SECOND CARNEGIE INQUIRY INTO POVERTY
AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Education and training in the
homelands: A separate development?

by

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The aim of this paper is to analyse the significance of the major post-independence developments that have taken place and are taking place in Bophuthatswana in the sphere of education and training. Independence, however politically fraught, unleashed certain political, social and economic forces committed to bring about changes in the system of Bantu Education inherited from South Africa. Shortly after independence, a Commission of Enquiry, set up to formulate educational priorities in Bophuthatswana, identified two main pressures on the authorities to replace Bantu Education: on the one hand, the expectations of the population for a better quantity and quality of education which is regarded as a gate opener and symbol of social status and wealth and on the other hand, the need to produce a high level manpower needed to assist in the development and modernisation of Bophuthatswana.

Various challenging innovations have already been introduced in the field of education and training. Among others, two public multi-cultural schools, Mmabatho Primary and Mmabatho High, have been set up as part of a commitment to non-racialism; they enjoy modern equipment facilities, a relatively well qualified teaching staff and high academic standards. A new non-racial University, with a professional and vocational emphasis in its degrees and research activities, was started in 1980 with the view of linking the needs of academic excellence with those of the community. An Institute of Education was set up at the University to coordinate and upgrade teacher education in Bophuthatswana; its brief including the drawing up of new curricula and syllabi for these teacher training colleges which rely at the moment on the material of the Department of Education and Training in Pretoria. A new, modern Manpower Development Centre is about to be launched in Mmabatho to conduct a new form of modular skill training in the technical and commercial trades which will allow more flexibility in keeping pace with the rapidly changing labour needs of employers.

These changes immediately raise the question of the extent to which Bophuthatswana has managed, or rather is managing to escape from the political and economic strangelhold of its past. Has formal independence brought with it the possibilities of a radical break from Bantu Education and from the most powerful state in Africa?
When analysing developments in the homelands, there is a certain tendency among academics and media people to try and establish the functional nature of these developments in terms of South Africa's grand apartheid design. The problem with such an approach is that this plan is constantly revised and reformulated as political and economic circumstances change. At another level, this state strategy is the product of conflicting forces and tendencies which often get reflected in contradictory policies and practices or give way to different interpretations by different branches of the state apparatus. By delegating some of its repressive and administrative powers to the homeland authorities, the central state opened itself up to potential conflicts and clashes of interests. It gave these new branches of the state apparatuses (namely the homeland authorities) a certain space within which the latter could manoeuvre and use their relative freedom to follow their own perceived immediate interests even if it sometimes run against the central state's interests. However, these challenges are bound to be limited by the fact that the political and economic control of the homelands remain ultimately in the hands of the central state.

The homelands are all heavily dependent on the central state in key areas such as trade, finance, internal and external security. Their economy is structurally dependent on and should be seen as an integral part of the powerful central economy of 'white' South Africa. None of the homelands can absorb even half of its internal labour force, largely heavily on South Africa to provide their workers with employment and wage income. To take the example of Bophuthatswana, which is economically-speaking the most viable and successful homeland with its vast mineral resources, out of a working population in 1980 of 406,000 (the subsistence sector being excluded from this figure), 140,000 or 35% of the total were employed internally, another 103,000 (or 25%) commuted daily to their place of work in 'white' South Africa and the rest (162,000) were migrants. In 1979, the commuters' and migrants' income represented 70% of the Gross National Income of Bophuthatswana. Although these statistics are not too reliable, they nevertheless point to the strong labour dependency of Bophuthatswana on the central economy and suggest the limits within which Bophuthatswana can exercise its relative freedom, for instance when introducing changes in its system of education.

Another tendency in academic writings on the homelands is to conflate all the homelands into one and the same category and refer to one homeland policy and one homeland population. Each homeland stands in a specific and unique relationship to the central state by virtue of its political, social and economic configuration. Hence our attempt at undertaking a study of one homeland, Bophuthatswana,
in the hope of stimulating further research in similar areas in other homelands in order to complement our understanding of what is taking place in the whole of South Africa, both in the 'white' areas and in the homeland areas.

Since Bophuthatswana is inextricably linked to the central economy, it is imperative when analysing changes in the sphere of education and training to assess them in the light of what is taking place in South Africa both at the level of education and training and at the more general restructuring occurring in the political economy of South Africa.

Restructuring in Education and Training

The South African system of education and training is in a state of transition. The Soweto uprisings of 1976 and the nation-wide boycotts of the early 1980s have highlighted the crisis of confidence that has developed among the black population towards their system of separate education. This system of education has also been criticized by sections of capital for failing to provide them with an appropriate black labour force suited to their rapidly changing needs.

In response to these various protests, the de Lange Commission was set up to investigate educational provisions in South Africa. The de Lange report, published in 1981, recommends a more differentiated system of career-oriented education which would answer more adequately the more differentiated labour needs of employers with regard to the black labour force. Such a system, according to the report, would no longer be discriminatory on the grounds of race or ethnic group but would be based on merit only. However, it is also implied that streaming is necessary and that the academic stream will be mainly self-financing at high school level whereas the career-oriented vocational stream will be subsidised by capital and the state. This is inevitably going to lead to the entrenchment of existing social and racial inequalities with the privileged few (namely white children and an elite section of blacks) remaining in the academic stream and ending up filling the highly paid professional jobs and the less privileged majority being forced, by lack of funds, towards the vocational stream and getting technically and socially prepared towards lower paid blue collar positions.

Thus, far from challenging the roots of Bantu Education, the de Lange report aims at streamlining and modernising apartheid education to adapt it to the changing political and economic circumstances of the 1980s. On the question of separate education systems for each population group, the report notes the frustration generated at the level of the pupil population and recommends
that black education be brought into the South African mainstream in order to create a new spirit of confidence for further educational reforms and a new base for more equal standards and facilities for all South African students.

The Government White paper (published in November 1983) accepts the principles of the de Lange report but rejects the idea of a single ministry of education and recommends instead that white, Indian, 'coloured' and African education remain under different government departments in line with the constitutional terms (education being regarded as 'own' affairs). The introduction of a common and unified education system for all was politically too sensitive to be introduced in 'white' South Africa at this particular moment in time given the existing balance of forces. The strongest opposition came from the politically important section of white teachers, white petty bureaucrats and white workers whose position is threatened by any form of change which involves the upliftment of even a section of the black population. Nevertheless, the de Lange report remains the educational blueprint of the 1980s and 1990s and it is only a question of the pace at which to implement it that remains to be negotiated.

At another level, the de Lange educational strategy must be seen as part of the central state's total strategy of cooption of a small section of the African population which could act as a buffer against the rest of the African population over which tighter control and repression is to be exercised. A key element in that strategy is the furthering of divisions among the African population between the 'insiders' or those with permanent residential rights in 'white' South Africa and the 'outsiders' or those originating from the homelands and the rural areas. It has been argued that the total strategy intends to step up a process of African class differentiation in the 'white' urban areas while it will increase the political and economic exclusion of the homeland population through control and repression.

It is in this context that critical educationists have analysed the de Lange strategy. This is what leads Kallaway to write: ²

Homeland citizens/inhabitants were by definition excluded from the new dispensation because they were now assumed (in terms of the logic of apartheid) to be the responsibility of their own governments.

While not incorrect, such analyses must also go a step further and examine what is taking place in the sphere of educational reforms in the homelands before concluding on the areas of reform and repression of the state's total strategy which is intended to aim at the whole of South Africa.
In this paper, we want to argue that it is incorrect to assume that the reform plank of the state total strategy is directed exclusively at the urban areas of 'white' South Africa and that it is equally wrong to treat the homeland population as an homogenous rural mass. Reforms are also being introduced in the homelands with the similar view of further differentiating among their population. We want to examine to what extent these reforms are aimed at a section of the more urbanised section of the homeland population. Indeed, when talking about urban africans, it is vital to remember that an increasingly large number of urban africans have been and are still being relocated to the homelands in these 'dormitories' of labour in areas adjacent to 'white' industrial complexes. In 1980, nearly 20% of the urban african population live in the homeland areas. Through population removals and resettlement, the central state has fostered a further line of differentiation within the african population, namely between the permanent urban africans residing in 'white' South Africa and the urban population of the homelands living in areas adjacent to 'white' industrial complexes. Hence, our argument that if the permanent urban african population is targetted for class differentiation in the 'white' areas, a similar process is taking place among the urbanised homeland population.

More specifically, we want to examine to what extent the restructuring in education and training in Bophuthatswana is contributing to this process of african differentiation in Bophuthatswana and to what extent it is geared towards the changing labour requirements of the central economy and its regional development strategy.

Before tackling the case study of Bophuthatswana, we would like to present an overview of black education and training both in the white areas and in the homeland areas of South Africa and see if and to what extent educational changes have taken place in these areas.
African Education in the 'white' areas and in the homelands

The homeland areas cater for more pupils relatively to their de facto population than the 'white' areas. With an overall distribution in 1980 of 9,5m africans in the 'white' areas (or 47% of the total african population) and 10,7m in the homelands (or 53%)³, the total number of african school pupils enrolled in 1977 was 4,1m, 65% of which were at school in the homelands. By 1982, the number had risen to 5,3m with 70% of them in the homelands. At secondary school level, there were 0,5m pupils in 1977, 68% of which were in the homelands and by 1982, the number had risen to 0,9m with 73% of them in the homelands⁴. This overrepresentation of pupils in the homelands was a direct product of the policy of separate development according to which the homelands were supposed to cater for the welfare, cultural and educational development of the african population which was allowed into the 'white' areas only when and if their labour was needed.

Until a few decades ago, it was government policy not to build secondary schools for africans in the 'white' areas but to concentrate these provisions in the homelands where a more educated and trained african labour force was needed to assist in the development of these areas as autonomous political entities. Even today, most boarding schools are still located in the homelands and children of families living in the 'white' areas (both urban and rural) are often sent to the homelands for their schooling, a tendency that has been stepped up since the Soweto school uprisings.

The past few years have seen a rapid expansion of secondary schooling for africans which unfortunately wasn't accompanied by a corresponding increase in the school budgets nor in the supply of qualified teachers. This resulted in serious overcrowding of classrooms and a general drop in the quality of schooling and in the academic performance. In 1977, the number of std 10 candidates were 1,876 for the 'white' areas with 71% of them passing the S.C exam and 9,216 for the homelands with a 68% pass rate. By 1981, the candidates for the 'white' areas had increased to 14,447 with a low 56% pass rate and in the homelands there were 44,964 candidates with only 47% of them passing the exam.

Thus, while the homelands are responsible for the secondary schooling of a larger number of african pupils, the quality of such provisions seems to have deteriorated faster than in the 'white' areas. One explanation could be found in the fact that, since the Soweto uprisings, the Department of
Education and Training has stepped up its building programmes and its in-service education in the hope of defusing the school children militancy and frustration at their poor educational provisions. However, it should be noted here that it is difficult to make close comparisons between schooling in the 'white' areas and in the homelands as both these areas are characterised by strong regional and local differences in the quantity and quality of their educational provisions. Also, the political and economic context of the 'white' areas and the homelands differs and is bound to affect the process of schooling as the various education boycotts of the early 1980s show.

An accompanying feature of this rapid expansion in secondary schooling among africans is the rising unemployment among this more educated school leaving population. The capacity of the economy to absorb them appears limited and yet employers continue to complain about skill shortages. Since the relaxation in the early 1980s of the legal and administrative restrictions on the training and utilisation of africans into skilled positions, employers have concentrated their complaints on the inferior Bantu Education system. According to them, the unemployment of school leavers must be attributed to the poor quality and inadequate content of schooling which they criticize for being too academic and unrelated to the requirements of industry and commerce. They argue for stronger links between the educational authorities and industry so as to narrow down the widening discrepancy between the educational output and the demands of the labour market. They are in favour of a system of education which is more practically-oriented and equips the school children with certain skills required by industry and commerce. At the moment, statistics reveal that only 14% of white pupils in the Transvaal and only 0.8% of african pupils choose the technical stream at secondary school level. As the de Lange report notes:

The majority of pupils require vocational training at school to enable them to enter the world of work. The minority requires the development of academic skills. 50% to 80% of children in standard 5 and 8 receiving vocational education is in line with the manpower needs of South Africa.

In fact, the de Lange report calls for a redesign of the education system so that schools could channel pupils into vocational and technical education regardless of their wishes. However, it is true that a more career-oriented education could partially alleviate the growing school-leaver unemployment problem. As Mare points out, in 1978 unemployment was worse among academically trained school leavers than among those with some form of technical and vocational training. But this is not to say that career education can deal with the real causes and roots of unemployment which lie in the dynamics of the labour market of an economy which is increasingly dominated by monopoly capital and the use of sophisticated capital-intensive methods of production.
There has been strong criticisms voiced by educators against the introduction of career education which, they argue, will be too closely linked to- and therefore at the service of- industry and commerce. They believe that education should remain independent from industry and commerce on the grounds that it is about giving students a broad and sound educational base which will allow them to understand the world they are part of and develop their mental and critical faculties towards it with the view of having then the ability to choose their direction of work. Career education, as it is described in the de Lange report, risks, according to them, to transform education into training and the imparting of specific marketable skills for a specific range of jobs.

On the whole, there have been some attempts at giving a more technical orientation to African education both in the 'white' areas and in the homelands. Since the early 1980s, departmental vocational training centres have been set up to provide a form of vocational orientation to middle school pupils as part of their normal school programmes. In 1982, there were 16 centres in operation mainly in the 'white' urban areas and another 24 are planned for 1987 both in the 'white' areas and in the homelands. Technical subjects are getting introduced in secondary schools to lead either to technical institutes offering the N stream to future artisans or to a technical matric which is the basic requirement for the T stream offered at technikons for future technicians.

At the level of technical and artisanal training, until recently, most of the African facilities were to be found in the homelands. In line with the policy of separate development, the training and utilisation of Africans into skilled positions was only allowed in the homelands. However, such a training remained poor, underdeveloped and inappropriate. The trade schools or technical institutes suffered from inadequate funding, poor workshop equipment and a shortage of qualified instructors and technical teachers. Above all, given the limited industrial development of the homelands, there were very few apprenticeship opportunities for these students to gain practical on-the-job experience under the supervision of a qualified artisan (with the exception of the building trade). As a result, these technical institutes ended up producing semi-skilled operators and industrial workers.

With the relaxation of restrictions on the utilisation of Africans into skilled positions in the 'white' areas, technical and artisanal training facilities mushroomed in these areas. Whereas in 1977 2 out of 21 technical institutes were located in the 'white' areas, by 1982 there were 17 technical institutes in the 'white' areas and 25 in the homelands. The newly built colleges in 'white' South
Africa benefit from certain advantages compared to the homelands. The former tend to have access to better funding, more qualified teaching staff and better equipped facilities. Furthermore, the students could find a placement more easily as they are physically closer to the centres of industrial activity of South Africa. The other side of the coin, though, is that there is a greater resistance coming from the white petty bureaucrats and white artisan unions to the indenturing of african apprentices. Indeed, the ideology and practice of white supremacy in 'white' South Africa is bound to create obstacles to any process of african advancement.

At the level of technical and industrial training, a new development has appeared in the form of a growing intervention of capital. Some sections of capital have decided to take the initiative in certain spheres of education and training given the poor state educational provisions. Through financial aid and tax concessions the state has been encouraging capital to sponsor educational projects and conduct private training programmes. In 1982, 150,000 workers went through 3,722 approved in-house in-service training courses run by their employers and 77,000 workers attended private training centres. Tax concessions derived from training fetched some R100-150m. These private training programmes are usually found in big companies both in the metropolitan centres and in the border areas. In general, they are aimed at the more stable urbanised african labour force which includes both the more permanent urban workers residing in 'white' South Africa and the urbanised workers of the homelands commuting to the 'white' industrial complexes.

At tertiary level, most african educational institutions were, until recently, found in the homelands. In its 1980 report on High Level Manpower, the National Manpower Commission emphasises the need to establish tertiary institutions for the urban african population. Pointing out the future needs for an increasingly large number of high level and middle level technical, managerial and professional manpower, the Commission concludes on the urgency to recruit from the african population and therefore on the need to set up appropriate educational establishments to that effect. Vista has recently established four campuses in 'white' metropolitan centres; Medunsa and the Mabopane East technikon were built in the Pretoria area on the doorsteps of Bophuthatswana with the view of recruiting students from that area so as to provide the PMV complex with a supply of african professionals and technicians. These institutions are recent initiatives and the number of black students attending tertiary institutions remains quite small.

Finally, efforts and money have been put into improving the quantity and quality of teacher education. Teachers occupy a central position in the
education system and are instrumental in carrying through any educational change or strategy aimed at the student population. In line with the policy of separate development, most teacher training colleges were located in the homelands. In 1977, there were 40 colleges with 17,000 students in the homeland areas compared to 5 colleges in the 'white' areas with 2,100 students attending the various courses on offer. By 1981, the academic standard of these colleges was upgraded with the introduction of a 3 year post std 10 diploma both for the primary and the secondary stream. More recently, there has been a proposal, in an attempt to further upgrade and coordinate teacher education, to affiliate teacher training colleges to a close by university whose task will be to grant the certificates and improve their curricula and syllabi. University courses are to be introduced as part of the teacher diplomas and will count as credits towards further university education. These reforms which are planned both for the 'white' areas and the homelands are bound to be resisted by the existing teaching staff (which is often Afrikaner-dominated). Also, the inherent bureaucratic tendency of teaching institutions and the lack of money and personnel are other factors which will stand in the way of a rapid implementation of these proposed changes. In the field of african technical education, a severe shortage of qualified instructors and technical teachers (who are often more tempted to go into private industry) weigh heavily on the standard of education. Both technical colleges and technikons in the 'white' areas and in the homelands have complained of the lack of experienced teaching staff.

In the final analysis, it is obvious that there is a tendency to introduce reforms in certain areas of african education and training both in the 'white' areas and in the homelands. The 'white' areas benefit from a greater capacity to set this process in motion. They are characterised by much more developed and industrialised centres of economic activity in need of a larger number of skilled and educated workers; they have access to a better physical and social infrastructure already partly in existence for the other racial groups and they also have access to better sources of funding and a more adequate supply of teachers who, in general, are more attracted by the big centres of economic activity. On the other side, the 'white' areas will also encounter greater obstacles to implement these reforms. The ideology and practice of white supremacy in 'white' South Africa means that a politically significant opposition from within the lower classes of the white population is to be expected, especially that these reforms at uplifting a section of the african population are bound to threaten their objective privileged position. Hence, the likelihood for the implementation of the de Lange educational strategy to be slower and subject to long negotiations given the existing balance of forces. In contrast, some homelands, although limited
in their resources and facilities to implement these reforms on a large scale, will face less significant obstacles in the implementation of educational reforms. On the contrary, their ideology of self determination and the commitment of the authorities to show that they have turned their backs on apartheid education are strong elements which will push towards reforms aimed at the advancement of even a section of its local population.

Finally, a last theoretical point about the socio-economic role of education in the process of social and class differentiation in society. If we take the de Lange strategy, the idea of a more differentiated system of education should not be taken to mean only a more technically differentiated education system designed to train people towards different technical positions in the division of labour. Education does not equip people only with technical and objective knowledge and skills but it is also an ideological apparatus socialising people into differentiated roles by inculcating them with certain social attitudes and dispositions. In that sense, a more differentiated education system is also meant to reinforce and contribute to the more general process of class and social differentiation in society. Far from being neutral institutions designed to develop the mental and manual capacities of people, educational institutions are part and parcel of a political and economic system, in this case, characterised by racial and class lines of differentiation.

Let us bear in mind this point when examining the nature of skill training. For at least a decade, sections of capital have complained about skill shortages and the need to upgrade the skills of the African labour force so as to provide for the existing and future needs of the economy. It is partly as a result of structural changes in production and the use of more capital-intensive and technologically-dominated methods of production that new skill requirements and a new skill hierarchy have developed. Mechanisation tends to produce, on the one hand, a limited requirement for a technically qualified and highly skilled labour force, and, on the other hand, a greater need for machine operators. As Braverman argues, the machine takes over the skills of the workers:

> The more science is incorporated in the labour process, the less the worker understands of the process...the less control and comprehension of the machine the worker has.

Thus, mechanisation tends to deskill artisans and dispossess them of their craft which is no longer needed. Instead, the machines take over and lead to a process of job fragmentation and segmentation which explains for the replacement of artisans by 'skilled' operators. These operators require a shorter and narrower training which makes them a cheaper labour force and reduces the labour costs of
employers. Questioned on the level of education and training required for these skilled operators, employers agree on a minimum std 8 formal education which, they argue, provides a sound educational base for further in-house skill training.

When asked on the nature and content of skill training, employers refer to three different levels of training: management training, technical training and a broader and more general/industrial relations-oriented form of training. In other words, they understand the technical and social/ideological aspects of training as being inextricably linked. Apart from the need to improve the technical competencies and productivity of their workers, employers want to develop certain social attitudes and dispositions among their African labour force which will make them reliable, flexible and disciplined workers. With the use of high technology and sophisticated capital-intensive methods of production, employers are increasingly conscious of the need to enforce a certain work discipline and work ethic. As a training personnel puts it: "training nowadays is not a labour cost, it is an investment in stability"; or another one: "it is important to introduce African workers into the western way of thinking and teach them basic economics". Such an understanding of the value and multi-dimensions of training makes Chisholm note the purpose is as much to intensify ideological control over workers and wed them more firmly to capitalist principles as it is to provide for South Africa's manpower requirements.

Finally, let us note that it is not a coincidence that capital and the state have moved on a large scale into African education and training at a time the African population shows its frustration and militancy at the existing political and economic system and expresses it increasingly powerfully at the point of production. An interesting research area would be to test/to what extent training, as an ideological weapon of capital, can successfully control and defuse African workers' militancy. Presumably its effectiveness will depend on the ability of African workers to demystify its ideological role and rely on that process on their own education and training programmes which could combat the endoctrination they are subjected to at their place of work. But ultimately ideological endoctrination cannot succeed on its own if it isn't accompanied by solid material concessions.

A Case Study Of Bophuthatswana

Bophuthatswana inherited a system of education which had suffered from the worse cumulative effects of 25 years of Bantu Education, ie of poor buildings, overcrowded classrooms, inadequate equipment, underqualified teachers and in general poor and deteriorating academic standards. With independence, the Bophuthatswana authorities took on the full responsibility for remedying this poor state of affairs; they
committed themselves to replace Bantu Education with a system of better quantity and quality. These educational problems, according to the authorities, were problems of underdevelopment and third world poverty and were no longer to be seen as an integral part of the South African education system.

In contrast, the Buthelezi Commission which deals, inter alia, with the KwaZulu education system, starts from the premises that the KwaZulu system is and always will be part and parcel of the South African educational system. Rejecting the political notion of homeland independence, they argue that the educational problems of KwaZulu are not the product of underdevelopment so much as problems of inequalities which make African children permanently handicapped members of South African society. Since KwaZulu serves the wider integrated South African economy, the Commission argues for a common and unified education system which would provide a base to redress these gross inequalities and allow students to compete more equally on the labour market. Hence, their recommendations for a total overhaul and reorganisation of the whole of the South African education system by using the resources of the whole country.

The Bophuthatswana authorities decided on another course of action because, they say, the existing balance of forces in 'white' South Africa is such that reforms challenging white supremacy and the apartheid system were bound to generate a lot of resistance. Instead, they committed themselves to tinker with the system and introduce whatever educational reforms they could within their own borders with their own limited resources but also with the support and financial backing of South Africa. In fact, it could be argued that Bophuthatswana is becoming a laboratory for South Africa to experiment ways in which to modernise apartheid education and do away with the more disfunctional aspects of the apartheid system.

Education and Manpower Policies

The significance and direction of educational changes in Bophuthatswana can only be fully understood in the light of the political and economic context in which they are situated. The Commission of Enquiry, Education for Popagano, refer to a context of rapid industrialisation and scientific and technological changes. The report concludes on the need of the education system to "produce sufficiently educated and efficiently trained workers .. to meet the challenge of modernisation". In other words, education is seen as a path to modernisation and educational changes as aiming at meeting the manpower needs which this process of
modernisation creates in its wake. This technologically-oriented world contrasts with the fact that Bophuthatswana is a region largely dominated by subsistence farming, limited industrial development and therefore a limited capacity to absorb its own internal labour force. What was the Popagano report referring to except to the fact that Bophuthatswana lies at the periphery of the most powerful and industrial economy of Africa? Bophuthatswana is structurally dependent on the South African central economy and should be seen as an integral part of that economy. At the moment, between 65/70% of its labour force is employed by the central economy either as migrants or as frontier commuters. However, it is also true to say that independence has created in its wake a relatively large number of high positions at professional, managerial and technical level. According to a Benso report on 'Manpower Planning in Bophuthatswana' in 1979 the proportion of internally employed workers in these high and middle level positions (namely, professionals, managers, technical and artisanal workers) amounted to 20% of the total (or 20,800 posts) in contrast with the border areas which do not yet employ a high proportion of qualified African employees; the equivalent proportion was 5% of the total (or 15,000 posts and within these categories of work, 80% belonged to the artisan and supervisory bracket). It is obvious from these statistics that there are more openings in terms of high level positions inside of Bophuthatswana because of the relatively artificial growth of the post-independence period.

In the long term, though, it is difficult to see Bophuthatswana absorb a large number of more educated and qualified manpower partly because of its limited economic development but also because of the competition coming from its powerful industrial neighbour. The central economy is bound to offer wider and more attractive employment opportunities to the more qualified African labour force. Various government agencies (such as the Public Service Commission, Agrico, and Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation) together with teachers of various higher education institutions openly admit to a growing 'brain drain' towards the central economy. Is it the irony of a poor and peripheral region like Bophuthatswana to invest so much money into the education of its inhabitants only to see them leave for 'greener pastures' in 'white' South Africa? or is it the inevitable fate of peripheral regions caught up in the vicious circle of dependency?

This structural labour dependency on the central economy is acknowledged by the Bophuthatswana authorities as an inevitable long term phenomenon. Far from wanting to change this state of affairs, they are determined to benefit from it.
For example, the Popagano Report stresses the need for the education system of Bophuthatswana "to gain acceptance of its standard in Southern Africa and elsewhere so that young people coming out of such a system will not be hampered in their future education or in their future careers". At the moment, all external examinations and therefore syllabuses and certifications fall under the Department of Education and Training of Pretoria with which most teaching institutions in Bophuthatswana have strong links (and yet Bophuthatswana has no representation on the South African Examination Board). At another level, the Manpower authorities of Bophuthatswana, set up in 1983 to identify short term manpower shortages and training priorities, decided to benefit from Bophuthatswana's close proximity to the PWV industrial complex and planned its training programmes at these employers as well as at Bophuthatswana's employers. The thrust of their strategy is to try and upgrade the skills of the commuter section of Bophuthatswana's 'exported' labour force and train them to keep pace with the rapidly changing labour needs of employers. To sum up, many aspects of the reorganisation of education and training in Bophuthatswana seem geared towards the South African central economy. This is partly reflecting the aspirations of those who want to develop Bophuthatswana by drawing the latter more fully into the orbit of the central state.

The problem of such a strategy, directed as it is towards the needs of the central economy, is that it tends to ignore the other more pressing problems of a region like Bophuthatswana which is characterised by large scale unemployment and marginalisation of its labour force, rural underdevelopment and growing social and regional inequalities. It is not centred on the rural needs of the majority of Bophuthatswana's population which lives off subsistence farming and have to supplement their living by migrating to the central economy for wage employment. It is also the reason why the educational reforms as they are formulated and slowly implemented do not seem to address the problems of rural underdevelopment because the development goals themselves are not centred on these problems. The strategy is industrial before being rural and agricultural and therefore the educational changes are expected to deal mainly with technical and industrial labour requirements.

Commuters and the Regional Development Strategy

To understand the future industrial labour requirements as they will affect Bophuthatswana, one needs to present the political and economic context of the 1980s. For a long time now, the central state has tried to control the
the process of African urbanisation in the 'white' areas of South Africa. While accepting this process as an inevitable and necessary feature of industrial South Africa, the central state has tried to act on its pace and channel its direction and growth. In the last two decades in particular, it has relocated a large number of urban Africans to the homeland border areas in an attempt to take the pressure off the 'white' areas and to foster the development of a commuter labour force. The idea was to keep in line with the policy of separate development according to which Africans should live in their own ethnic areas and be only allowed into 'white' South Africa if and when their labour was needed. These Africans, moved from the 'white' areas into these dormitories of labour in the homeland border areas, combine the best of two worlds in that they constitute a stable and permanently urbanised labour force in the homelands (ie with no residential rights nor any legal claim to political rights in 'white' South Africa) able to work in the big 'white' decentralised industrial complexes.

The economic restructuring of the 1980s has involved the revamping of industrial decentralisation. The new regional development strategy, based on close economic cooperation between the central state and the homelands, aims at promoting industrial development insight functionally defined regions which encompass the whole of South Africa and cut across political boundaries. It is regional as opposed to homeland development which is at the centre of this reformulated version of industrial decentralisation. Various alternative growth points were chosen to counterbalance the concentration of economic activity in the four metropolitan centres and were divided into deconcentration points (or points close to existing big industrial centres) and development points (or points further afield). Priority ratings were assigned to each region depending on its development needs and potential. Incentives were graded accordingly and were highest for the development points in the homeland areas and lowest for the deconcentration points in the 'white' areas.

In the past, industrial decentralisation programmes have failed to attract capital to far remote areas with a poor physical and social infrastructure. A limited decentralisation occurred at points closer to existing big industrial complexes to the point of generating a certain base for self-sustaining development in these areas. For example, Rosslyn, started off as a small industrial site on the border areas, is now one of the major sites of the motor industry and no longer a border area but is about to become a fully-fledged city.
Bell has recently highlighted an often neglected factor which contributed to the move by private capital to the decentralised points:\footnote{17}

Given the obstacles to inter-racial substitution within the metropo-
litan regions this largely became translated into a strong incentive, especially in the case of the PWV region, with its almost exclusively White and Black labour force, for existing plants in certain industries to relocate and for new plants to be established in industrial areas outside of the main areas.

Initially a majority of black labour intensive, low skill intensity industries moved to the periphery in order to avoid the labour laws and union organisations of 'white' South Africa so as to benefit from cheaper labour. For the more capital intensive industries, the lack of skilled labour at the periphery was a slight deterrent (among others). Bell doesn't see that as a permanent problem:

Even for these industries, however, there is the immediate advantages of cheaper unskilled and semi-skilled Black labour and the somewhat longer term prospect, aided by the labour training subsidies, of a cheaper supply of labour at higher level of skills. Another major attraction would probably be the weaker state of unions in these areas.

As far as Bophuthatswana is concerned, successful deconcentration points such as Rosslyn, Brits, Rustenburg have been a major source of employment and wage income. For the future the Manpower Department sees it as its task to provide employers with the 'other leg' of the regional development strategy, namely the quantity and quality of suitable labour. The recent Industrial Conciliation Act passed in March this year, by prohibiting the militant black South African-based unions from operating in Bophuthatswana, another illustration of the Bophuthatswana authorities' wish to create favourable conditions for capital investment and decentralisation towards its borders.

In the last section of this paper, we would like to examine to what extent the reorganisation of education and training is geared towards the labour requirements of the regional development strategy and therefore towards the commuting labour force. Also, we will investigate to what extent and how these educational changes differ from similar tendencies emerging within the South African black education system.

\textbf{Developments in Education and Training in Bophuthatswana}

Because we are dealing with the contemporary situation, it will be difficult to present hard facts and significant trends in educational developments in Bophuthatswana since independence. Instead we will try and identify the overall direction of changes and the forces motivating these changes. Educational policies
have been newly formulated in Bophuthatswana; it is only 6 years ago that the 'Education for Popagano' report was published; the report's recommendations have formed an educational blueprint; some are getting implemented, others have been reformulated and others are in the pipeline but on the whole the education situation is still fluid and subject to changes.

We are basing our analysis on information collected over six months' fieldwork, interviewing government officials, teaching staff, students and training officers, both in Bophuthatswana and in 'white' South Africa. The common theme emerging from these interviews is that Bophuthatswana has the commitment, money and relative freedom to bring about changes and reforms in its system of education and training. However, although the intention was obviously there for everyone to hear, the concrete details and operationalisation of such a strategy were still vague and in the planning stage. The object of this section is to assess the major post-independence educational achievements of Bophuthatswana and to understand their significance in terms of the South African context.

There has been a rapid expansion in secondary schooling. From a secondary school population of 15,761 students in 35 schools in 1977, the number has risen to 40,562 in 73 schools by 1982. However, this quantitative expansion had a price to pay in terms of the quality and academic performance of the schools. Whereas in 1977, the number of Senior Certificate pupils was 1,531 and the pass rate was 63% and the matric exemption 25%, by 1981 the number of students reached 6,402 and the pass and matric rate fell respectively to 54% and 14%.

These educational provisions were unequally distributed and tended to reflect the regional and local bias of Bophuthatswana's uneven economic development. Far from redressing these inequalities, the educational changes since independence seem to have reinforced them. A better quantity and quality of education is developing in these areas marked for development and in areas close to 'white' industrial centres. More specifically, efforts are concentrated on the Mafikeng area and on the southern regions of Odi/Moretele which lies at the north of the Pretoria, Rosslyn and Brits area. In Odi Moretele where more than 40% of the de facto population of Bophuthatswana lives in 1980 there were 11 high schools with 30% of the high school population in 1977 whereas by 1982 the number of high schools rose to 30 with 46% of the high school population. In contrast, in the rural region of Ganyesa and Thlaping Thlaro, there were 3 high schools with 5% of the high school population in 1977 whereas by 1982 the same number of high schools provided for 3% of the total high school
Another important factor to take into account when looking at the changes in education is that the financial system is different in the urban areas and in the rural areas. Whereas with the former the educational levy is paid directly to the government who is in charge of their educational provisions and facilities, in the rural areas it is the chiefs who collect the levy and decide how many and what kind of schools to build, the government following the chiefs' decision by providing certain subsidies. In other words, conservative tribal authorities may become an obstacle in improving the quantity and quality of schooling in the rural areas whereas in the urban areas the Bophuthatswana authorities are directly involved in centralising and coordinating educational provisions.

Turning to the academic standards of the different regions and looking at the pass and matric rates, there did not seem to be a marked difference per region at the time of independence. Certain schools were known to be of higher standards (in particular the missionary schools). By 1982, there seems to develop a new pattern with schools from the more developed circuits like Moretele, Thabane, Thaba Nchu and Molopo (see enclosed map) rating better than the average (the old missionary schools being the exception), suggesting an improvement in the quality of schooling in these areas. School teachers interviewed in some of these better circuits believe that the majority of their school-leavers go to look for work in 'white' South Africa because of the wider and more attractive employment opportunities which these areas of Bophuthatswana can not hope to compete with. There are also the students who originate from these 'white' urban areas who, on completion of their schooling, return to their families. In fact, in the Odi Moretele region north of Pretoria, government officials complain about these "alien people" (namely non-Tswana citizens around the Winterveld (squatter area) who benefit from Bophuthatswana's educational provisions without contributing in any way to the government's expenses. But what is also in need to be stressed is that many Tswana educated school-leavers leave Bophuthatswana to look for 'greener pastures' in 'white' South Africa. There will most probably be an increase in the future of this 'brain drain' which could make Bophuthatswana into a place which will increasingly supply the central economy with more educated workers. But to argue that the quality of labour exchanged between Bophuthatswana and the central economy will change in the future is not to say that the main role of Bophuthatswana as a convenient dumping ground and reservoir of cheap labour has fundamentally changed.
There are plans to improve technical education. The Curriculum and Examinations Council has recommended the introduction of practical technical subjects at middle school level and the upgrading of maths and sciences as the two foundation subjects for further technical education. More technical high schools are about to be built (the only one being in Thlabane) and an emphasis has been laid on the import of overseas technical teachers to upgrade the general standard of technically-oriented education. At the level of technical and artisanal training, there are plans to revamp the old technical institutes (in particular the Temba Institute near Hammanskraal, the Setlogelo Technikon in GaRankuwa and the Boitsenape college in Mafikeng). At the moment the teaching staff of the first two believes their students to look for work in 'white' South Africa and in particular for the border industries of Rosslyn, Brits and Pretoria although they, as institutions, have very little direct contact with these employers.

Apart from having erected a new technical institute in Baiteredi near Kuruman, the Manpower Authorities of Bophuthatswana are directing their energy at a new form of institutionalised technical training. The idea is to launch a new Manpower Development Centre (which is about to open in Mmabatho in April) to conduct a new form of modular skill training which will allow more flexibility in keeping pace with the rapidly changing labour needs of employers. The emphasis is on technical trades such as boilermaking, welding, sheetmetalworking as well as electrical and mechanical trades and a few commercial and catering trades. Whether this new form of modular skill training will be successful depends on its ability to remain in close cooperation with the employers and to deliver the goods. In spirit, it is bound to tempt the employers in that it is designed to respond to their changing skill needs and to replace the much more expensive, out of date old apprenticeship training. Not much resistance is expected from artisan unions and the Manpower Department is determined to institutionalise and monitor the new training scheme before the unions can intervene. Asked if such modular skill training would undermine the position of artisans, an official from the Manpower Department replied: (this system) will not displace artisans but supplement them instead, allowing the artisans to tend to more productive and sophisticated tasks while properly trained assistants can carry out the elementary routine tasks.

In fact, such a modular approach is also in the pipeline in 'white' South Africa but strong opposition is expected to come from artisan unions.

A problem raised by employers of the border industries near Pretoria is the choice of location of this new Manpower Development Centre in Mmabatho. Doubting that the same amount of money will be spent on the existing technical institutes of
their area, they have shown some reluctance in releasing their workers to a Centre so far away from their location. Also, some big employers have started to introduce their own modular training courses and the location of the Manpower Centre at Mmabatho might be the last straw to decide to concentrate only on inservice in-house training. The other potential market for the students of this Manpower Centre is the Bophuthatswana's public sector but there again the needs are limited and bound to get saturated relatively shortly. Thus, one can expect this Centre to encounter some problems in its operationalisation stage although the Manpower officials are advocating flexibility and the need to reassess constantly. At the moment, though, the target for a big expensive venture such as this Centre seems unusually vague and undefined.

On the content of this modular training approach, little can be said at this early stage. The Manpower authorities appear very neutral and technicist in their approach; they see training as an improvement of workers' productivity "for their own good as well as the good of the employers". Each module is designed in such a way as to impart specific skills within specific trades. Hence, the possibility to train workers in parts of the trade-as well as in the whole trade depending on the needs of employers. One thing remains obvious is that this modular skill training is designed to produce what employers require both technically and ideologically.

Finally, let us have a quick look at tertiary institutions in Bophuthatswana. Bophuthatswana inherited 4 teacher training colleges known for their poor facilities, poorly qualified staff and bureaucratic management. Since then, 2 new colleges have been built, one near Taung and one in Makapanstad in Moretele. The Bophuthatswana authorities are very committed to upgrade both inservice and pre-service teacher education so as to remedy to the serious lack of qualified teachers which has been made worse by the recent rapid expansion of secondary schooling. An Institute of Education has been set up at the University to coordinate and upgrade teacher education in Bophuthatswana. Its brief includes the granting of certificates and the redrafting of their curricula and syllabi so as to break away from their present reliance on material from the Department of Education and Training in Pretoria. The Institute also plans to level off primary teacher education with secondary teacher education both at the level of the courses and the salary structure so as to retain the good elements in the primary stream as well.

On the whole, the commitment, initiative and money is there but the Institute will encounter serious problems in the implementation of its plans, not the least the inherent bureaucracy of teaching institutions-the still powerful Afrikaner
staff seconded and paid by Pretoria.

A drain of qualified teachers to 'white' South Africa is not expected to occur on a significant scale in the near future as there are plenty of work opportunities in Bophuthatswana and the salary structure is not that different from South Africa's. One can expect a concentration of more qualified teachers in the more developed areas of Bophuthatswana and, because of the University site in Mmabatho and the possibility for teachers to do part-time studies if they live in that area, better teachers are likely to be found in the Mafikeng/Mmabatho area.

The University of Bophuthatswana (UNIBO) is the other tertiary institution established since independence. It was set up on a professional model to produce the high level manpower needed to assist in the development and modernisation of Bophuthatswana; it trains future managers, lawyers, teachers, nurses, community workers and agricultural officers. Yet, the capacity of Bophuthatswana to absorb a large number of highly educated professionals and compete with 'white' South Africa in terms of attractive employment opportunities is limited. As a result, a drain of graduates is expected to occur on an increasingly large scale as the University expands. Most students sponsored or on loans from companies are known to repay their loans by serving four years in their donor companies and the leave for 'white' South Africa. In fact, with time one can expect Unibo to gain more credibility as a black-dominated university and to attract an increasingly large number of African undergraduates from other parts of South Africa. Here again the question presents itself of the extent to which Bophuthatswana is going to end up subsidising the higher education of students who will go back to 'white' South Africa for better work opportunities.

Conclusion

We hope to have shown that there is some attempt at reorganising education and training in Bophuthatswana. Although some of the changes are unique to Bophuthatswana, it is also important to see that most of them run parallel to similar changes being planned in 'white' South Africa. The latter might have a greater capacity to set this process of reform in motion but it will also encounter greater obstacles in its implementation. We also noted that many of the changes planned in Bophuthatswana are geared towards the central economy and therefore should be seen as an integral part of the restructuring going on in South Africa.
In the final analysis, it is the path of industrial development chosen by those in power in Bophuthatswana which fixes the limits within which educational reforms can take place. The Bophuthatswana authorities appear keen to respond in their own real and limited way to the changing nature of the central monopolist economy. As such, the pragmatist aspirations of those who want to develop Bophuthatswana make them draw the latter more fully into the orbit of the most powerful industrial state in Africa.

Finally, the changes planned in the sphere of education and training are part of a wider strategy which aims at coopting a section of the African population. This process is intended both at the 'white' urban areas of South Africa and at the homeland areas. The idea in reforming aspects of education and training is precisely to contribute to this process of cooption and further class differentiation among the African population. At this early stage of reorganisation of education and training, it is difficult to gauge its chance of success but it might also be a question of time and need to experiment; in that respect, the non-racial constitution and non-discriminatory policies of Bophuthatswana might provide a good training ground to experiment in how to depart gradually from the rigid aspects of apartheid education at a time the political and economic circumstances demand changes.
Footnotes

An earlier version of this paper entitled "Education and Training in Bophuthatswana: a separate development?" was presented at the Kenton-at-the-stadt Education Conference, Mafikeng, October 1983

2. Kallaway P: An Introduction to the Study of Black Education - paper presented to the Education Seminar of the University of the Witwatersrand, May 1982, p 26
4. statistics compiled from various South African Institute of Race Relations Annual Survey, 1977 and 1982; also Education and Manpower Production (Blacks), 1982, No.3 University of the Orange Free State
5. The de Lange Report of the Technical and Vocational Education Sub-committee, HSRC Investigation into Education, July 1981, Pretoria, p 95
7. see article of J. Mare: Dimensions and Causes of Unemployment and Underemployment in South Africa, South Africa Labour Bulletin, Vol 4 No 4 p 23
10. compiled from SAIRR annual survey, op.cit.
11. quoted in Unpopular Education: Schooling and Social Democracy in England since 1944 Centre of Contemporary Cultural Studies, Hutchinson, London 1981 p 151
12. Interviews carried out with employers from the Pretoria/Brits area, February 1984
13. Chisolm, op.cit. p 369
15. de Klerk D. and Mastoroudes C: Manpower Planning for Bophuthatswana - Benso R14/82, Pretoria 1982
16. Education for Popagano, op.cit. p 27
17. The Growth and Structure of Manufacturing Employment in Natal by RT Bell-
19. One should add that the region of Odi-Moretele and in particular its southern parts are the site for some social tension and chaos as an increasing number of squatters tends to concentrate in these areas which are situated at close proximity of the PWV industrial complex. Hence, the gross underestimation of the official population figures and the Government's awareness of the political sensitivity of this area as well as the need to monitor and regain control over that area.


22. For an interesting critical analysis of the Popagano Report, see R;Jaff: Education for Papogano, Perspectives in Education, Vol.5 No.1, March 1981 University of the Witwatersrand

23. Interview with officials of the Department of Manpower, August 1983

24. from interviews with members of the Public Service Commission, Agricor and the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation (BNDC), August 1983.