested methods of implementing the proposed influx controls system at the place of work and residence.

The next time the influx control law surfaced was in 1982 as the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Person's Bill. It was clear that all Mr Mills objections were shared by the government and incorporated in the draft Bill. Grosskopf had been overruled.

The Bill tightened influx control considerably for both urban and rural people.
It made urban residence rights dependent on approved accommodation and authority (in the form of a permit) to be in the area. No other Africans would have the right to be in an urban area between 22.00 hours and 05.00 hours the following day. Provided they have "approved accommodation" the following category of people were granted permanent urban status:

* SA citizens who have been legally resident in an urban area for a continuous period of ten years. (This excludes citizens of independent homelands or people in the process of acquiring their Section 101 (b) rights.)

* Africans who are SA citizens or citizens of independent homelands who have already gained "Section 10" rights at the time of the enactment of the Bill.

* People who, before the bill was enacted, were the registered owners of fixed property in any area. (This would apply to a very limited number of people.)

* Persons born in an urban area of parents who both have urban rights.

The central enforcing mechanism of the Bill was a proposed maximum R5 000 fine for employers of an "illegal worker" or a maximum R500 fine for the person housing an "illegal" citydweller.

The Bill was vigorously opposed from many quarters, including the Urban Foundation. The main argument against it was that it would remove permanent urban residence rights from all Africans, making such rights dependent on a job and an "approved" house. Secondly it would make it almost impossible for "illegal" people to obtain jobs in urban areas -- because employers would not be prepared to risk the prohibitive R5 000 fine. Nor would homeowners be likely to risk a R500 fine for housing an "illegal" city-dweller. Employers and homeowners would be turned willy-nilly into policemen, applying influx control.
Sheena Duncan predicted that the result of this law would be a large increase in the number of people squatting within homeland borders around metropolitan centres "but they will not be in the white areas which is the policy objective. The figures of pass law arrests will decline dramatically but the controls will be worse than anything we have ever experienced before." (60)

So great was the outcry against the Bill that it was again withdrawn and referred to the Heunis commission on the Constitution. This is an extremely significant move as it underlines how central influx control and demographic distribution of Africans is to constitutional strategy.

In March 1984, as the country waited for the re-emergence of the Bill, the Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Bill slipped through Parliament, barely noticed, proposing a maximum R5 000 fine or two years imprisonment for employing or harbouring an "illegal alien." As all Tswana, Xhosa and Venda speaking South Africans are now deemed to be "aliens," political analysts (notably the Black Sash) pointed out that the measure could be used to tighten influx control by ensuring that people would not employ or shelter "citizens of independent homelands" unless they had urban residents rights. Although the government denied that it would use the legislation against the citizens of these homelands, the assurances were not generally accepted. ------------

As the government was going through its torturous procedure of
attempting to reformulate an influx control system, several initiatives were taken outside the sphere of the state in an attempt to relax influx control.

The forum for these attempts was the courts. The major landmarks were:

* The Appeal Court's 1980 Komani decision, upholding the rights of the families of blacks with city rights to live with them.

* The Appeal Court's 1983 confirmation of a 1982 Rand Supreme Court judgement in the Rikhoto case, establishing the right of long-service migrant workers to claim city rights.

* The Cape Supreme Court's 1982 Booi decision which established the same principle.

* The same court's Mthiya decision which established the right of such a migrant to city rights even though he had enjoyed three periods of long leave.

The combined effect of the Komani and Rikhoto judgements caused the most official concern prompting hysterical speculation that the cities would be flooded by blacks streaming to the cities as the families of migrants with newly gained city rights poured in to join their men. (It has been calculated that if the government were to follow the Rikhoto judgement in spirit, it would mean a once-and-for-all increase in the urban African population of no more than 145 000 (2.4%) and that thereafter the annual increase would be only 29 000 people -- all of whom would be dependants of bread-winners already in the towns.) (61)

After long debates in the inner circles the government's official stance, announced in Parliament by Dr Koornhof, was to accept the Rikhoto decision -- but to apply it only in cases which duplicated the facts of the Rikhoto case.

However the government then moved to effectively negate the
benefits gained by the Komani judgement (enabling men with city rights to be joined by their families) by passing the Laws on Co-operation and Development Act. Section 4 of this law makes it impossible for the newly qualified contract workers to have their families live with them unless they are the legal registered owners or tenants of approved accommodation.

Since up to the time of the court judgement such migrants were not eligible to rent or own anything at all, and because of the acute shortage of family housing, they have no hope of complying with Section 4 and will therefore be unable to have their families with them.

Sheena Duncan noted that the most marked feature of the "Reform" and "Change" meant a departure from the old, vulgar and inefficient ways of doing things, to a much more subtle and sophisticated and very much more efficient method of excluding those whose labour is not required in the white area and of discarding those who are superfluous to the economic and political planning of white South Africa's future." (62)

And as Savage put it: "The trend of contemporary policy is clearly to limit permanent residence in urban areas, while giving increased privileges to existing permanent residents to tighten up influx control, by-pass the courts and move more fully towards what has been termed "administrative rule." (63)

It clearly shows that effective influx control has remained a central goal of Nationalist policy. The attempt to make it more effective while diminishing the oppressive role of the state in
the process has caused a serious political dilemma.

So far, this paper has examined some of the causes of poverty in South Africa and concluded that influx control has played an important contributory role. It has also considered the emerging policy on restructured influx control and concluded that, so far, it appears as if effective influx control remains a "non-negotiable" aspect of government policy.

The next section of this paper will attempt to compare these conclusions with the perceptions of leading "technocrats" and administrators of the government's restructured policy. It will reflect their views on poverty and its causes. It will also reflect their understanding of current political developments and their predictions on future ones. Throughout the emphasis will remain on influx control.

Interviews have been conducted with:

* Dr Flip Smit, vice President of the HSRC and the government's adviser on urbanisation policy.

* Mr Johan Raath, the Director General of the Department of Co-operation and Development.

* Mr Louis Kok, who was at the time of the interview, the Director of Labour and Identification and in that capacity served as the administrative director of influx control. He has subsequently been promoted to Chief Director of the Commission on Administration.

* Mr Hennie van der Walt, former deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development and Chairman of the Commission on Co-operation and Development who, at the time of the interview in October 1989, still played an active role in the department.

* A senior constitutional adviser to the government.

One of the most interesting facets of these interviews was the lack of consensus on several key issues. Dr Smit, for example,
believed that a demographic shift towards the major metropolitan areas was inevitable, requiring a "rational urbanisation policy" particularly regarding the provision of self-help and core housing schemes. Focussing on Crossroads as an example, he supported an upgrading scheme for the squatter camp in cooperation with the people living there. He was strongly opposed to plans to move Crossroads residents and bulldoze the shacks.

On the other hand the representatives of the Department of Co-operation and Development took a different view, focussing primarily on schemes to divert the movement of people to the cities and legal methods of enforcing this. On the Crossroads issue, they supported plans to move "legal residents" to Khayelitsha while deporting the rest to Ciskei and Transkei.

However there was also agreement on a wide range of topics. All those interviewed agreed that poverty was a serious problem in South Africa requiring attention.

However they all disputed the statement that influx control could be regarded as a cause of poverty.

In fact, the general view was that urban poverty is worse than rural poverty, and that a "disorderly" process of urbanisation would simply exacerbate the poverty problem in South Africa.

The position was best summarised by Dr Smit, who said that in assessing the problems of poverty in Southern Africa "we can begin on an assumption that urban poverty is very much worse than rural poverty. Research all over the world has shown that."

This was because people were totally reliant on a cash income to
survive in the urban areas while in rural areas "accommodation, water and firewood cost a person nothing."

Yet he agreed that men came to the cities for economic reasons, although not to ensure basic survival -- but in order to buy items that enhance their "status" with the women back home.

"In the rural areas a man finds that his status is nil if he has not been in the city. The man who works the land has no status amongst the women. A man who returns from the city has toured the world and he has status. The men know that if they want to get their shiny shoes, they won't get them out of the earth."

The men, he said, did not want their families to follow them to the cities:

"They realise that the city costs money and that the family will struggle if they come there. They do not want to expose the family to the evils of the city. And he wants to get away from his screaming children and the women that are around him everyday. Alone in the city he can enjoy a time with well-dressed women and he has some money to spend on them."

But the women often followed their men to the cities, he said.

The recent drought had played a role in the process but

"I believe radio and television have played a role in building up the perception of the city where there are well-dressed people and riches. This message has got through to the rural areas. And so they simply follow their men."

He said that in his experience people did not come to the cities because they were starving in rural areas: "I do not have much experience of the Eastern Cape. But in Natal and the Bushveld areas, mother nature is wonderful. It is now nearly the Marula season and even in a drought year nature looks after its children at this time. Then there are other types of fruit like the Marog, a type of bean and then there are Mopani worms. The Bushveld is rich from a nutritional point of view."

However, he did express the fear that these resources were dwindling with ecological decline and overcrowding on the land.

"Everytime there is a fire this source of food diminishes but it is surprising how much they still get from the veld."

This view was expressed in different forms by other senior state
officials interviewed on this theme.

A new perspective was added by Raath, who said that relaxing influx control would increase poverty because it would drive down urban wages.

"The more people come into the city the more people will be looking for jobs. Then your industrialist can employ people at a low rate and that will cause poverty. If you can employ four people rather than one man do do a job at a decent wage, that will cause poverty. Urbanisation in general goes together with a lowering of living standards.

"In the national states the fact is that people can always make a plan to keep going. They can plough a bit and get food."

However, there was a general acceptance that a continued and accelerating process of urbanisation was inevitable. As Raath put it: "Urbanisation is an unavoidable process and as far as the black community is concerned there is an expectation that it will continue at an escalating pace." (64)

But different people gave varying reasons to explain why this process of urbanisation would continue. Kok explained that people were flowing to the cities because of the "illusion of riches there."

"People come to the cities under the wrong impression that if they just get there everything will be alright and as soon as they come their situation starts to deteriorate if people don't help them. There is no work."

But the constitutional adviser had a different view:

"It has now become a matter of urbanise or die. If the rural population were to remain predominantly agricultural then one would run out of land. So one has to alleviate the pressure on the land by getting people into urban environments."

Another issue on which there is widespread agreement is on where this urbanisation should take place.

"Urbanisation is unavoidable it will happen at an accelerating
pace, but in the national states. Why must it be in the white area?" asked Raath.

The Tomlinson commission he said, had as early as 1956 recognised that urbanisation amongst the blacks would take place because not everyone could be accommodated agriculturally in the "national states."

"But (the commission realised that) if urbanisation wasn't going to happen in the national states then it was going to happen in the white area. The starting point of the commission was to prevent that and develop the black states because a process of urbanisation in the black states is accepted. Because if people urbanise in the white area you will create an impossible situation."

He said the flood to the four major metropolitan complexes in the "white area" could have been avoided if the advice of the Tomlinson commission had been followed.

However, he did point that some "success" had been achieved. In 1960, he said there were only three proclaimed towns in the national states. By 1980 there were 90 such towns with a population of two million. He said the Government expected the population of the national states to rise from 11-million in 1980 to 23.2-million in 2000.

Now the government was again trying to ensure that urbanisation took place inside the "national states." "This is what the decentralisation plan is about," he said.

Smit took a more flexible approach to future urbanisation:

"We no longer insist that there must be development only in the national states. Look at the Northern Transvaal for example. Even if you can only get Pieterburg developed, it makes no difference that people are in the white area. At least we must be satisfied that there hasn't been a massive movement of people to the main metropolitan centres."

However, all those interviewed agreed that it was still a
major goal of government policy to keep "at least a majority of Africans living in the homelands."

"And the urbanisation policy will be the most important vehicle for reaching that goal," said the constitutional planner. There were signs, he added, that unlike previous attempts, the latest strategy was showing signs of "success."

The "success" of the latest decentralisation strategy, outlined in detail above, was the central talking point in official circles in Pretoria late in 1983.

As one senior official put it: "We in government are totally surprised about the impact of the decentralisation initiatives that were only announced in April 1982."

According to the report of the Board for the Decentralisation of Industries for the period April 1982 to March 31, 1983, a total of 777 applications -- representing an investment of R2,459-million -- had been approved by investors wishing to establish industries of various kinds in the designated development regions. The applications include 55 from overseas companies. According to the report, the total investment represents a potential 65,342 jobs.

Reading from the report, the official said: "If you take an average of 5 in a family and multiply that by the number of jobs we expect to create in this first phase of development, that makes 653,425 people who can be supported by it."

"There aren't many success stories around, but this is honestly a
success story measured by any yardstick."

He conceded that it cost an average of R21,000 to create each job opportunity in the decentralised areas -- double the amount it cost in places following decentralisation strategies such as Venezuela. (65)

"But despite this, it is a tremendous success," he said.

Asked whether the number of prospective employment opportunities created by the decentralisation strategy would make a considerable difference in terms of the number of people the government hopes to keep away from the established metropolitan areas, the official replied:

"I am not saying it is enough. It will never be enough." But he added that had it not been for the decentralisation strategy, the people would have come to the established metropolitan areas.

If jobs could be created in or near the homelands and urbanisation encouraged in decentralised areas "this urbanisation policy can be seen as a substitute for influx control," he said.

On the other hand, Smit has predicted that the new decentralisation strategy aimed at curbing the influx of people to the major cities will have less impact in terms of the number of people involved. In his final published paper of 1983, He predicts that, if past trends continue, 75% of all blacks who become urbanised will come to the four major metropolitan
However, in a subsequent interview he said he had re-calculated the figure and believed it would be nearer 50 - 60%.

And he strongly advocates a "rational" policy to deal with this influx -- particularly an "appropriate housing" strategy.

However this sort of analysis did not have any impact on Raath who made a few forceful points about "academics" who tried to force policy-makers to accept "reality."

"Why is it (that some people) always accept that what the Government is doing to prevent the swamping of the white area is going to fail? There are people who have no idealism. Their argument is that you must get rid of ideology. But if we had accepted that, there would never have been a Blood River, there would never have been an Anglo-Boer war. It is always said we must accept the realities. If we had accepted the realities we would not be sitting here today with a white government. If we had accepted the realities we would have had a black majority government."

He then focussed on the attempt to ensure that urbanisation takes place in the "homelands."

"If you can offer the people a fatherland and if you can develop it physically and economically, that is the key to the solution. That is why we are spending R500-Million a year on developing the black states," he said. (67)

To ensure that urbanisation takes place at planned growth points, the government was providing housing in priority areas designated under the industrial decentralisation strategy and attempting to develop "viable communities within their own areas," said Raath.

He used KwaNdebele as an example of the "success" of the government's policy.

"Look at Bronkhorspruit. That is a development point. Ekandustria is going to be the new industrial area there. And,
the residential area is going to be Ekangala. It is about 10 miles from Bronkhorstspruit. The living area borders on KwaNdebele. Now, in the consolidation process the living area is going to be included in KwaNdebele so that the urbanisation will take place inside KwaNdebele. The industrial development will be across the border, partly in KwaNdebele and partly in the white area."

The people would then "commute" to work, he said.

But many KwaNdebele residents are not fortunate enough to live 10 kms from their places of employment. Many spend between five and eight hours daily commuting between their homes and their workplaces around Pretoria and Brits. Buses leave their depots some 130 kms East of Pretoria to pick up their first passengers at around 2.30 am. "By 3 am the buses are often full and by 4 am most of the standing passengers sit on the floor in quest of a place to doze." (68)

Commenting on this point, Kok said that no-one was "forced to commute."

"If someone wants to make use of work opportunities and commute to Johannesburg, then he can commute, then he can ride on the buses but no-one forced him to do it."

He added that the whole of the Ciskei was built on the commuting policy.

"It has been planned like that. Now (the people) live in their fatherland, under their own country's laws and governed by their own traditions and language. And they want to stay there because they can get property rights for their houses and can live together with their people, they can participate in their government. And outside their country they can't have that."

The same situation applied near Durban where people commuted from townships in KwaZulu, he said.

Raath said that government critics tended to point to the
commuter situation to claim that the government's policy was not working. Turning again to the example of KwaNdebele he said: "They have asked for independence and that is a proof that it is succeeding."

But people always wanted to see it in a negative context, he complained. "They say there are so many buses that are coming from KwaNdebele, they don't want to accept the fact that it is because our policy is succeeding."

He said the reason people were streaming into KwaNdebele was due to the "magnetism of a spiritual fatherland." (69)

"One day the Prime Minister asked me: 'What motivates these people to trek here like this?' My answer to him was: 'What motivated the Israelis to go to Israel after the Balfour declaration? Idealism gripped them and see what happened to Israel.' It is the same thing in KwaNdebele. It is all about the magnetism, the pulling power of a spiritual fatherland. They are streaming in and we just can't keep up with services there. They prefer to live there, in their own community. And what is the result? Buses. That is what it is all about."

He made the point -- as did everyone else interviewed -- that the development of the "national states" was the incentive that would have to be built up to counter the "coercive" side of influx control -- pushing people out of the established metropolitan areas once they had got there.

Van der Walt said he hoped the need for coercive influx control would vanish altogether once there had been sufficient development in the "national states" and once they had all become independent.

He explained the point this way:
"We now have the situation where whites, who are still South Africans, are living in Mafikeng and Thaba 'Nchu which are both in an independent state. If we can have whites living in the national states but keeping their South African citizenship and their voting rights in South Africa, then why can't we have it the other way round, with citizens of independent national states living in South Africa but having their voting rights in their states?"

When this had happened the need for influx control would fall away, he said.

Smit underscored the point:

"In the South Africa of the future, where there will be dual citizenship, it will not make such a difference exactly where a person lives."

All those interviewed agreed that independence for all the homelands remained the primary goal of government policy.

However the administrators in the Department of Co-operation and Development were extremely dubious about the possibility of scrapping influx control. "You can't practice independence in a vacuum, if all your people are gone," said Raath.

He was also strongly opposed to a system applied on the basis of accommodation and a job, because such a system was incapable of being monitored.

"Riekert said that control must be applied only on the basis of work or housing. Now I am going to ask you: How are you going to apply that? Say at Rosslyn at the Chrysler or Datsun factory -- how are you going to determine that all those people are legally there other than coming to the company and saying: 'Now close your doors we want to check.' That factory will tell you to get out. The same thing in Mamelodi or Soweto. How are you going to check that everyone living there is legal? I tell you, you cannot implement it without an additional measure. You have to have a document. And whether it is a reference book or a doompas or an identity document -- you can call it what you like -- but the fact is there will have to be such a document."
Kok explained that he had an idea that would differentiate the "legalis" from the rest "so that they don't have to be harrassed."

"We have accepted that they are here. Those people have asked us 'Please, we want a document that we can show the world we are here, so we don't have to be harrassed. They have said (they) want a document of another colour so that they can be distinquished from the others. If you have control there are certain people that you can permit and certain people that you cannot permit. And to do that you can only do one thing: you have to put the onus on that person to show in what category he is. And it is the easiest to give him a document in his own interest so that he can say 'I am legal.' Otherwise you would have to paint a spot on his head so that you can recognise him. So I think as far as that is concerned we must accept that work and housing will play a larger role but we still need (a document) in the interests of the people who have the right to be in the cities."

Smit took a different view:

"The gradual phasing out of coercive influx control is an absolute must in South Africa. You can't scrap it overnight but alternative methods will have to be found like decentralisation schemes and big agricultural projects."

These are the type of contradictory positions the government faces as it tries to find an acceptable formula for the toughest influx control measure of them all -- the Orderly Movement Bill. While some interviewees were convinced that the Bill would be passed during the 1984 session "with the same penalties -- and when they are applied they will work" others were equally convinced that the Bill would not go through without significant amendments.

"It won't go through in 1984. It hasn't even been drafted yet. That means it will probably come up the next year. And then it will depend on Hendrickse and Rajbansi whether or not this thing will be passed. I suspect that it won't be because they will not want it to pass. And if they do not it shall not be passed," said the constitutional adviser.
Asked whether in the case of a deadlock between the "White" Parliament and the Coloured and Indian chambers the Nationalist dominated President's Council would not simply resolve the conflict in favour of the white parliament, he replied:

"If the new constitution stands to be exposed as a fraud within the first six months of its application then this whole thing sinks and P.W. Botha sinks with it and he knows it. This is the psychology of what is built into the new constitution. Legally the President's Council can override objections that the Coloured or Indian House may have. But the government wouldn't like to override every disagreement between the Houses via the PC favouring the white parliament. In terms of the psychology of it, it will be very unwise to do this. If they do, this thing stands exposed as a fraud."

However he said that "many of the coloured leaders are urging and demanding still that the Western Cape be retained as a preferential area for coloured labour and that we cannot allow the swamping of the Western Cape by people from Ciskei and Transkei. There were also some vibes that we picked up that coloured leaders would have been very happy if the Government had overruled the Rikhosto decision." He declined to name the "coloured leaders" involved but added that public statements often differed from privately stated positions.

Although such different prognostications were made on the Orderly Movement Bill, there was agreement on one point: The government is intent on retaining an "effective" form of influx control -- but with the support of the black town and village councils and of the Indian and Coloured "chambers." Time and again it was stressed that a major goal of the influx control system was to protect the interests of blacks with legal rights to be in urban
Ideological reasons for influx control were generally played down and a host of other reasons advanced: the cost of urban accommodation; the risk of increasing crime; the danger of urban squalor and decay; and most especially -- the shortage of water in major metropolitan centres (except Cape Town.) As far as Cape Town was concerned the shallow water level was advanced as a reason why "uncontrolled urbanisation" -- the official name for squatting -- could not be allowed.

However, strong ideological reasons came to the fore in the process of explaining other aspects of government policy such as the urbanisation strategy and the commuter policy. In fact the political objectives of the government -- including the necessity of retaining the ethnic demographic distribution of blacks on the "geo-political map" -- were fundamentally accepted as the basic parameters within which alternatives were considered. It was almost absurd in that context to ask for these parameters to be spelled out!

Population removals -- another major tool in manipulating the "geo-political map" -- is also an area in which the government is trying to replace coercion with incentives.

Raath in fact resented the very use of the term "population removals."

"I don't like that phrase," he protested. "That is a misnomer. We don't do it on the scale of Kenya or Mozambique." He then hotly defended the policy, saying that Crossroads
couldn't remain where it was because it posed a danger to the health of everyone living there. Driefontein couldn't remain where it was because a dam was going to be built there and the place would be swamped.

Then he turned on people "agitating against removals."

"Now it is becoming an emotive matter with people who are opposed to the Government's policy saying that those people mustn't move. Your agitator element, agitating against the moving of these people -- These are people who want universal franchise. They are not well-disposed to government policy."

Asked whether forced removals would continue, he replied:

"Look at the success that is already being achieved with the people moving into their homelands voluntarily."

Raath and Kok were also particularly scathing about the "political motives" of those pressing for freehold rights in the metropolitan areas.

"At the moment there is not talk of freehold as far as we are concerned. You must ask yourself why it is that there are certain elements that insist that in white South Africa blacks must have freehold... Aren't they doing it with a political motive? First you recognise the black man's relative permanence by giving him a community council. Next you say to him he can have an autonomous local authority and he can have 99-year leasehold. The greater content you give to his permanence and link that to freehold, what more are you withholding from a man but the vote? And then, if he has everything else, what is the justification of withholding the vote from him? This is one of the basic rights that a man should have if he is born in a country and is a permanent resident there. If he owns land, that accumulatively strengthens his demand for the right to vote. People have an ulterior motive -- they are people who are in favour of universal suffrage."

Blacks, he said, could own their land in the "national states."

But on the political future of blacks -- either in a confederal
framework or in the so-called "white" area, he did not venture a
prediction: "But what I can say is this: one-man-one-vote is
out."

The constitutional adviser spoke at length on the subject. He
said confederation remained the immediate goal of constitutional
policy.

"I think it will be an instrument of reform because it will again
bring together under one umbrella what apartheid has put asunder.
We could have an entirely new concept of citizenship within the
confederal framework that would be acceptable to nationalists and
Afrikaners. In terms of a common nationality, passport
arrangements could be made for all and other initiatives would be
possible. It could be a very powerful vehicle for reform." A
confederation could also be a transition mechanism to a form of
federation, he added.

However, he conceded there were obstacles in the way of
establishing a confederation -- not so much from the Rightwing
as from the homeland leaders themselves.

"There is a problem between Transkei and Ciskei and there is the
problem with Lucas Mangope who says he doesn't want to be
involved in any political association with us (South Africa.)
Not before we have abandoned all racial discrimination and
apartheid in South Africa. He is prepared to establish
multilateral ties on the EEC type of model. Things are going very
well with Bophuthatswana. Mangope is making all kinds of
headway as far as international recognition is concerned. He
fears that too close an association with South Africa at this
point would jeopardise his on-going quest for recognition and
his perception is that it is only a matter of time before
Bophuthatswana will get the international recognition that it
deserves."

He then explained how Bophuthatswana was the only "third-world
country" that received financing from an international financing
institute in Brussels in 1982 in the form of a R10-million loan
-- not guaranteed by South Africa. "And we can't establish a
confederation without Bophuthatswana because it is the most viable and the wealthiest of all the apartheid siblings."

But the government clearly faces even deeper problems on the issue of the group of people known in political jargon as "urban blacks."

A member of the committee appointed to consider the future of the "urban blacks" put it this way: "There are a range of options. But obviously the government would not like to abandon the homelands policy."

However he ruled out the possibility of establishing urban constituencies of homelands -- a favoured option of Rightwingers. "This government has accepted that linking the political rights of urban blacks to the homelands has been less than a success. In fact, it has been a disaster. It doesn't work."

A fourth chamber in the present "three-chamber" parliament was also out because of the logic behind the 4:2:1 ratio in the present tri-cameral constitutional system. "For this reason the whites wouldn't be happy with that (a fourth chamber,)" he said.

Several Cabinet Minister have also repeatedly stated that a "fourth chamber" in the present system is not on. (70)

He predicted the following progress for the committee:

"First it will look at the possibility of improving linkage between urban blacks and the homelands and it will find that it is impossible to improve linkage. It has been investigated by three previous committees and all found that it cannot work. Then it will move to other options that can be incorporated
within the confederal model and it will look at the "city state option."

The "city-state" option has been a "flying kite" for several months now.

Dr. Willie Breytenbach, a senior government "technocrat" in the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning and a member of the committee on urban blacks recently wrote a long article on the possibilities inherent in a confederation concerning the political inclusion of "urban blacks."

The article appeared in "Ontwikkelingstudies" a Benso Publication, that has in the past been a common forum for launching and testing government proposals and policy adaptations. (An edited version was republished in Rapport shortly afterwards at a time of heated debate on the future of urban blacks. The newspaper article focussed almost exclusively on the section of the longer article dealing with the possible creation of city states within a confederation. The article was clearly regarded and presented by the newspaper as an authoritative view on the subject.) (71)

In the article Breytenbach said that there were no constitutional rules governing confederations that excluded the possibility of urban blacks in South Africa becoming "associate" (or partial) members of a confederation. Full city-states (envisaged as a possibility for centres like Soweto and elsewhere) could have full membership of a confederation "according to the full membership of cities like Lubeck, Bremen, Frankfurt and Hamburg
in the former German Bund."

He goes on to say that "associate" statehood has nothing to do with membership of international or regional inter-state organisations. "It refers to a particular inter-state association between only two states -- usually between a small state and a larger one. There are today 22 such inter-state associations in the world."

This emphasis on bi-lateral treaties for membership of a confederal system is important: it clearly refers to potential bi-lateral agreements between South Africa and various created entities called "states." It appears that this could be the major mechanism whereby the government will avoid creating any confederal association in which it can be outvoted on any issue by the participating smaller entities "ganging up" to outvote "white" SA on any issue.

Breytenbach scours the world for examples of "associate city states" and concludes that "there is no special representation (for the city state) in the central government of the larger state."

And on the confederal principle in general, he stresses:

The sovereignty of independent member states is not affected.
The equal status of all parties is guaranteed. Co-operation is voluntary.

Such statements are clearly designed to convince people that a confederation will not in any way threaten white sovereignty and power within the borders of what is known in official shorthand
as RSA -- or "white South Africa."

Breytenbach then looks specifically at the example of Soweto as a possible "associate state".

"Here the question of application is the most problematic. It requires far-reaching changes like the recognition of urban black communities as independent constitutional entities, especially in a municipal context. It requires a set of rules and conventions that concretely symbolise this status: relatively autonomous structures also on levels above local level; a clearly definable political community; clear borders with a viable economy; a willingness to accept such a dispensation; agreement that South Africa can perform certain services for or on their behalf and finally that this political community, in municipal, but possibly also in regional or national context, must be prepared to accept a separate citizenship from both South African and homeland citizenship or at least agree to the status of special domicile. Whether all these things will be attainable depends in the last instance on the politicians and naturally also on the negotiation process."

From the various interviews it was clear that the major priority of the Cabinet committee investigating the future of "urban blacks" will be to find a vehicle for this negotiation process to take place -- a replacement for the abortive "Black Council" that was proposed several years ago as a parallel to the President's Council.

**CONCLUSIONS.**

From the analysis and interviews above, it is possible to draw the following conclusions.

1. The Government's policy of excluding blacks from a common political system remains unchanged -- and the independent homelands remain the centrepiece of restructured apartheid.
2. For the foreseeable future, demographic manipulation will remain central to the government's reformulated apartheid policy -- in order to give demographic content to the policy of independent homelands.

3. However, the government is trying to move the weight of the apartheid policy from a coercion-based system to an incentive-based system -- in order to broaden its base of allies, particularly from people of colour.

4. There is an official acceptance that continued urbanisation is inevitable, but, for the ideological reasons outlined above, government strategists are devising plans to ensure that this urbanisation occurs inside the "homelands."

5. The revised decentralisation and urbanisation strategies are the major "incentive" mechanisms of the new scheme, designed to ensure that urbanisation takes place in the homelands. Strategists hope that the desired demographic distribution can be better achieved by incentives than coercive influx control alone.

6. However, coercive influx control will remain, until such time as "glittering urban centres arise from the homeland bush to attract those who are after jobs and the bright lights," as the Cape Times aptly put it. (72)

7. Because the chances of this are negligible in terms of the numbers of people involved (on admission of the most optimistic predictions of government technocrats) there is little doubt that coercive influx control will remain.
8. Its form has not yet been finalised -- but it appears that it will be unenforceable without some type of document that will still have to be shown on demand either to employers, government officials or the police. It will also rely heavily on tough fines for employers of "illegal" workers or those who provide them with shelter -- a move that could turn most citizens into influx control enforcers.

9. Population removals will continue -- but with a concerted effort to entice "voluntary" removal rather than those that rely solely on force. As the Sunday Times observed: "No longer are people thrown onto the GG trucks or pulled at dawn from their homes. The bulldozer has clattered somewhat into the distance. The new method is more subtle: Cut off services, withdraw health and educational facilities, close down pension pay-out points, step up police harrassment, and finally slap on a court order." (73)

And if this doesn't work, force is ultimately used, and the Press kept away -- as the recent removal of Magopa showed.

10. In the attempt to broaden its support base, the government will probably undertake consultations -- and make concessions -- to the members of the coloured and Indian chambers and to black local authorities. But it is clear that these concessions will fall within the parameters of the government's confederal homeland formula at present under construction.

11. The stated aims, form and content of the various aspects of
the reform package make it clear that the goal of the restructuring process is not to destroy the foundations of apartheid, but to win the support of a broader constituency (particularly people of colour) by persuading them that measures essential to the policy -- particularly influx control -- are being implemented in their interests.

This has opened the door on a new dimension in the apartheid policy that John Saul and Stephen Gelb analyse in their incisive article on the restructuring process in South Africa.

Focussing on "formative attempts" of the government's restructuring process and comment:

"Formative attempts ..........are always potentially two-edged swords for the dominant classes. Ironically in the game of reform they (the dominant classes) stand to win the most when they put themselves most at risk -- precisely at the point where the attempt at co-optation could most easily collapse into significant concession." (74)

Their point is that if the government hopes to co-opt a wider base of support for its policy it has to make concessions to do so. The greater the "reform" content of these concessions the greater is the chance of winning allies. But ironically, there is also a greater risk that genuine concessions can be made -- that can be used by the dominated groups as a lever to destroy rather than support the pillars of apartheid. The State could find that it has set in motion a process that it never intended -- and from which there is no turning back.

Will this happen in the implementation of the government's constitutional strategy? Political analysts doubt that the
present constitutional proposals offer such an opportunity because white government retains virtually unlimited dominance over the whole process -- and because in many cases, those blacks earmarked for co-option are those with a large potential stake in the restructured system and its continuation (albeit with minor adjustments.) (75)

Yet the extent to which they will be willing or able to exploit the many contradictions that will arise in the government’s attempts to get the dominated groups to help implement the essentials of apartheid has not yet been tested. It will be one of the most interesting developments of South African politics in future.

And if a controversial law, such as the revised Orderly Movement Bill, is tabled in 1985, soon after the tri-cameral system has begun operating, it will be one of the major test cases for those who argue that fundamental reform is possible by exerting pressure from within the system.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR POVERTY?

The government spokesmen clearly understand that poverty exists and is a problem in South Africa. It is of deep concern to them partially because poverty propels people to the cities, undermining the demographic distribution without which the apartheid policy can have no basis, rationale or substance.

Although many top officials believe the shift to the cities is an
"irrational economic choice" (76) they nevertheless realise that urbanisation is here to stay -- and are trying to make sure it happens in the homelands.

At the same time, there is a desire to ensure that blacks, who have the right to remain in the major metropolitan areas, form a contented and stable community -- with an economic and political stake in the system. There is no clarity on what form this should take, but the attempt to find it is perhaps the central political concern, and most controversial area, of government policy today.

Not all will be disadvantaged by the government's urbanisation strategy. Blacks with the right to remain in cities will predictably experience upward mobility, using their trade-union clout and slow-won "permanent status" to improve their position. Upgrading of shantytowns and squatter camps could occur on the model of the present Winterveld upgrading scheme -- with significant effects for those who live in them. However, this will not apply to Crossroads that lies hundreds of miles from the nearest "homeland" border. The government is pressing ahead with its plans to move all the residents out of the area -- with the primary goal of facilitating the deportation of an estimated 30 000 "illegal" residents to the Transkei and Ciskei. (77)

The relative prosperity facing those with urban rights will be paralleled by the conditions of those who are locked out of this system: locked out of the cities through more strictly enforced influx control, unable to find an "illegal" job because
employers are not prepared to take the risk of enormous fines.
And the industrial decentralisation policy, even by the most optimistic assessments, cannot begin to form a substitute in the rural areas. The landless, the unemployed, the removed, the rural poor will be locked in a structural cycle of poverty from which there is little chance of escape.

For them, there is no legal escape route from poverty without fundamental political change — change that will see, amongst other things, the phasing out of influx control and an urbanisation strategy geared to channel the society's resources into creating a viable infrastructure to support each citizen's free choice of where to live.
FOOTNOTES FOR CARNEGIE PAPER:


3. Ibid. p 23.


8. Ibid pp 39, 42, 44.


10. Ibid pp 220.

11. Ibid pp 70, 71.

12. Ibid pp 42 - 43. (stated best here.)

13. Ibid.


17. Ibid pp 62, 84, 135.

18. Ibid p 58.

19. Ibid p 144.

20. Ibid p 133.

21. Interview with Flip Smit, October 1983.


25. Dewar, David: Cape Times, Nov 24, 1983:

In an article on Transkei, Dewar notes that although it is one of the "best chance" homelands, some 25% of rural households have no land at all and for the rest, the average size of land-holding is only 1.9 ha "hardly sufficient (given the lack of irrigation) for viable agriculture."

Sparks, Allister, Argus, Nov 24, 1983.

Sparks notes that in QwaQwa the population has increased by 927% in 10 years and there is a density of 483 people per square km.

Green and Hirsch, The Impact of Resettlement in the Ciskei: Three Case Studies, Cape Town, SALDRU working paper No 49, p 37. Green and Hirsch note that the population density of Ciskei is 90 people per square km with the vast majority of people in resettlement camps who have no access to land and even those that do have little chance of surviving by means of agricultural production alone.


28. Support for these conclusions (covering footnotes 28 -- 33) may also be found in many papers prepared for the Carnegie Inquiry, including paper #s 1, 46, 73, 84, 85, 149 etc etc.

Kane-Berman, John 'The Irresistible Tide.' In Leadership South Africa, Summer, 1983 Volume 2 No 4 pp 28 and 29. (Average density of the "white" areas in 1978 was 20.5 people per square km but Transkei had a density of 55.1; KwaNdebele of 84.6 and Kwakulu of 98.9.)

Sparks, Allister, op cit

Loots, Lieb: A Profile of Black Unemployment in SE: Two Area Surveys SALDRU working paper no 19, p 38.


Green and Hirsch, Op Cit pp 4; 15; 16, 17, 27.

Kane Berman, Op Cit p 27.

All interviewees conceded the same point.


32. Simkins, 1983.


33.


35. Ibid.


37. Giliomee, Op Cit.


43. SA Digest op cit.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid and Streek, Barry. op cit.

46. Information "newsletter" issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information with the SA Digest, August 28, 1981. Also Rapport, September 19, 1982.


48. Supplement to SA Digest. op cit.


55. For a good summary, see SA Institute of Race Relations Survey 1979, p 394.

56. Interview with Johan Raath, Director General of Co-operation and Development, October 1983.


58. Ibid p 7.


64. Speech delivered by J Raath, Director General of Co-operation and Development, at the Conference of the South African Housing Institute in Bloemfontein in October 1983. p 59.

65. According to a report in the SA Digest published by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, the total cost of creating a job in the rural area (including the development of costly infrastructure) "soars to between R50 000 and R100 000 per job" at least four times the cost of creating a job in the established metropolitan area. It was quoting a Sunday Times report of May 2, 1983.


67 From Raath's housing speech quoted in footnote 64. p 61.

68 Leadership SA vol 2 No 4.

69 Sheena Duncan and Aninka Claassens strongly contradicted this, saying the majority of people had been displaced from their traditional homes on white farms, deproclaimed townships or "black spots."

70 e.g. Dr Piet Koornhof qu Cape Times 24th September 1983 and F W de Klerk qu Argus October 27, 1983.

71 Dr W Breytenbach 'Die Begrip "Assosiasie" met Besondere Verwysing na Geassosieerde Lidmaatskap en Geassosieerde Staatskap; en Toepassingsmoontlikhede in Suid-Afrika.' in Development Studies Vol 5 No 3 April 1983 (Benso). This article was severely edited and an article on the "City State" option appeared in Rapport.

72 Cape Times October 11, 1983

73 Sunday Times "We can move more people than you" December 4, 1983. See also Aninka Claassen's paper in the Carnegie series, "The Myth of Voluntary Removals."

74 Saul and Gelb pp 62 and 75.

Andre Du Toit.

76 Professor Jan Lombard, Head of the Department of Economics, Pretoria University and President of the Free Market Foundation, qu John Kane-Berman. Leadership SA Vol 2 No 4.

77. Reported Cape Times March 21 1984.
These papers constitute the preliminary findings of the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa, and were prepared for presentation at a Conference at the University of Cape Town from 13-19 April, 1984.

The Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa was launched in April 1982, and is scheduled to run until June 1985.

Quoting (in context) from these preliminary papers with due acknowledgement is of course allowed, but for permission to reprint any material, or for further information about the Inquiry, please write to:

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